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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Part One we concluded that administrative guidance as to 
capitalization versus expensing in the form of ''rough justice" regulations 
was in order. Part Two primarily addresses the best form such regulations 
should take. First order options are (a) general standards or (b) detailed 
rules, or both; or (c), numerous factual examples with bottom line 
conclusions, or a combination of all. Section II considers these options. 
A "standard'' consists of a general principle or policy of the particular body 
of substantive law. 1 In the instant context of capitalization versus current 
deduction, this article argues that the standard is minimum distortion of 
income from the timing or character of deductions. 2 Under jurisprudential 
theory, a standard's inherent functional approach requires the decision maker 
to determine whether the facts of the particular transaction merit the desired 
treatment. 3 A "rule" in contrast is definitional and ideally capable of 
generating precise and predictable answers. 4 The justly-discredited no 
"separate saleable asset" doctrine and the arguably more correct not more 
than 1-year benefit constitute capitalization rules of thumb. Tax lawyers 
should recognize the standard-rule dichotomy as the familiar substance and 
form debate in another guise; common lawyers, as the equity versus law 
tension. Professor Daniel Shaviro uses the compelling illustration of a 
stated speed limit as a rule and an admonition to drive not unreasonably fast 
in light of all the circumstances as a standard. 5 
I. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 
1685, 1688 (1976); James W. Colliton, Standards, Rules and the Decline of the Courts in the Law of 
Taxation, 99 DICK. L. REv. 265 (1995); John W. Lee, The Art of Regulation Drafting: Structured 
Discretionary Justice Under Section 355, 44 TAX NOTES I 029, I 030 (Aug. 28, 1989) [hereinafter Lee, 
Structured Discretionary Justice]. 
2. Alan Gunn, The Requirement That a Capital Expenditure Create or Enhance an Asset, 15 
B. C. INDUS. & COMMERCIAL L. REv. 443, 452-57 (1974); John W. Lee & Nina R. Murphy, Capital 
Expenditures: A Result in Search of a Rationale, 15 U. RICH. L. REV. 473, 509, 541-43 (1981) 
[hereinafter Lee & Murphy, Capital Expenditures]; John W. Lee, Start Up Costs, Section 195, and Clear 
Reflection of Income: A Tale of Talismans, Tacked-On Tax Reform, and a Touch of Basics, 6 VA. TAX 
REv. I, 24-28 (1986) [hereinafter Lee, Clear Reflection of Income]; John Lee, Doping Out the 
Capitalization Rules After INDOPCO, 57 TAX NOTES 669, 670, 679-80 (Nov. 2, 1992) [hereinafter Lee, 
Capitalization]; Hearings on Miscellaneous Revenue Issues before the House Ways and Means 
Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures (Part 2), 103rd Cong. 1687, 1705-07 (1993) (prepared 
stalement of Professor Lee) [hereinafter Lee, 1993 Hearings]. 
3. Kennedy, supra nole I, at 1688; Charles S. Whitman, III, Draining the Serbonian Bog: A 
New Approach to Corporate Separations under the 1954 Code, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1194, 1253-55 (1968). 
4. Kennedy, supra nole I, at 1687-88. 
5. Daniel Shaviro, Compliance and Enforcement under the Passive Lass Limitations, 4 TAX 
MGMT REAL EsT. J. 107 (May 1988); accord Lee A. Sheppard, Kohl Discusses Forthcoming Guidance, 
Anti-Abuse Rules, 73 TAX NOTES 399 (Oct. 28, 1996) [hereinafter Forthcoming Guidance]: 
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The second order options are as to the form of rough justice rules for 
current deduction or capitalization and depreciation over safe harbor 
standard periods discussed in Sections ill and IV. This article maintains 
that in some capitalization areas the doctrine and policy have evolved far 
beyond simple case-by-case rules and any regulation should reflect that. 
Thus, as elaborated in Section ill below, proposed regulations should not 
only state the general principle of minimum distortion of income from 
timing but also should contain rules such as (1) a presumption of 
capitalization where an expenditure provides future benefits, with (2) 
exceptions for average lives of not more than 12 months, de minimis and 
regularly recurring expenditures and where depreciation is impractical.6 
Similarly Section IV calls for capitalization and amortization over uniform 
periods of substantial, irregularly recurring expenditures. The regulations 
should state in the context of timing distortions the clear reflection 
(minimum distortion) of income standard, these rules and specific problem 
areas such as (1) business expansion costs, (2) advertising, (3) employee 
training costs (including just-in-time retraining), (4) repairs including 
cyclical overhauls, (5) pollution clean up expenses, and (6) writers 
prepublication costs should be addressed through examples based upon 
judicial precedents and the Service's ruling experience.7 
Another fundamental capitalization principle mandates capitalization 
where necessary to avoid a character mismatch between a current ordinary 
/d. 
During the Clinton administration, Treasury has continued the previous administration's 
practice of writing broad general rules that are adaptable to the circumstances. Kohl 
compared those rules to the Montana practice of telling people to drive at a speed that is 
reasonable for the circumstances, rather than setting a specific and inflexible speed limit that 
may not be appropriate for all circumstances. Anti-abuse rules, he argued, are intended to 
address the tax law equivalent of reckless driving. 
6. Structured discretionary justice regulations should set forth the factors that are to be applied, 
for example, in determining (I) de minimis and (2) how infrequently recurring and how much variation 
from average annual costs is permitted under a recurring exception. 
7. At the time of Professor Lee's 1993 testimony recommending that Congress authorize 
legislative regulations as to capitalization with the Service first developing a body of ruling experience 
which it would then distill into legislative regulations, he had not yet investigated the body of Service 
non-published rulings which provide both the necessary factual experience and legal reasoning supporting 
many of the rules proposed in our Submission and this article. At the time of the Submission Professor 
Lee anticipated that the final version of this article would apply the model to the areas mentioned in text 
as well as other areas. That turned out to be too many stories for one article to carry. Professor Lee 
will participate in a discussion on capitalization at the Virginia Tax Study Group Seminar in March 1997 
and to give a speech in June at the 49th Annual Virginia Federal Tax Conference at Charlottesville, 
Virginia that will attempt that project In the meantime good discussions of the areas are presented by 
Glenn Carrington, Capitalization after INDOPCO, 2 N.Y.U. 53RD lNST. ON FED. TAX. Ch. 25 (1995); 
Peter Faber, INDOPCO: The Still Unsolved Riddle, 47 TAX LAw. 607 (1994). 
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deduction and related tax preferenced income. The precedents and rulings 
there are less developed than the timing authorities. 8 This article proposes 
that minimum distortion of income as to character at this time be addressed 
primarily through examples in the regulations applying the "origin of the 
claim" doctrine, particularly as to merger issues. The Solicitor General's 
Office attempted in argument and on Brief to make that argument to the 
Court in INDOPC0,9 but the Court, perhaps understandably, 10 appears to 
have been fixated on the future benefit rationale. This article argues that 
this does not mean that INDOPCO precludes adoption of a character 
distortion rationale for denying a current deduction to a (hostile) takeover 
or any other merger. Rather, it means that the argument once received 
favorable policy review at a high level of tax administration and thus any 
future administrative development should very seriously consider it. 11 
II. GENERAL VERSUS DETAILED GUIDANCE 
The core issue of general standard (or principle) and detailed rule of 
application have been much written about issues in recent years in general, 
and increasingly in Federal taxation, although often not couched in those 
terms. The exception is academic scholarship where "there is a substantial 
body of scholarship that deals with the rules of standards and rules in the 
law.''12 One strand of the debate centers on the choice of general versus 
specific tax statutes or regulations. Tax theorists, perhaps most notably 
Harvard Professors Stanley Surrey and Ernest Brown three and four decades 
8. See generally Lee & Murphy, Capital Expenditures, supra note 2, at 509-27. 
9. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, at 34-38, INDOPCO, Inc. v. 
Commissioners, 503 U.S. 79 (1992) (No. 90-1278}, available in WESTLAW, SCT-ORALARG .. 
I 0. Kent Jones at times seemed to merge and thus obscure the doctrines. Additionally Justice 
Blackrnun was the author of the leading cases adopting the future benefit rationale and capital transaction 
for capital expenditures, Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. I, 16 (1973) (Blackrnun, J.); 
Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345 (1971) (Biackrnun, J.) respectively, 
which naturally Kent Jones played to. 
11. Professor Lee must once again acknowledge a "vested interest'' here. The Solicitor General's 
Brief and Assistant Jones' argument were solidly grounded on Professor Bittker & Lokken's income tax 
treatise as well as Professor Bittker & Eustice's corporate tax treatise. Professor Lee is most proud of 
his collaboration with Professor Bittker on the former and of some of his capitalization work having 
made Professor Jim Eustice's long and short lists. (Perusal of Lee's work here will show how much he 
followed in their footsteps.) 
12. See Colli ton, supra note I, at n.l, and the "substantial body of scholarship" the author lists. 
In addition to his list see Lee, Structured Discretionary Justice, supra note 1, at I 030-32 (sketches rules 
and standard scholarship of Professor Duncan Kennedy and structured discretionary justice thinking of 
Professor Davis and applies to the noteworthy evolution of the Section 355 regulations in a "collaborative 
model"). My colleagues Professors Charles Koch and Alan Gunn had read them the first time. Thanks 
again for turning me on to them, guys. 
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ago, have long debated the advantages of generalized tax statutes, that is, 
standards, versus detailed, rule-oriented tax statutes. 13 Currently the Janus-
like faces of "check-the-box" (formalism is almost dead) and anti-abuse 
authority of the Commissioner to disregard the form say of partnership tax 
shenanigans if they are abusive best brings out the general standard versus 
detailed rules issues as seen by the Treasury/IRS and practitioners. As 
discussed in Part One, the notion of "rough justice" versus detailed, 
unadministrable exact justice also is related to this debate. In the real world 
~ question going to the heart of tax administration is the role of the revenue 
agent's discretion. The theme of Professor Lee's 1993 testimony before 
House Ways and Means Subcommittee Chair Charles Rangel, D-N.Y., and 
in our Submission in 1996 pursuant to the Internal Revenue Service's 
request for comments on INDOPCO has been that only structured 
administrative justice can cure the malaise at that level. Strong evidence 
that the Chief Counsel's Office is pursuing a deliberate policy here of 
obfuscating its true policy, to "advise" by litigation not regulation arose far 
too late to put in Part One or even this Part, if truth be told. Our editors 
and in particular Brett Woodburn have been far more than understanding 
and helpful. The emerging contours of that story are sketched in the 
Conclusion to this Article. 
A. The Literature on General and Detailed Regu/ation14 
Tax theoreticians, including Harvard's Professors Ernest Brown and 
Stanley Surrey, have long debated the advantages of generalized tax 
standards versus detailed rules!5 Writing under Professor Brown's 
tutelage, Charles Whitman, in a seminal article on corporate divisions, called 
for a focus on the underlying policy (device) and a lessening of the role of 
13. ERNEST ]. BROWN, 861lf CONG., 1ST SESS., AN APPROACH TO SUBCHAPTER C, 3 TAX 
REVISION COMPENDIUM, HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 1619, 1619-20 (Conun. Print 1959) 
(detailed tax statutes lead to deficiencies and anomalies appearing which requires even more intricate 
elaborations of pattern; fundamental source is an attempt to eliminate the necessity for responsible 
administration); accord Colli ton, supra note I. Contrast Stanley S. Surrey, Complexity and the Internal 
Revenue Code: The Problem of the Management of Tax Detail, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 673, 
695-702-10 (1969) (debate between generalized and particularized tax statutes; concludes ideal is 
generalized statute with detailed regulations). Interestingly, the Tax Reform Act of 1969, which was 
Surrey's brainchild, rarely took this tack (Section 385, which came from the forehead of Assistant 
Secretary Ed Cohen, constitutes a conspicuous exception). See John W. Lee, Entity Classification and 
Integration: Publicly Traded Partnerships. Personal Service Corporations, and the Tax Legislative 
Process, 8 VA. TAX REv. 57, 132 n.346 (1988) [hereinafter Lee, Entity Classification). 
14. This section of the Article is largely derived from Lee, Structured Discretionary Justice, 
supra note I. 
15. See supra note 13. 
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the additional mechanical statutory detail arising from the active business 
test. 16 How pleased he must have been to see the Service follow his 
advice. 17 Many tax commentators in the past followed the Surrey school 
of a general tax statute implemented and amplified through indisputably 
detailed Treasury regulations. The greater flexibility of administratively 
amending regulations in light of developing administrative and judicial 
experience under the statute carried the day. This is a part of the 
incremental "Muddling Through" notion discussed in Part One. 
Under the Surrey approach, the role of courts in resolving the 
substance and form dichotomy in tax law is thought lessened. Conventional 
jurisprudential wisdom holds that the advantages of rules are (1) the restraint 
of arbitrariness by the decision maker and (2) the attainment of certainty or 
predictability. 18 A cost generally is the lack of precision in rules alone in 
carrying out the underlying policy objectives, which standards more readily 
effect. 19 Standards often further differ from rules in the former's greater 
generality in an attempt to deal with as many different potential fact patterns 
as practicable. According to jurisprudential thinking such generality 
16. Whitman, supra note 3, at 1252-57. 
17. Professor Lee showed how the First Circuit in Rafferty v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d 767 (1st 
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 922 (1972), in addition to explicitly adopting (a) this reversal of device 
(more standard oriented) and active business rules as the first tier defense of the policy of Section 355, 
and (b) reorientation of device as well to focus on the standard of worthy of deferral, went out of its way 
(i.e., extreme dictum hypotheticals in footnotes) to salute the host of active business issues raised by 
Whitman. See John W. Lee, Functional Divisions and Other Corporate Separations Under Section 355 
After Rafferty, 27 TAX L. REv. 453 (1972) [hereinafter Lee, Functional Divisions]. The Service agreed 
with his reading of Rafferty and the soundness of Whitman's advice. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,069 p. 14 
(Nov. 5, 1974). The 1989 revised regulations made that shift abundantly clear. That was the easy part. 
(Professor Peter Weidenbruch, shortly thereafter to serve as Assistant Commissioner Technical [in charge 
of rulings], had walked all of us Georgetown night LLM students through the old Section 355 regulations 
on active business in class, in problems, and on the exam as best Lee now recalls, and had given us a 
syllabus with the leading cases and commentators. The latter can be found in Lee, Functional Divisians). 
Lee was worried in initially planning the article about the device portion because Whitman, and hence 
the First Circuit, had not provided the same guidelines. Researching and writing the active business 
portion laid his fears to rest. Boris Bittker and Jim Eustice had already thought deeply about the 
questions raised by a device potential approach. Lee applied their analysis of bailout potential. The pro 
and con device factor approach of the revised regulations in general and the related function test in 
particular can be traced back to earlier editions of their corporate tax treatise. Both Jim and Boris must 
be proud of this too. For just a taste of the awe all feel for them, search "Bittker w/5 Eustice" in the 
LEXIS, Fedtax; memos file. Then search the casrel file to pick up the cases and other private rulings. 
Do the same with Bittker's Treatise. Awesome. 
18. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1688-89; but cj Frank V. Battle, Jr., The Appropriateness of Anti-
Abuse Rules in the U.S. Income Tax System, 48 TAX LAW. 801, 803, 805 (1995) (arguing that where 
rules are minutely detailed, anti-abuse rules become meaningless) (The Gregory story suggests this is 
overstated.) 
19. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1689. 
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increases the number of occasions of lawmaking by the decision maker, as 
contrasted with the legislative occasions.20 "The difference between the 
two approaches ... [is] the difference between ex ante and ex post decision 
making: When a law is drafted as a rule, it is known in advance whether 
particular transactions or acts fall within or without the law. Laws setting 
out only broad standards create less certainty. It is up to some decision 
maker- usually, a court or administrative body- to determine whether 
a transaction or act satisfies the standard."21 The debate over standards or 
general principles versus rules lies at the heart of the recently re-emerging 
anti-abuse rule school of bold Treasury regulation drafting versus the earlier 
drafting approaches of detailed statutes implemented by even more detailed 
legislative regulations.22 Conversely, jurisprudence scholarship views 
detailed legislation as generally decreasing the decision maker's 
discretion.23 This notion may be accurate as to judges laboring in the tax 
field who follow the rules, but not so much as to courts that fashion new 
standards to overcome the inequitable rules as witnessed, for instance, by the 
cases forging ways around the no deduction of start-up costs rule.24 
Professor Duncan Kennedy holds that rules and standards tend to shade 
into each other. For instance, a standard may be implemented by a number 
of per se rules, either in the statute or accompanying regulations or case-law 
adjudication. Conversely, such wisdom holds that decisionmakers may 
create so many exceptions to a rule (or often legal fictions in the case of 
courts), in order to avoid injustice in penumbral cases, that the rule becomes 
like a standard in effect. 25 
B. Service's Regulatory Philosophy 
Starting with the Bush Administration's rough justice campaign 
discussed in Part One of this Article and continuing under the Clinton 
Administration, the government's approach to regulation of tax laws has 
been (1) to promulgate simpler regulations with fewer bright-line rules and 
20. /d. 
21. Laura Cunningham, Use and Abuse of Section 704(c}, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 93, 124 (1996) 
(footnotes omitted); Kenneth W. Gideon, Use, Abuse, and Anti-Abuse: Policy Considerations Affecting 
the Nature of Regulatory Guidance, 73 TAXES 637, 639 (1995). 
22. See infra Part II.C. 
23. Kennedy, supra note I, at 1690. See Gregory v. Commissioner, 21 B.T.A. 223,225 (1932), 
rev'd, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), affd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) ("A statute so meticulously drafted must 
be interpreted as a literal expression of taxing policy, and leaves only the small interstices for judicial 
consideration"). The Second Circuit formulated the opposing force to literalism of a broad, free-standing 
judicial standard - business purpose. See infra Part II.C. 
24. See Lee, Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 2, at 5-6, 51-52, 56-58. 
25. Kennedy, supra note I, at 1700-01. 
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often backed up by broad anti-abuse standards, and (2) to prefer less 
authoritative published revenue rulings, revenue procedures, private letter 
rulings including technical advice memoranda. 26 
How detailed the rules should be, how many transactions they should 
aim to encompass, "is a resource allocation issue," said [Deputy Tax 
Legislative Counsel Michael] Thomson. He applies a mental equation to 
arrive at a "global pjcture of the tax system" by gauging how much a 
benefit a project will produce using a limited amount of resources. 
Treasury's view is to get guidance out as quickly as possible, 
Thomson said. "To wait until we've gotten every answer to every situation 
would take too long," he said. "We have to stop short, but the question is 
how short?'' 
Reg writing begins with articulating the principles in the statute, and 
then fleshing those principles out as they apply to factual situations, 
Thomson explained. In recent years, Treasury and the IRS have favored 
the use of "purpose-based backstop" rules, known as anti-abuse rules. All 
statutes should be read in light of the general principles, Dunn and 
Thomson stressed. 
No matter how a rule is written, no one should be able to apply the 
rule literally in all cases; Dunn and Thomson agreed. Each application has 
to be informed by congressional intent and context, Thomson said. "We 
ultimately rely on the good judgment of taxpayers and practitioners.'m 
The leading industry voice on the current capitalization versus 
expensing issues, Tax Executives Institute, scored the Treasury for issuing 
"only limited published guidance on the proper treatment of certain 
expendit'Jres as ordinary or capital in nature (thereby affecting their current 
deductibility) and hence spawned considerable audit activity as field agents 
have sought to capitalize expenses that have long been treated as currently 
deductible. "28 It also objected to "the IRS's aggressive expansion of the 
amorphous concept of 'clear reflection of income' to override longstanding 
taxpayer positions" and to "adoption of vague and sometimes torturous 
26. How Regulations Are Made: A Look at the Reg Writing Process, 74 TAX NOTES 544, 549 
(Feb. 3, 1997) [hereinafter Reg Writing Process]; Sheldon I. Banoff, Anatomy of An Antiabuse Rule: 
What's Really Wrong with Reg. Section 1.701-2, 66 TAX NOTES 1859 (1995) ("current government 
mindset with respect to regulations is to promulgate shorter, simpler regulations containing fewer 'bright 
lines' accompanied by antiabuse rules") [hereinafter Anatomy]; Pamela Olson, Some Thoughts on Anti-
Abuse Rules, 48 TAX LAW. 817, 822 (1995); Sheldon I. Banoff, The Use and Misuse of Anti-Abuse 
Rules, 48 TAX LAW. 827, 829-30 (1995) [hereinafter Use and Misuse]. 
27. Reg Writing Process, supra note 26, at 549. 
28. Statement of James R. Mu"ay, Tax Director, Pacificorp on behalf ofT ax Executives Institute, 
Inc. before National Commission on Restructuring the Internal Revenue Service (Nov. 8, 1996), available 
in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 220-60 (Nov. 12, 1996). 
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'anti-abuse' rules that are engrafted on various sets of substantive 
regulations . . . . "29 
Insight into recent IRS and Treasury thinking as to options regarding 
regulation of capitalization versus expensing may be gleaned from officials 
publicly discussing environmental clean up costs guidance. "At issue, 
according to [Treasury accounting specialist] Kilinskis, is the form the 
guidance should take - whether rulings, regulations, or legislation - and 
what position the government ought to adopt with respect to cleanup costs 
- whether deductible in all cases, capitalizable with no recovery, or 
capitalize it with some sort of recovery."30 Then Assistant Chief Counsel 
Income and Accounting Issues Glenn Carrington discussed similar regulatory 
options apparently as to self-created intangibles in general: 
First, IRS is considering whether to tailor revenue rulings to particular 
taxpayer fact patterns, according to Carrington. 
"Some would argue that maybe we should take the typical examples 
and publish revenue rulings addressing them, saying, 'If you fall within the 
four comers of these particular facts, the answer is x, y, z or whatever,"' 
he said. 
A second option would be to publish an analysis similar to that for 
package design, under which taxpayers would capitalize the costs and write 
them off over a period of five years or 10 years, Carrington said. 
However, IRS is concerned that many taxpayers would not buy into 
that system, he said. "It may help people in the very gray area and other 
people would continue to do what they're doing and it won't be useful," 
he said. 
Asked whether IRS believes it has regulatory authority to "arbitrarily" 
require capitalization over a fixed period, such as five years or 1 0 years, 
Carrington responded, "It would be arbitrary, but we've done arbitrary-
reasonably arbitrary- things in the past." · 
Third, IRS is exploring the adoption of the presumption that taxpayers 
would capitalize the expenditures if they already would capitalize them 
under the rules under generally accepted accounting principles, according 
to Carrington. 
29. /d. 
[Responsibility for the ·heavy burden that the tax system imposes lies in part] with efforts to 
apply the current tax law - which was developed to deal with a manufacturing-based ("bricks 
and mortar") economy -- to one that turns on services, information, and other intangibles. 
In many respects, the ''round peg" of the Internal Revenue Code is being forced into the 
"square hole" of an ever-changing international marketplace, and the result has been 
uncertainty -- and mind-numbing complexity. 
30. Treasury Official sees Environmental Clean-up Guidance this Year as Wa"anted, 1993 
DAILY TAX REP. 88 d23 (May 10, 1993). 
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"We hear that agents are raising Indopco and long term benefit and 
really causing problems out there and maybe we should look and see what 
you're doing and if you're saying it's capitalized and you're following the 
GAAP rules maybe that's what we should use. Maybe that's good bright 
line test," he said. 
Carrington acknowledged that normally the GAAP rules do not 
control for purposes of the tax code, but that IRS would be looking at 
those rules to see whether they "are somewhat in line with what we think 
the law is."31 
C. The Rest of the Gregory v. Helvering Story: The Stage for 
Discussion 
There are an amazing· number of tax stories as to general standard 
versus detailed rule, far too many to tell in this Article. Nearly all are 
illustrated in the rest of the story of Gregory v. Helvering.32 The story 
starts over a decade before the actual litigation with Dr. T.S. Adams and 
Mr. A.W. Gregg, special Treasury tax advisers. Dr. Adams was the famous 
Treasury expert who to this day is known as the father3 of the much 
studied34 Revenue Act of 1921, which began the alphabet soup of 
31. IRS Environmental Cleanup Guidance May Be Out by July, Official Says, 1993 DAILY TAX 
REP. 89 d 15 (May 11, 1993). Robert Kilinskis, a tax specialist in Treasury's Office of Tax Legislative 
Counsel, suggested that many taxpayers would not like the results of applying GAAP to determine 
capitalization. Juliann Avakian-Martin, Environmental Cleanup Costs Addressed at Two ABA Tax 
Section Meetings, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 93 TAX NOTES TODAY 165-67 (Aug. 
9, 1993). Carrington apparently was thinking of the package design safeharbor discussed in Part One. 
The three-year front loaded depreciation of writer's prepublication costs serves as an even better example 
of a ''reasonably arbitrary" rule. 
32. 293 u.s. 465 (1935). 
33. United States v. Rogers, 122 F.2d 485, 490-91 (9th Cir. 194l)(Haney, J., dissenting) 
("appellant concedes was 'the Treasury expert' and the 'father' of the 1921 act''); E.I. Du Pont de 
Nemours & Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 1211, 1214 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Ohio Nat'! Life Ins. Co. v. United 
States, II Cl. Ct. 477, 479 (1986), affd, 807 F.2d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Commissioner, 97 T.C. 30, 33 (1991) (Parker, J., dissenting) ("considered to have been the 'father' of 
the Senate bill"). But cj 61 CONG. REC. H8073 (Nov. 21, 1921) (Remarks of Rep. Gamer) ("We had 
a Treasury expert there who came in in the morning and made a very interesting and, I thought, 
conclusive argument; then the Secretary of the Treasury would give him different instructions, and in 
the afternoon he would make the most conclusive argument on the other side of the same proposition 
that I ever heard in my life. This expert helped to make up this bill in the House, and when he was 
asked why amendment 41 was put in here, he said, that 'it was thought wise at the time, but is not 
thought wise now."') (referring to flip-flops on applying the predecessor of Section 1031 to exchanges 
of investment properties). 
34. William J. Tumier, Continuity of Interest- Its Application to Shareholders of the Acquiring 
Corporation, 64 CAL. L. REv. 902, 912-13 (1976); Matjorie E. Kornhauser, Section 1031: We Don't 
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reorganizations and in general was the first modem Federal income tax 
statute. Adams, an economist on leave from Yale, articulated as his drafting 
goal "a rather simple tax law that the average man can understand."35 He 
walked the members of the Senate Finance Committee through the Act, 
literally line-by-line.36 In the reorganization area the Act in fact or at least 
in effect functionally codified the existing regulations37 under the Revenue 
Need Another Hero, 60S. CAL. L. REV. 397 (1987) [hereinafter Section I 03I]; Mmjorie E. Kornhauser, 
The Origins of Capital Gains Taxation: What's Law Got to Do with It?, 39 Sw. L.J. 869 (1985). 
35. See Confidential Hearings on H.R. 8245 before the Sen. Comm. on Finance, 67th Cong. 5 
(1921) (statement of Dr. T.S. Adams, Tax Advisor, Treasury Dept.), reprinted in 95A INTERNAL 
REVENuE Acrs OF THE UNITED STATES 1909-1950 lEGISLA 11VE HISTORIES LAWS AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
DocuMENTS (Bernard D. Reams, Jr., revised 1979) [hereinafter 1909-1950 LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES]. 
Adams had worked with the very barebones Revenue Act of 1918 and the very expansive regulations 
Treasury promulgated under it. See infra note 38. 
36. Intel Corp. v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 616, 625 n.2 (1993). 
37. The earliest corporate income tax acts in this century were silent as to the tax effects of 
reorganizations or combinations of corporations. Treasury promulgated in this vacuum Regulations 33, 
revised in 1918 under the Revenue Act of 1916, providing in Article 124 non-recognition treatment at 
the corporate level only as to stock-for-stock acquisitions (as well as subsequent transfers of assets from 
the now subsidiary corporation to its corporate parent). Regs. 33, Article 124, reprinted in 132 1909-
1950 LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, provided that in an acquisition by purchasing corporation (P) of all of 
target (7) corporation's stock in exchange for P stock, Trecognized no income on such acquisition nor 
upon its transfer of its assets up to the new sole corporate shareholder, but in a P stock-for-T assets 
acquisition, T was taxable and had to include in its amount realized its liabilities assumed, or taken 
subject to, by P. See also Regs. 33, Articles 101 and liS. In short ''reorganizations" were taxable at 
the corporate level in the case of asset acquisitions but not stock acquisitions. Conversely apparently 
stock acquisitions, but not asset acquisitions, were usually taxable at the shareholder level even if P stock 
or securities were received. The Revenue Act of 1918 first statutorily considered the tax treatment of 
reorganizations, granting non-recognition at the shareholder level as to the receipt of ''new stock or 
securities of no greater aggregate par or face value [in exchange for] stock or securities owned by him 
in connection with the reorganization, merger, or consolidation of a corporation." The new stock or 
securities were ''treated as taking the place of the stock, securities, or property exchanged." See Heverly 
v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 1227, 1237 (3rd Cir. 1980). The ''par value" limitation "was framed upon 
the idea that there was merely a swapping of shares of stock of a definite par value, and that it would 
really amount only to an exchange of shares of stock of a definite par value, each being equal to the 
other in par value." 61 CONG. REC. S6562 (October 21, 1921) (Remarks of Sen. Jones). Note that 
Senator Jones, a Democrat with populist leanings judging from the legislative history, focused on the 
mere change in form policy for non-recognition. Regulations 45 promulgated in 1919 under the 1918 
Act adopted a transactional approach continued in successive versions of the regulations for the next 
decade: (I) dissolution of corporation B (in modem terminology "T'arget corporation) and sale of its 
assets to corporation A (in modem terminology the acquiring or "P'urchasing corporation), (2) sale of 
assets by T toP and then dissolution ofT; (3) sale of Tstock toP and then dissolution ofT; (4) merger 
of T into P; and (5) consolidation ofT and P. Article 1569 following the statute converted the excess 
par value limitation into a ''boot'' rule rather than a disqualification rule. In transactions (I) through (4), 
i.e. mergers and ''practical" or "de facto" mergers, Article 1567 provided for non-recognition so long as 
no income was received, i.e., ''recognized" in modem terminology, from the transaction by TorPor 
their shareholders provided that (a) no greater aggregate par value stock was received than the par value 
1494 OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23 
Act of 1918's very bare bones reorganization provision.38 A case can be 
made that the non-recognition reorganization and like-kind exchanges rules 
together with the low flat rate capital gains preference 12 112 percent (1/4 
of the maximum ordinary rate) were intended to render the apparent 
progressivity a facade, 39 which was in fact the case.40 Moreover, it is 
possible that Adams and Secretary of Treasury Mellon intentionally left 
some very big loopholes.41 In any event, at the beginning of the Roaring 
20's, when in a good year the top 10,000 taxpayers reported around half of 
the income of the class income tax, 42 loopholes did immediately develop 
of the old stock or securities surrendered and (b) the only consideration received by T and its 
shareholders was P stock or securities. T shareholders' cost in their T stock became their basis in the 
new stock received in the reorganization; similarly P, or the new corporation in a consolidation, took 
over rs assets at their cost in rs hands and rs other attributes. Article 1568. The inheritance of rs 
''new invested capital" was particularly important for the excess profits tax, the big corporate sector 
revenue raiser. Dr. Adams explicitly codified the consolidated return regulations, the involuntary 
conversion provisions, and the incorporation provisions from earlier regulations into the Revenue Act 
of 1921. Union Pac. R.R. v. Commissioner, 17 B.T.A. 793, 798 (1929)(consolidated retums)("Senator 
Smoot You are putting the regulations into law, that is what this is? Dr. Adams. Yes."). 
38. See supra note 37. Dr. Adams also ''was a member of the first Advisory Tax Board 
appointed under the Revenue Act of 1918." Dr. Adams had stated that the Revenue Act of 1918 was 
"filled with difficult, ambiguous points, and all the regulations are filled with doubtful rulings." Lawrence 
v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 128, 130 n.2 (1941). In many cases the 1919 regulations had indeed strong-
armed the statute. Hearings on Revenue Revision before the House Ways and Means Comm., 66th Cong. 
40 (1920) (colloquy Rep. Cordell Hull, 0-Tenn., and Dr. Adams), reprinted in 1 1909-1950 LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORIES. 
39. Kornhauser, Section /03/, supra note 34, at 437-38. Cf Hearings on H.R. 9682 (Revenue 
Act of /938) before the Senate Finance Committee, 75th Cong. 228-29 (1938) (statement of Kalman 
Linker, Editor Monthly Tax Digest). See generally 65 CONG. REC. H2085 (Feb. 8, 1924) (Remarks of 
Rep. Mills) (pointing to 1916-18 drop off in revenue at top); 57 CONG. REC. S828-29 (December 23, 
1918) (Remarks of Senator LaFollette). Cf 61 CONG. REC. H8073 (Nov. 21, 1921) (Remarks of Rep. 
Gamer). 
40. John Lee, 'Death and Taxes' and Hypocrisy, 60 TAX NOTES 1393, 1394-95 (1993) 
[hereinafter Lee, Death and Taxes). The specific "spin-oft'' reorganization provision used by Mrs. 
Gregory was enacted to overturn Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U.S. 176 (1921) (holding taxable a 
spin-off by John D. Rockefeller). See Whitman, supra note 3, at 1195. 
41. Unlike the prior regulations, the 1921 Act afforded no carryover basis to P as to assets 
received in the organization or reorganization. Tumier, supra note 34, at 911; Randolph Paul, The 
Background of the Revenue Act of /937,5 U. Cm. L. REv. 41,44 n.28 (1937) ("like taking candy from 
children"). The ''boot'' rules and like-kind exchanges of stock were also defective prompting a special 
legislative session just for "exchanges of property" in 1923. 64 CONG. REC. H2855, 2851 (Feb. I, 
1923); 64 CONG. REc. 2854 (Feb. 1, 1923) (Remarks of Rep. Fordney); see Secretary of Treasury 
Mellon's Jan. 13, 1923 letter to Rep. Green, R-Iowa, Acting Chair of House Ways & Means, reprinted 
in H.R. Rep. No. 1432, Exchange of Property, 67 Cong. 1-2 (1923), reprinted in 95A 1909-1950 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES and in 64 CONG. REC. H2852 {Feb. 1, 1923) (Remarks of Ways & Means Chair 
Green); 64 CONG. REC. H2851-54 (Feb. 1, 1923); 64 CONG. REC. H2852 (Feb. I, 1923) (Remarks of 
Rep. Gamer). 
42. See Lee, Death and Taxes, supra note 40. 
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necessitating an emergency Congressional session to close. After that Dr. 
Adams left the Treasury and returned to Yale.43 Secretary of the Treasury 
Andrew Mellon, of course, stayed. Adam's successor A.W. Gregg followed 
the diametrically opposite school of drafting in the Revenue Act of 1924: 
complications come primarily from a complicated policy, [including 
reorganizations. T]he bill will cover a given case definitely and certainly. 
Under the existing law there are hundreds of cases where nobody knows 
the effect of the transaction upon the' tax. This law is definite enough so 
that the taxpayers will be able to tell the effect of a given trans-
action .... 44 
The complications were evident in the "Gregg Statement" published by 
the New York Times, which ultimately became the Committee Report.45 
In any event, the case may also be made that the 1924 Act reorganization 
amendments were intended to sanction the various forms of reorganization 
that taxpayer representatives dreamed up, 46 and hence a preferential 
provision. 
43. After the 1923 emergency session (January-February), Secretary of Treasury Andrew W. 
Mellon, at the request of the Ways and Means Chairman established a committee, chaired by A.W. 
Gregg, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, (Dr. Adams having returned to Yale,) to 
prepare amendments for simplification and clarification of the 1921 Acl See Explanatory Note p. 5, 66 
1909-50 LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES. The Committee worked closely with Treasury and Internal Revenue 
Bureau personnel (predecessor to the IRS), but the tax writing Committees grilled Gregg unmercifully 
in 1924 Hearings on his background, Hearings before the Sen. Fin. Comm. on H.R. 6715 (Revenue Act 
of 1924), 68th Cong. 2, 57 (1924) -probably 1924 Act flip-flops from Dr. Adams' positions were 
raising questions in Members of Congress' minds. Or, why are we doing this again? In January 1924 
Treasury prepared a draft of a proposed bill and accompanied it with a "Statement of the Changes made 
in the Revenue Act of 1921 by the Treasury Draft and the Reasons Therefor." 
44. Hearings on H.R. 6715 before the Sen. Fin. Comm., 68th Cong. 7, 57 (1924) (statement of 
A.W. Gregg, Special Ass't to Treasury), reprinted in 2 1909-1950 Legislative Histories. 
45. Compare NEW YORK TIMES pp 8-9 (Jan. 5, 1924); see Explanatory Note Compilation of the 
Revenue Bill of 1924 in Its Various Forms, 66 1909-1950 LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES; with H.R. REP. NO. 
179, 68th Cong. 68-179, at 51-55 (1924); S. REP. No. 68-398, 15 (1924). 
46. "The theory of these provisions in the 1924 law . . . was that reorganization might be 
accomplished in great variety of ways and that the desirable policy was to permit the reorganization to 
be accomplished in any one of the ways which it might normally take." Confulential Hearings on H.R. 
7835 (Revenue Act of 1934) before Sen Fin. Comm. (Part 4), 73rd Cong. 115 (1934) [hereinafter 1934 
Confidential Senate Hearings] (statement of Dr. Roswell Magill, Under Secretary of the Treasury). 
Magill defended the status quo on the grounds that over the rest of the decade "a large number of 
reorganizations ... [were] carried through." !d. at 115 (statement of Magill.) H.R. REP No. 179 and S. 
REP. No. 398 indeed state that the purpose of the amendments to the reorganization provisions was to 
exempt "from tax the gain from exchanges made in connection with a reorganization in order that 
ordinary business transactions will not be prevented." H.R. REP. No. 68-179 (1924); S. REP. No. 68-398 
(1924). 
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Congress predictably47 failed to anticipate the avoidance techniques 
or "mere devices" such as those employed by Mrs. Gregory to avoid 
dividend treatment on a distribution by her wholly owned corporation. 
Relying upon Gregg's corporate spin-off provisions, she caused her wholly 
owned holding company to transfer shares in a publicly traded "target" 
subsidiary to a newly-formed wholly owned subsidiary which the holding 
company "spun off." Three days later, she liquidated the new subsidiary, 
obtaining a stepped-up basis at a capital gain rate in the public shares, which 
she then sold to the buyer at no further gain. 
The first aspect is the effect of this special interest origin of this 
reorganization provision manifested in a detailed statute as Seventh Circuit 
Judge Frank Easterbrook holds special interest provisions are wont.48 In 
1932, the Board of Tax Appeals49 upheld Mrs. Gregory's scheme as a 
transaction clearly within the confines of the statutory language. "A statute 
so meticulously drafted must be interpreted as a literal expression of taxing 
policy, and leaves only the small interstices for judicial consideration."50 
Judge Easterbrook views such detail as limiting judicial discretion. 51 
Notwithstanding such statutory detail, Judge Learned Hand, writing for the 
Second Circuit in Helvering v. Gregory,52 formulated the opposing force 
to detailed literalism of a broad, free-standing judicial standard - business 
purpose. 
We agree with the Board and the taxpayer that a transaction, otherwise 
within an exception of the tax law, does not lose its immunity, because it 
is actuated by a desire to avoid, or, if one choose, to evade, taxation. Any 
one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he 
is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there 
is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes. . . . Therefore, if what 
was done here, was what was intended by ... [the definition], it is of no 
consequence that it was all an elaborate scheme to get rid of income taxes, 
as it certainly was. Nevertheless, it does not follow that Congress meant 
to cover such a transaction, not even though the facts answer the dictionary 
definitions of each term used in the statutory definition. It is quite true, 
as the Board has very well said, that as the articulation of a statute 
47. Brown, supra note 13, at 1619-20; Whitman, supra note 3, at 1199. 
48. Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 
4, 16 (1984) (arguing that the "more detailed the law, the more evidence of interest-group compromise 
and therefore the less liberty judges possess"). 
49. Gregory v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 223, 225 (1932), rev'd, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), 
aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
50. /d. 
51. See supra note 48, and accompanying text. 
52. 69 F.2d at 809, 811 (2d Cir. 1934). 
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increases, th~ room for interpretation must contract; but the meaning of a 
sentence may be more than that of the separate words, as a melody is more 
than the notes, and no degree of particularity can ever obviate recourse to 
the setting in which all appear, and which all collectively create. The 
purpose of the section is plain enough; men engaged in enterprises -
industrial, commercial, fmancial, or any other - might wish to 
consolidate, or divide, to add to, or subtract from, their holdings. Such 
transactions were not to be considered as "realizing" any profit, because the 
collective interests still remained in solution. But the underlying 
presupposition is plain that the readjustment shall be undertaken for reasons 
germane to the conduct of the venture in hand, not as an ephemeral 
incident, egregious to its prosecution. To dodge the shareholders' taxes is 
not one of the transactions contemplated as corporate "reorganizations. "53 
The Supreme Court in Gregory v. Helvering affirmed the Second 
Circuit. It created the famous "device" image and following Hand imposed 
a business purpose requirement or standard. 
When ... [the defmitional paragraph] speaks of a transfer of assets by one 
corporation to another, it means a transfer made "in pursuance of a plan of 
reorganization" . . . of corporate business; and not a transfer of assets by 
one corporation to another in pursuance of a plan having no relation to the 
business of either, as plainly is the case here. Putting aside, then, the 
question of motive in respect of taxation altogether, and fixing the 
character of the proceeding by what actually occurred, what do we fmd? 
Simply an operation having no business or corporate purpose - a mere 
device which put on the form of a corporate reorganization as a disguise 
for concealing its real character, and the sole object and accomplishment 
of which was the consummation of a preconceived plan, not to reorganize 
a business or any part of a business, but to transfer a parcel of corporate 
shares to the petitioner. No doubt, a new and valid corporation was 
created. But that corporation was nothing more than a contrivance to the 
end last described. It was brought into existence for no other purpose; it 
performed, as it was intended from the beginning it should perform, no 
other function. When that limited function had been exercised, it 
immediately was put to death. 
In these circumstances, the facts speak for themselves and are 
susceptible of but one interpretation. The whole undertaking, though 
conducted according to the terms of subdivision (B), was in fact an 
elaborate and devious form of conveyance masquerading as a corporate 
reorganization, and nothing else. The rule which excludes from 
consideration the motive of tax avoidance is not pertinent to the situation, 
because the transaction upon its face lies outside the plain intent of the 
53. /d. at 810-11 (Emphasis supplied). 
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statute. To hold otherwise would be to exalt artifice above reality and to 
deprive the statutory provision in question of all serious purpose. 54 
The Gregory/spin off/standard vs. rule story has yet more chapters. 
The Democrat-controlled Congress of 1933, generally unsympathetic to 
business problems, was "acutely hostile to tax avoidance schemes. "55 
Resisting its first inclination to repeal the reorganization provisions in 
toto,56 which President Franklin Roosevelt's Treasury strongly opposed,57 
Congress in 1934 repealed only the spin-off provision and tightened up the 
54. Gregory v. Commissioner, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935). 
55. Whitman, supra note 3, at 1200. In 1933 and 1934 tax avoidance was very much in 
Congress' eyes [they could taste the paybacks after a dozen years of a Republican Treasury headed by 
Andrew Mellon). COMPILER'S NOTE REGARDING TilE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TilE REvENuE ACT OF 
1934,- 1909-1950 LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES; Heverly v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 1227, 1238 (3rd Cir. 
1980). Particularly subject to abuse were the 1921 Act defective ''boot" rule which allowed basis 
recovery and the much more egregious allowance of P [and/or T shareholders] to obtain a fair market 
value basis in [stock or assets?] acquired in the reorganization. H.R REP. No. 68-179, at 13 ( 1924 ); see 
generally Daniel Q. Posin, Taxing Corporate Reorganizations: Purging Penelope's Web, 133 U. PA. L. 
REv. 1335, 1349 (1985). The latter omission is puzzling, even suspicious, given the earlier substituted 
basis in the Revenue Act of 1918 as to stock acquired and carryover basis as to assets received under 
Regulations 45, Article 1568. Both loopholes were more or less corrected by the Revenue Act of 1924 
(the Revenue Act of 1928 finished patching up the basis provisions which had only been supplied for 
incorporations in 1924 ). But the Revenue Act of 1924 authorized "spin off' divisive reorganizations 
without out any "safeguards" against bailouts (tax-free split-ups were already permitted). Additionally 
from the beginning populists were aware that preferences such as the reorganization provisions (and 
especially the capital gains preference) allowed high income individuals to evade progressivity. See 57 
CONG. REC. S828-29 (daily ed. December 23, 1918) (statements of Sen. LaFollette). 
56. Prevention of Tax Avoidance, Preliminary Report of a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Ways and Means Relative to Methods of Preventing the Avoidance and Evasion of the Internal Revenue 
Laws, together with Suggestions for the Simplification and Improvement thereof, 73d Cong. 8 (Comm. 
Print 1933). See Chapman v. Commissioner, 618 F.2d 856, 865 (1st Cir. 1980). To the traditional 
"mere paper profit'' (equity) and "interference with business" (economic efficiency) arguments the 
Subcommittee replied that by being able to defer the gain realized on such exchanges and to elect the 
year of recognition/reporting, "the taxpayer is able to escape tax on these gains entirely." In the light of 
the capital losses just generated by the 1929 Crash and the fact that 1/3 to 112 of individual capital gains 
were and are never taxed by the Federal income tax system due to step up "in basis at death, the statement 
was largely true. 
57. "In the cases of complicated subjects of this kind, it is almost impossible to foresee all the 
ingenious devices which lawyers will invent, and to provide against them expressly in the statute. The 
more effective plan is to place the responsibility squarely upon the Department administering the law 
from day to day. It can readily amend its regulations to cover new situations as they arise." STATEMENT 
OF TilE ACTING SECRETARY OF TREASURY REGARDING TilE PRELIMINARY REPORT OF A SUBCOMMITTEE 
9-10 (1934). Roswell Magill of the Treasury Department weakened Morgenthau's proposal by expressing 
satisfaction with the 1924 Act definitions, but suggesting legislative regulations if the Committee wanted 
to make changes. It disagreed with both points. Hearings on Revenue Revision 1934 before the House 
Ways and Means Comm., 73rd Cong. 74-75 (1934). 
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definition of reorganizations in general.58 (Split-ups continued to be 
permitted under that general reorganization definition. 59) About 15 years 
later as control of Congress bounced back and forth between almost evenly 
matched Republicans and Democrats from 1947 to 1951, Congress 
manifested antipathy to judicial innovations in the reorganization area 
through adoption of detailed active business and device rules in 
reintroducing non-recognition divisive reorganizations in the 1939 Code 
predecessor to present Section 355. Congress anticipated that courts would 
not add new conditions to the statute, on the theory that detailed rules lessen 
the decision maker's discretion.60 Of course, in fact, this set the stage for 
the ultimate "collaborative model" of scholarship influencing courts, thus 
influencing more scholarship which in turn influences the agency in its rule 
making culminating in the 1989 revised Section 355 regulations.61 When 
Lee separately described to Professors Gunn and Koch such neat evolution 
of the Section 355 regulations,62 Alan told him about Professor Kennedy's 
58. Lee, Structured Discretionary Justice, supra note 1, at 1033. The full House Ways and Means 
Committee compromised in its Revenue Bill of 1934 by proposing the repeal of "B", "C' and divisive 
"D" reorganizations, while retaining "A" type statutory merger or consolidation. Confidential Comm. 
Print No. 1, 73d Cong. § 112(g)(l), pp. 85-6 (Feb. 2, 1934); H.R REP. No. 73-704, at 12-14 (19J4); 
78 CONG. REc. H2663 (daily ed. February 14, 1934)(remarks of Rep. Hill, O-W ash.); Heverly, 621 F.2d 
at 1237; Chapman, 618 F.2d at 865. Treasury acquiesced at the time. Letter of February 12, 1934 from 
Sec'ty of the Treasury Morgenthau to House Ways & Means Chairman Bob Daughton, 0-N.C., read into 
the record 78 CONG. REc. H2512 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 1934). The 1934 Executive Session or Confidential 
Senate Finance Committee Hearings reveal that the origin of the "voting stock" requirement in Type B 
and Type C reorganizations in the Revenue Act of 1934 lay in the Senate Finance Committee's 
competing desires to permit non-statutory mergers, while preventing the abuse of sale-like transactions 
obtaining reorganization status. The Committee's compromise was to codifY the "idea of continuity of 
interest'' contained in the then recent Pinellas case (Pinellas Cold Storage Ice Co. v. Commissioner, 287 
U.S. 462, 468-69 (1933) ("the seller must acquire an interest in the affairs of the purchasing corporation 
more definite than that incident to ownership of its short-term purchase-money notes" which were not 
securities since payable within four months))in order to ensure that shareholders ofT did not sell their 
stock pursuant to a stock-for-stock or stock-for-assets reorganization. 1934 Confulential Senate Hearings, 
supra note 46, at 117. 
59. BORIS I. BJTIKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS 
AND SHAREHOLDERS ~11.01(2][b] (6th ed. 1994). 
60. Whitman, supra note 3, at 1202. 
61. See generally Lee, Structured Discretionary Justice, supra note 1. 
62. The legislative treatment of corporate divisions has varied. Initially, they were included 
with the organization provisions, and the predecessor to present section 355 spawned Gregory 
v. Helvering. Although the government triumphed in the Gregory case, Congress thought 
Gregory was insufficient to protect the Federal fisc. Corporate divisions offered too great an 
opportunity for bailing out corporate earnings, and the tax-free blessing was withdrawn from 
them. This blanket consignment to tax purgatory, however, was argued to be too broad. By 
1951, Congress was receptive to the notice that the good and the bad could be effectively 
distinguished, and corporate divisions were revived, but tax deferral was denied to 
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standards and rules scholarship; Charles, about Professor Davis' idea of 
structured discretionary justice. 
D. Lessons from the Partnership Section 701 Anti-Abuse 
Regulations 
Subchapter K sets forth the taxation of partners and partnerships, 
following a pass-through regime under which the partnership as such is not 
subject to the income tax; persons carrying on a trade or business as partners 
are liable for income tax in their separate or individual capacities. 63 Each 
partner in determining her Federal income tax must take into account 
separately her distributive share of gain or loss reported by the 
partnership.64 A partner's distributive share in turn is determined 
according to the partnership agreement so long as its allocation of such 
transactions used principally as devices for the distribution of earnings and profits to 
shareholders. In regulations issued in 1955, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) drew the line 
mandated by Congress primarily by restricting corporate divisions to distributions of an entire 
business. Under these regulations, a corporate division also could effect a business division 
only by surrendering its tax-free status. In practice, the IRS relied on this active business 
requirement, but supplemented it with the argument that some distributions essentially were 
equivalent to a dividend and were, therefore, devices for a distribution of earnings and profits. 
The first prong of this two-part test did not fare well in the courts, and in 1964, after the 
courts had determined that a single business could be divided, the IRS announced that it 
would revise the regulations to permit the division of a single business. 
The promise of revision was hailed by the tax bar, and advice that it be a complete 
overhaul of the existing regulations soon was abundant. Recognizing that any distribution 
necessarily produced a distribution of earnings, many commentators argued that the presence 
of a good business purpose should be sufficient to pass the tax deferral test. They also 
thought that less reliance should be placed on the definitional aspects of an active business. 
In short, they wanted less formalism and more inquiry into the question of whether a given 
distribution could be supported by reasons other than the desire to reduce the barriers between 
the shareholder and realization of the corporate earnings. 
Revision finally arrived a quarter of a century later, and the final regulations recently 
promulgated under section 355 largely accomplish these goals. These regulations give 
substantial guidance to the practitioner about whether a transaction complies with them. More 
importantly, they deal with the underlying policy and provide their guidance at a level of 
sophistication that is unparalleled in Treasury regulations. 
Lee, Structured Discretionary Justice, supra note I, at 1029-30. 
63. I.R.C. § 701 (1997). An entity approach applies for purposes of calculations and reporting 
and in a few other places (often optional). See Lee, Entity Classification, supra note 13, at 88-89 n.l26. 
64. I.R.C. § 702 (1997). Section 702(b) provides that the character of any item included in a 
partner's distributive share under paragraphs (1) through (7) of section 702(a) is determined as if such 
item were realized directly from the source from which realized by the partnership, or incurred in the 
same manner as incurred by the partnership. Treas. Reg.§ 1.702-l(b) provides "character'' determination 
rules. Treas. Reg. § 1. 702-1 (b) (1996). 
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share has "substantial economic effect.'o6s Professor Lee suspects that in 
many cases allocations produce results at odds with the taxpayer's treatment 
had she acted as a sole proprietress,66 thus violating the fundamental policy 
of Subchapter K- seeking ''to tax a partner in the same manner as a 
hypothetical individual entrepreneur or proprietor in similar circumstances 
would be tax.ed.'o67 
In May, 1994, the IRS and Treasury proposed regulations under Section 
70168 adding an anti-abuse standard under Subchapter K. The regulation 
was finalized at the end of the year.69 The drafters expected that it would 
65. I.RC. § 704 (1997). 
66. The Treasury regulations implementing section 704{b), according to some observers, 
were written for the benefit of the tax shelter promoters. Section 704(b) was amended in 
1976 to require that partnership allocations of tax items must have "substantial economic 
effect" The present section 704(b) regulations give lip service to substantial economic effect 
by requiring that capital accounts be adjusted for these allocations. But this ignores the time 
value of money, according to Professor John Lee of William & Mary's Marshall- Wythe 
College of Law. After all, what limited partner in a tax shelter cares what his capital account 
says? Assistant Treasury Secretary J. Roger Mentz has pointed out at congressional hearings 
on passthrough entities that these mere chargebacks do not reflect economic reality. The 
regulations permit flip-flops of income and losses - arrangements which, if the time value 
of money is taken into account, achieve the same result that the Tax Court condemned in 
Orrisch, 55 T.C. 395 (1970). 
Lee A. Sheppard, The Gauntlet: Joint Committee's Corporate Base Broadeners, 36 TAX NOTES 9, 10 
(1987). Professor Lee's point is consistent with legislative history cited by the Preamble to the Section 
701 Regulations: 
Subchapter K was enacted to permit businesses organized for joint profit to be 
conducted with "simplicity, flexibility, and equity as between the partners." S. REP. No. 83-
1622, at 89 (1954); H.R REP. No. 83-1337, at 65 (1954). It was not intended, however, that 
the provisions of subchapter K be used for tax avoidance purposes. For example, in enacting 
subchapter K, Congress indicated that aggregate, rather than entity, concepts should be 
applied if such concepts are more appropriate in applying other provisions of the Code. H.R 
CONF. REP. No. 83-2543, at 59 (1954). Similarly, in later amending the rules relating to 
special allocation, Congress sought to "prevent the use of special allocations for tax avoidance 
purposes, while allowing their use for bona fide business purposes." S. REP. No. 94-938, at 
100 (1976). 
Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule, 60 FED. REG. 23, 24 (1995). See also Lee, Entity Qassification, supra 
note 13. 
67. John W. Lee, Partnership Profits Share for Services: an Aggregate Exegesis of Revenue 
Procedure 93-27 (Part 1), 62 TAX NOTES 1733, 1744 {1994) [hereinafter Lee, Aggregate Approach]. 
For a very early reliance on the aggregate theory as a basis for non-recognition of contributions to a 
partnership see Confidential 1934 Senate Hearings, supra note 46, at 77-78 (statement of Mr. 
Bartholow). 
68. Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule, 25,581, 59 FED. REG. (1994). 
69. The regulations were filed on December 29, 1994 and published in January 1995. 60 FED. 
REG. 23, 33 (1995). This speed in finalization parallels the speed in its inception. "Former Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Leslie Samuels is credited with fathering the partnership anti-abuse 
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only affect a relatively small number of partnership transactions that make 
inappropriate use of the rules of Subchapter K and would not interfere with 
bona fide joint business arrangements. 70 The Eighth Circuit in Brown 
Group, Inc. v. Commissioner put it well: 
[F]or transactions occurring on and after December 30, 1994, Congress for 
the first time has apparently permitted, in special circumstances not 
relevant here, the recasting of partnership income under Subpart F. 
Treasury Regulation [section] 1.701-2 was thereafter announced. That 
Regulation, characterized as the "anti-abuse rule," permitted the IRS to 
recast partnership transactions that make inappropriate use of Subchapter 
K rules. In particular, [section] 1.701-2(e) provided that the IRS can treat 
a partnership as an aggregation of its partners in whole or in part as 
appropriate to carry out the purpose of any provision of the Code or 
regulations. 71 
The drafters spelled out that "[i]mplicit in the intent of subchapter K 
are ... [three] requirements.'.n These broad standards are (1) substantial 
business purpose, (2) substance over form, and (3) clear reflection of 
income, subject to an exception for "administrative convenience.''73 Where 
a principal purpose of formation or use of a partnership is "to reduce 
substantially the present value of the partners' aggregate federal tax liability 
in a manner that is inconsistent with the intent of subchapter K, the 
Commissioner can recast the transaction . . . . "74 The regulations further 
provide seven non-exclusive factors that may indicate the tainted principal 
purpose. These factors cluster around (1) present value of tax liabilities are 
substantially less than if the partners had owned the assets directly and 
conducted the activity directly; (2) one or more partners is protected against 
risk of loss or has little or no participation in profits other than a preferred 
return; (3) substantially all the partners are related; (4) allocations to 
regulation, which is said to have gone from his brain to the Federal Register in six weeks." Reg Writing 
Process, :supra note 26. 
70. Partnership Industry Coordinated Issue Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule Regulation Section 
1.701-2 (June 19, 1995), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TAX NOTES TODAY File 95, TNT 124-10 
(June 27, 1995). 
71. Brown Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 F.3d 217,222 (8th Cir. 1996). The court also noted 
that the regulation also permitted recasting partnership transactions "as appropriate to achieve tax results 
that are consistent with the intent of subchapter K". /d. For types of recasting see Samuel C. 
Thompson Jr., Ex-Government Officials Challenge Partnership Anti-Abuse Reg: An Analysis, 69 TAX 
NOTES 1395, 1396 (1995). 
72. Subchapter KAnti-Abuse Rule, 60 FED. REG. 23,24 (1995); Treas. Reg.§ l.701-2(a)(l996). 
73. /d. 
74. Treas. Reg.§ l.701-2(b) (1996). Such recasting may include disregarding the partnership 
or a partner, changing the partnership's method of accounting or method of allocation of items between 
partners; or otherwise adjusting or modifying the claimed tax treatment. /d. 
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functionally tax-exempt partners; and (5) the burden and benefits of 
ownership of property contributed to a partnership are in substantial part 
retained by the contributing partner or shifted to a distributee partner before 
actual distribution. 75 These factors are very consistent with, even mandated 
by, Lee's "hypothetical proprietress" aggregate approach to subchapter K.76 
In an outstanding illustration of structured discretionary justice 
accompanying examples include "the weight to be given to relevant factors" 
so listed and provide transactions that are consistent and inconsistent with 
the intent of Subchapter K. 77 
Outside the regulation, the Service administers the anti-abuse standard 
through the Industry Specialization Program78 with direction of revenue 
agents to contact the partnership industry or issue specialist when 
considering a Section 1.701-2 issue.79 The problem is less ''rogue" 
agents80 and more less specialized agents.81 
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(c) (1996). 
76. Compare Lee, Aggregate Approach, supra note 67, at 1743-46. 
77. Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule, 60 FED. REG. 23, 25 (1995). 
78. See supra Part I for a discussion of ISP's. 
79. Examiners Directed Not to Raise Anti-Abuse Issue Without Permission (Oct 17, 1995), 
available in, LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 95 Tax Notes Today 207-10 (Oct 24, 1995); Margaret 
Milner Richardson, Speech to ABA Tax Section Annual Meeting, August 6, 1994, available in, LEXIS, 
Fedtax Library, TNT File 94 TNT 157-67 (Aug. II. 1994) [hereinafter Commissioner's Remarks]. See 
generally Sheryl Stratton, Examiners Told to Get Clearance Before Raising Anti-abuse Regulation, 
available in, LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 220-3 (Nov. 9, 1995). 
80. Before leaving the discussion of the partnership anti-abuse regulation, I would like to 
say a few words about the so-called ''rogue agent'' argument being proffered by critics of the 
regulation. Many have suggested that the proposed regulation could be used as a powerful 
tool by IRS agents to recharacterize partnership transactions inappropriately. First of all, we 
do not have a ''rogue agent'' problem in the Service. Our revenue agents are generally 
well-trained, professional individuals with high ethical standards, who do their best to ensure 
that the proper amount of tax is collected in all circumstances. These agents are capable of 
handling cases in a fair and judicious manner, even those cases presenting the most difficult 
conceptual issues. 
We recently announced a national coordination of partnership issues, including the 
anti-abuse regulations, through our Industry Specialization Program. I want to note that this 
announcement was not made because we feel our agents cannot properly apply broad 
regulations. Remember, these are the same agents who are out there every day applying the 
"clear reflection of income" doctrine and the transfer pricing rules. We made the 
announcement because the anti-abuse regulation is intended to be part of an integrated 
compliance strategy which will include increased audit coverage of partnerships, particularly 
those with large foreign or corporate partners. The new audit plan is a significant undertaking 
and, therefore, like our other important compliance initiatives, it will be coordinated 
nationally. 
Commissioner's Remarks, supra note 79. 
81. I think the thing that scares us most is that very few agents, in all honesty as well 
trained as they are, understand partnership taxation. They get a transaction they don't 
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Commentators believe that the ''partnership antiabuse regulation 
changed the landscape, and certainly has brought into discussion- both on 
a specific (i.e., Subchapter K) and a broader conceptual basis - the 
understand, they don't like, they use this as a hanuner. It's got to be coordinated through 
national office, but it's a very, very big job to try to do that 
I think this is a step in the right direction, but it's something that you're really going 
to have to wrestle with if you're going to put in a broad anti-abuse rule such as this and use 
it effectively. 
Unofficial Transcript of IRS Hearing on Partnerships, available in, LEXIS, Fedtax Library, lNT File 
94 lNT 14 7-18 (July 29, 1994)(Statement of Charles H. Egerton, representing the Section of Taxation, 
American Bar Association) [hereinafter Partnership Hearing Transcript). News journalists found it 
noteworthy that Egerton did not challenge the authority of the Service to issue the regulations. /d. 
("Particularly surprising was the failure of ABA Tax Section Partnership Committee Chainnan Charles 
H. Egerton to call the validitY of the regulation into question, as the members of the section did in many 
pages of the written conunents they submitted."). Professor Lee was not surprised; he knew Charlie was 
too good a partnership theorist and a leading proponent of the aggregate approach (which Lee believes 
supports the regulation) to so challenge. See also Stratton, supra note 79. Samuels Addresses New Tax 
Committee Chairs' Concerns About Anti-Abuse Reg., available in, LEXIS, Fed tax Library, TNT File 94, 
TNT 255-18 (Dec. 30, 1994). 
With the clearance procedure, the Service appears to have made good on Treasury Assistant 
Secretary for Tax Policy Leslie B. Samuels' promise to establish a procedure that would 
"alleviate any fears taxpayers may have had regarding inappropriate application of the 
regulation." ... 
Examiners Told to Get Clearance Before Raising Anti-Abuse Reg., available in, LEXIS, Fedtax Library, 
lNT File 95, TNT 220-03 (Nov. 9, 1995). 
/d. 
Treasury and the IRS were "serious about it and acting in good faith,'' said Michael L. 
Schier, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York. The procedure represents "one more step to 
centralize the process,'' he said. 
The procedure "fills in the void" left by Announcement 94-87, commented Charles H. 
Egerton, who chairs the partnership committee of the American Bar Association's Tax 
Section. "It is basically what the committee was going to suggest in terms of 
implementation," Egerton noted. "I'm very pleased with it." Particularly important to Egerton 
is the procedure's two levels of review. "If the issue passes muster with the specialist and he 
wants to proceed, he must run it by the National Office," noted Egerton. "That's the way it 
should be." 
Indeed, a major criticism of the anti-abuse rule has been that because it lacks objective 
standards, it could be applied inconsistently and arbitrarily by ''rogue agents" in the field. 
Although she has generally supported the reg from the outset, Pamela F. Olson ofSkadden, 
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, Washington, says she became concerned when agents began 
''raising the issue in contexts where it was clearly inappropriate to raise it" 
Olson, though, said she's ''very happy" with the new procedure and thinks it is a 
"terrific idea." She said she is particularly glad to see that there will be National Office 
attorneys ''riding herd" on the field. They are needed because of their ''technical expertise" 
in .the partnership area, Olson maintains. 
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propriety (and validity) of antiabuse rules in general."82 A number of 
former high Treasury and IRS officials as well as bar association and other 
pressure groups strongly opposed the proposed form of this anti-abuse 
provision, while a much smaller number of former high officials and tax 
leaders supported it. Dean Samuel Thompson, Professor Lee's long-time 
friend from Sam's University of Virginia Law School teaching days, 
succinctly described the major players and the issues. 
Recently, the Assistant Secretary of the TreasUry for Tax Policy, 
Leslie B. Samuels, received several letters from former tax officials 
concerning the partnership anti-abuse regulations, which are set forth in 
Treas. Reg. section 1. 701-2. Two of these letters essentially recommended 
that the regulations be withdrawn. One withdrawal letter was written 
jointly by former Commissioner of the IRS Donald C. Alexander; former 
Chief Counsel of the IRS Abraham M. N. Shashy; former Chiefs of the 
Joint Committee Staff Mark L. McConaghy, Bernard M. Shapiro, and 
Harry L. Gutman; and former Tax Court Judges William A. Goffe, Samuel 
B. Sterrett, and John B. Williams. The other withdrawal letter was written 
by former Commissioner of the IRS Lawrence B. Gibbs and former 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy John S. Nolan. 
Another letter, written by former Chief Counsel of the IRS and former 
Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Kenneth W. Gideon, was critical of the 
anti-abuse regulations but stopped short of urging their withdrawal. 
Finally, former Chief of the Joint Committee Staff David Brockway wrote 
in basic support of the anti-abuse regulations. 83 
The major issues raised in this debate were: (1) certainty; (2) horizontal 
equity; (3) clear reflection of income; (4) the ISP procedure; and (5) 
statutory interpretation raising intent of Congress over the plain meaning of 
Code provisions. 84 The first and last issues go to the heart of the standards 
versus rules debate. This was the issue in Gregory v. Helvering- the 
certainty of a meticulously worded statute versus the policy or purpose of 
the reorganization provisions. 85 Sam points out that business purpose, one 
of the anti-abuse regulations "intent" factors, is incorporated in the 
82. Anatomy, supra note 26. For an excellent discussion of the broader question of rules and 
standards and particularly standards without rules see Hale Gann & Roy Strowd, The Recent Evolution 
of Antiabuse Rules, 66 TAX NOTES 1189 (1995), and Compendium on Anti-Abuse Rules, 48 TAX LAW. 
799-844 (1995). 
83. Samuel C. Thompson Jr., Ex-Government Officials Challenge Partnership Anti-Abuse Reg: 
An Analysis, 69 TAX NOTES 1395 (1995) (footnotes omitted) (note 6 lists the literature on the anti-abuse 
proposal at that time.). 
84. Thompson, supra note 83, at 1397. We derived these categories from Sam's slightly different 
list. 
85. See supra notes 44, 49-50 and accompanying text; Thompson, supra note 83, at 1399. 
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amalgamating and divisive reorganization regulations, although not 
contained in the underlying statute. 86 Moreover it has explicit support in 
the legislative history of Subchapter K. 87 Likewise the substance over 
form intent factor applies elsewhere even though not mentioned in the 
particular Code provision.88 Assistant Secretary of Treasury Leslie 
Samuels noted that this "regulation generated an intense debate. One 
interesting part of the debate was whether in fact any abuses needed to be 
curbed. Some suggested that the world was virus free, or at least no 
vaccination was needed. Others thanked us for the regulation. "89 
Protection of practitioners from aggressive clients was repeated by 
Government officials.90 In the public hearings on the proposed version of 
the regulations government participants scoured representatives of 
organizations who had in the context of other partnership provisions argued 
for a non-literal approach.91 The argument that uncertainty emanating 
86. Thompson, supra note 83, at 1399. In the hearing on the proposed regulations academic 
witnesses such as Professor Rebecca Rudnick and Professor Joseph Bankman took similar positions on 
intent versus literal language. Partnership Hearing Transcript, supra note 81. See also Joseph Bankman, 
The Proposed Antiabuse Rule: Appropraite Response to Serious Problem, 64 TAX NOTES 270 (1994). 
87. Thompson, supra note 83, at 1400. 
88. Sam points to the step transaction doctrine, also well-known in the corporate tax arena. 
Thompson, supra note 83, at 1400. 
89. Remarks of the Hon. Leslie B. Samuels. Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy) U.S. Department 
of the Treasury, ABA TAX Section's May Meeting (May 11, 1996); available in, LEXIS, Fed tax Library, 
TNT File 96 TNT 97-57 (May 16, 1996). 
90. Forthcoming Guidance, supra note 5 ("Kohl argued that the government's job in writing 
regulations is to give comfort to the conservative tax practitioner who needs some backup when he has 
to say 'no' to a client or, more likely, a client's investment banker."). 
91. For instance, the Chicago Bar Association had vociferously argued that the proposed 
regulation should be withdrawn. E.g., Letter dated February 20, 1995 from Karen V. Kole and Douglas 
J. Antonio of the Chicago Bar Association to Rep. Mcintosh and Sen. Nickles (seeking exclusion of 
anti-abuse regulation from exception for Treasury regulations from proposed moratorium on regulations), 
reprinted in 66 TAX NOTES 1203 (1995). The New York State Bar Association Tax Section (NYSBA) 
to the contrary objected to any ''targeted application of a legislation moratorium to one specific, existing 
regulation." Partnership Anti-Abuse Regs. Via Moratorium, available in, LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT 
File 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 62-44 (March 30, 1995). 
At the hearing Antonio argued that the regulation was legislative because not supported by any 
statutory language. Further he argued: "It is not possible to determine the purposes of the provision of 
the Code as opposed to the literal language of the Code. If a transaction complies with the literal 
language of the Code, it complies with the intent of the Code." Partnership Hearing Transcript, supra 
note 81. Paul Kugler, Assistant Chief Counsel, Passthroughs and Special Industries took CBA to task 
for inconsistency. 
I am frankly a little confused as to what this CBA's views are as to the proper role of the IRS 
in administering the tax laws. We've seen in your papers and your speech today your being 
critical that we're not sufficiently differential to the tax court's views in the Brown Group 
case, yet in 1981 when the tax court decided the Campbell case, the CBA was at the front of 
the line requesting us to grant prompt administrative relief effectively overruling the tax court 
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from a broad anti-abuse standard would retard commerce92- the nuclear 
winter claim93 -justly received short shrift.94 Indeed, many supported 
case because it was inconsistent with the previous GCF. 
If that's your position today, that's fine, but it hasn't always been. Campbell is not a literal 
interpretation. You know, the result that results in no taxable income even when there's a value. 
Also, you know, prior CBA comments have asked us to override the literal words of statutes 
on more than one occasion, because the literal language, for instance, of Section 168(j)(9) 
would imply a transaction Congress didn't intend. In a CBA comment on the Q-tip regula-
tions, you stated that "In view of the oppressive result produced by such an overly, literal 
construction of2519, we suggest that the Q-tip regulations could and legitimately should con-
strue the statute as requiring .... " then you went on to describe a non-literal interpretation. 
/d. The Chicago Bar Association position on Campbell in fact was the model for Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-
2 C.B. 343. See Lee, Aggregate Approach, supra note 67, at 1734 n.l. 
92. E.g., Anatomy, supra note 26, at 1862; Cunningham, supra note 21, at 124; Gann & Strowd, 
supra note 82; Gideon, supra note 21, at 639. 
93. Current tax law and regulations are flexible enough to respect the bargain for economic 
needs for the money partner, the idea partner and the property partner, as long as the 
economics follow the taxes. Take this flexibility and relative certainty away and nuclear 
winter will descend upon the joint venture profit-oriented partnership. 
Statement of Michael Lux, representing Deloitte & Touche, Partnership Hearing Transcript, supra note 
81. 
94. While government representatives gave good answers, the best was by Professor Bankman. 
I want to shift focus a little to address a concern voiced by some commentators here 
today that this approach of the Treasury, placing greater emphasis on purpose, will have a 
chilling effect on investment. In the words of- to paraphrase one commentator that "It will 
be the nuclear winter of productive joint ventures." 
You know, one way to approach this issue, I think, is to look at the experience the tax 
system has had with judicially developed doctrines, such as substance over form, business 
purpose, step transaction and the like. These doctrines have been uniformly, I think, accepted 
by courts, at least in principle, and are at least as vague in scope as the proposed regulations 
and applied to transactions in and out of Subchapter K. 
Have these transactions discouraged productive investment? Is it possible to identify a 
class of transactions that would have added to the social product, but were abandoned because 
of the doctrines? Would we be a wealthier society without them? 
I suspect that most tax lawyers will find these questions rhetorical. In general, I believe 
the investment community has more to fear than the tendency to over legislate against 
loopholes, than it does from adding to the Treasury's authority to interpret the law in a 
manner that takes into account legislative purpose. 
One thing's missing, I think conspicuously, from the discussion of the proposed 
regulation is any acknowledge of its benefits. The most logical alternative to the approach that 
Treasury has now embarked is increasing reliance on detailed rulemaking. One disadvantage, 
quite obviously to this approach, is that it gives taxpayers a multi-year window in which to 
cash in on even the most egregious tax-driven transactions so long as those transactions are 
supported by the literal language of one or more statutes. 
The delay inherent in this approach may produce an ongoing revenue shortfall of 
substantial magnitude. Social wealth, of course, is reduced by the fact that transactions are 
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a standard as retarding abusive transactions due to its uncertainty.95 
Horizontal equity is surely promoted by a standard that rests in large 
part on whether a different tax result would result if the transaction were 
carried on by individuals outside a partnership. Otherwise more 
sophisticated (read higher income with expensive tax advisers) taxpayers can 
obtain more favorable tax results that smaller income taxpayers directly 
carrying out similar transactions. Sam points out the ISP and review 
approach "should ensure uniform treatment of similarly situated 
taxpayers."96 Virtually everyone applauded the ISP/review approach, but 
some critics of the regulations viewed the procedure as an attempt by the 
Service to head off a weak test case97- the Service does believe that 
litigation is on the horizon.98 We believe that if a fair test case arises that 
the regulation will be upheld for the reasons discussed. 
Sam notes that the clear reflection of income standard applies in the 
corporate context and should apply generally in the partnership context as 
well.99 Commissioner Richardson points out that the clear reflection of 
income standard is applied by revenue agents "every day."100 Then Acting 
Deputy Tax Legislative Counsel Michael Thomson raised the same parallel 
at the hearing on the proposed regulations. 
/d. 
MR. THOMSON: I'd be very interested in your thoughts about what 
I view as another very, very broad rule and that is the clear reflection of 
income standard [of] 446(b ), very open-ended, very broad, very vague. 
But my sense is it's not perceived to be grossly misused by agents and I 
wonder if you have any thoughts on what that tells us about this regulation, 
or if there are things involved there that we might learn from to make sure 
this regulation is not misused. 101 
created that fill no plausible legislative purpose and would be uneconomic but for the tax 
savings. 
95. See Thompson, supra note 83, at 1398; Cunningham, supra note 21, at 125. 
96. Thompson, supra note 83, at 1401. 
97. Stratton, supra note 79. 
98. Herman Ayayo, Partnership Anti-Abuse Litigation on Horizon, IRS Official Predicts, 
available in, LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 212-23 (Oct 30, 1995) ('"We 
fully expect that the first [partnership anti-abuse] case that we go unagreed with, you folks are going to 
want to litigate it,' Steiner told the practitioners. 'It will be a very carefully chosen case, it's going to 
be a 'big dog case,' and it's probably a case like Brown Group. It is going to be a very straightforward, 
in our opinion, abuse of subchapter K. "'). 
99. Thompson, supra note 83, at 1400. 
100. Commissioner's Remarks, available in, LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 94 TNT 157-67 
(Aug. 11. 1994 ). 
101. Partnership Hearing Transcript, supra note 81. 
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The witness sidestepped the question. 102 
Contemporaneously with development of the Subchapter K anti-abuse 
standard Treasury also took a giant step towards simplification with its 
"check-the-box" regulations permitting elective classification of business tax 
entities (significantly other than formally organized corporations). 103 
Historically, both the courts and Treasury regulations classified entities as 
separate, i.e,, as "associations" taxable as corporations, on the basis of the 
Morrissey104 "corporate resemblance" factors: (1) continuity of the entity's 
life, (2) centralized management, (3) limited liability of the owners, and (4) 
free transferability of ownership interests. 105 At the same time entities 
formally organized as corporations were (and are) per se classified as 
corporations despite their usual inability to meet any of the four resemblance 
factors, 106 so long as they were organized for or carried out a business 
purpose. Treasury claimed in 1986 that acquiescing in state law corporate 
form promoted certainty and ease of administration, 107 but the political 
102. Brumbaugh: I have not seen clear reflection of income used as a hammer that much. 
There again, in my role - I'm a national tax partner and I'm not in the trenches as much as 
many of the other practitioners are on the AICPA committee. 
Partnership Hearing Transcript, supra note 81. 
103. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1, -2, -3, and -4 (1996). 
104. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 359 (1935). The predecessor to the Tax Court 
mechanically applied the Morrissey factors in determining status of a family limited partnership, when 
the Service sought corporate reclassification instead of generic reallocation arguments. See Glensder 
Textile Co. v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 176 (1942). Apparently for certainty as much as anything else, 
the early 1960 revisions of the entity classification regulations then mechanically applied Glensder 
Textile's form controls approach. Prior to the 1960 revisions of the classification regulations, the Service 
for ruling purposes held that an organization would not be treated as an "association" if any one of the 
four essential characteristics- (I) associates, (2), objective to carry on a business and divide its profits, 
(3) centralized management, and (4) continuity oflife)- were not present. See I.T. 3930, 1948-2 C.B. 
126; Rev. Rul. 57-341, 1957-2 C.B. 884; Rev. Rul. 57-607, 1957-2 C.B. 887; I.T. 3948, 1949-1 C.B. 
161; Rev. Rul. 54-484, 1954-2 C.B. 242. In order to provide certainty the regulations thus made 
classification of entities not formally organized as corporations tum on the presence of three or more of 
the four corporate resemblance factors. Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159, 185 (1976) (suggesting 
that these regulations be revised further to reflect more faithfully the Morrissey resemblance approach, 
disapproving of the "thumb on the scales" in favor of partnership treatment requiring that the entity 
possess three of the four corporate characteristics and that these characteristics were to be equally 
weighted). 
I 05. Lee, Entity Classification, supra note 13, at 85. 
106. Lee, Entity Classification, supra note 13, at 87 n.ll2. 
107. Assistant Secretary Mentz admitted that few close C corporations possessed any of the 
traditional corporate resemblance factors. Hearings on H.R. 1658, H.R. 2571, H.R. 3397, and H.R. 4448 
(Issues Relating to Pas; through Entities) before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House 
Ways and Means Comm., 99th Cong. 19 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Passthrough Entity Hearings]; 
however, he asserted that state law form, i.e., "objective" rules, was preferable to functional subjective 
classification, with the limited exception of publicly traded partnerships. See id. at 27-28. 
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reality was and is that small business pressure gr~ups fight hard for the $3 
to $4 billion a year subsidy108 of the graduated inside corporate rates on 
the first $75,000 of corporate earnings, which are much lower than the rates 
the business owners would be subject to were they taxed directly on the 
income reported by the entity. Under the aggregate policy discussed above, 
close corporations would be treated as passthrough entities where ownership 
and control are not separate, 109 as is usually the case in close C 
corporations. Politics rather than sober-minded policy considerations govern 
as to close C corporations as has always been the case. In any event 
Treasury believed that it was 
Often difficult and cumbersome to apply the existing regulations and 
rulings in determining whether an unincorporated entity is taxable as a 
partnership or corporation. In addition, many states revised their statutes 
to allow partnerships to possess characteristics traditionally associated with 
corporations. 
Instead of devoting considerable resources to complex classification 
issues, such as centralized management and free transferability, taxpayers 
will now be able to achieve certainty in classification by doing no more 
108. The Joint Committee Staff estimated that the revenue loss from the reduced or graduated rate 
on the first $75,000 of corporate taxable income at around $3 billion a year. Joint Committee on 
Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 1994-1998 14 (JCS-6-93 April 22, 
1993); see Congressional Research Service, Tax Expenditures Compendium of Background Material on 
Individual Provisions, 1 03rd Cong. 2d Sess. 253-54 (Senate Budget Comm. Pmt Dec. 1, 1994)("CRS"), 
available in, LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 8-35 (Jan. 12, 1995). 
109. The Joint Committee staff believes, correctly, that the presence of the Morrissey factors only 
overlaps the passive/active participation-by-owners dichotomy which supports separate entity treatment. 
"In particular, to the extent that an entity is viewed as acting separately from its owners, rather than 
merely as their agent or alter ego, an argument can be made that it should be treated as a separate taxable 
unit." Federal Income Tax Treatment of Pass-Through Entities (Including a Description of H.R. 1658, 
H.R. 2571, H.R. 3397, and H.R. 4448), Staff of JointComm. on Taxation, 99th Cong. 13 (Comm. Print 
1986) (hereinafter "Passthrough Entity Hearing Pamphlet'). See Lee, Entity Classification, supra note 
13, at 86-87 n.118 and authorities cited therein. The underlying policy question is whether the owners 
are the parties that actually earn the income of the entity in a realistic and substantial economic sense. 
This determination should tum in large part on whether the owner is active in management. See 
Passthrough Entity Hearing Pamphlet, supra at 14-15. The still-born 1977 proposed amendments to the 
classification regulations identified the core of the partnership as this aggregate characteristic. 
"A partnership is usually characterized by the partners' personal identification with the 
partnership, their personal participation in its decision-making, and their personal 
responsibility for its obligations." 
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2), 42 FED. REG. at 1040 (1977), withdrawn, 42 FED. REG. 1489 
(1977). For this story see Lee, Entity Classification, supra note 13, at 61 n.9. In summary, the only 
policy-based, functional entity classification distinction is between an aggregate approach, which treats 
an entity as a "collection of its owners banded together for profit" and treats the owners as if they 
owned proportionate shares of the entity's assets, and a separate entity approach under which owners 
have an interest only in the entity and not in its assets. /d. at 88, n.l26 and authorities cited therein. 
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than filing a simple election. This simplification stands as an example of 
the great strides that can be made in this area and should serve as a model 
for future reform. 110 
The combination of (a) substituting for easily gamed rules 
(transactionally elective as to passthrough treatment) an expressly elective 
classification test other than as to an entity formally organized as a 
corporation or its equivalent and (b) a general anti-abuse standard for 
Subchapter K embody the Treasury preference for a broad standard over 
detailed rules. Entities other than per se corporations can elect passthrough 
treatment, but abuse of that regime are then policed by the anti-abuse 
standard, which then is applied in a structured discretionary justice manner. 
E. Lesson from Debt-Equity Regulation 
Commissioner Goldberg's view in the 1992 Business Plan111 that the 
average taxpayer is burdened by detailed rules while the larcenous taxpayer 
finds a pathway to avoidance was probably based upon the uncomfortable 
IRSffreasury experience with Section 385 legislative regulations for 
categorizing corporate debt and (disguised) equity. All versions suffered 
from hyperlexis and detailed, annoyingly slightly varying rules, which 
Professor James Eustice pointed out small business (from whose world.the 
debt-equity criteria had been developed by the courts) heartily condemned, 
wanting no regulations, while the sophisticated Wall Street financiers gamed 
the contingent interest rules. 112 
110. Remarks of the Hon. Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy) U.S. Department 
of the Treasury, ABA Tax Section 's May Meeting (May II, 1996), available in, LEXIS Fed tax Library, 
TNT File, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 97-57 (May 16, 1997). 
Ill. Treasury-IRS 1992 Business Plan, available in, LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 92 TAX 
NOTES TODAY I 04-50 (May 18, 1992); Merits of Broad Regulations Debated by Former and Current 
IRS Officials, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) March 2, 1995, at dl3 ("Monte Jackel, deputy associate chief 
counsel (domestic), said that even under the approach in which more detailed, more mechanical 
regulations were written, 'in my opinion, the line was never clear.' When IRS relied on more detailed 
rules, some practitioners often would apply them mechanically so that they violated the spirit of the rules, 
Jackel explained."). 
112. Hearings on Tax Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions before the House Ways & Means 
Subcommittees on Oversight and Select Revenue Measures, 99th Cong. 763 (1985) (statement ofN.Y.U 
Professor Jim Eustice); id. at 184 (Statement of Joint Committee Chief of Staff David Brockway) 
(Section 385 very controversial); Hearing on Leveraged Buyouts and Corporate Debt before the Senate 
Finance Comm. (Part 2), JOist Cong. 24 (1989) (colloquy between Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 
D-N.Y., and Sec'ty James Brady): 
SENATOR MOYNIHAN ... .In 1969, Congress gave Treasury the ability to distinguish 
between corporate debt and corporate equity. It took you a long while to be able to issue 
regulations-it was not until 1980. And then, it turned out they could be gamed, and you 
withdrew them. 
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In 1969 Congress dropped the debt definitional ball into the 
Treasury's lap. They writhed with it for 10 or 11 years; they tried with 
three versions of regulations to come up with the perfect world. It is 
unlikely that we are ever going to see the perfect world here. Due to 
numerous protests from different portions of the tax community- I think 
the small business taxpayers thought it was too complicated, but the 
investment bankers loved it because it had bright lines which inevitably 
make for bright ideas- the whole thing was withdrawn several years ago 
for further study, and then as far as I can tell, total interment. 113 
Treasury washed its hands of the whole matter114 leaving it to 
Congress to nickel-and-dime legislate the current fad debt-equity abuse from 
time to time when it needs a nice revenue raiser115 under its pay-as-you-go 
/d. 
You have mentioned !he problem of equallrealment of debt and equity in !he Tax Code. 
Could I !hen ask if you have any plans to revisit !he relevant portion of !he Code-Section 
385? Please answer briefly, if you can. 
SECRETARY BRADY. You bet. We have looked at it for !he very same reason !hat you 
have asked !he question because it is very important right now. Our initial thinking is !hat 
the definees are quicker and swifter !han !he definors; we have found !hat out in !he past, and 
we haven't come up with a definition right now !hat changes our view on !hat. 
I 13. (Statement of Professor Eustice). 
114. MR. PEARLMAN [Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Tax Policy]. As part of !he 
section 385 regulations project, which has surfaced several versions of section 385 
regulations, one of !he things !hat !he Treasury Deparlment did seek to do was to look at 
some of !he more esoteric kinds of securities !hat were being used in acquisition transactions 
or that might be anticipated to be used in acquisition transactions. And what we found was 
that it was (a) very difficult to articulate what was debt and what was equity under particular 
circumstances, and (b) once a determination was made, !hen it became a highly controversial 
item as to putting !hose rules into particular play. They produced what people viewed as 
inappropriate results depending on !he circumstances. 
My own judgment is, although I think it is important to seek to try to articulate geueral 
debt-equity rules !hat are available to people to be guided by, !hat it is essentially a case-by-
case process, it has always been in !his country. I think Congress, with good intent, tried 
to articulate some general rules in 1969, but we found !hat !hey were very difficult to 
generalize. 
Hearing on Tax Treatment of Hostile Takeovers (S. 420, S. 476, and S. 632) before the Senate Finance 
Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management, 99th Cong. 144 (1985) (statement of Assistant 
Secretary Ron Pearlman). See also id. at 143. 
MR. PEARLMAN. Treasury has been working on !hose regulations [§385] since 1969. I guess 
it would be accurate to say we are not actively doing anything with !hose regulations now, 
having been wounded on a number of occasions. 
/d. at 143 (statement of Pearlman). 
115. See Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Rethinking the Dead Letter of the Debt-Equity Rules, 
69 TAX NOTES 1437 (1995). 
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or "pay go" rules for enacting revenue losing tax legislation 116 and to the 
Service to audit and litigate. 117 
This article maintains that it is time for detailed capitalization versus 
expensing rules. 118 This story should not preclude detailed rules as to 
capitalization versus expensing so long as they are compatible with the 
rough justice and structured discretionary justice arguments espoused in this 
article. 
F. Structured Discretionary Justice and Horizontal Equity or 
Rough Justice politically 
In choosing among the many options submitted pursuant to Notice 96-
7, the Service should be guided by the idea of evolutionary rule making 
propounded by the leading administrative law scholar, Emeritus Professor 
Kenneth Davis in his landmark book Discretionary Justice- A Preliminary 
lnquiry. 119 His thinking here is best appreciated against the perspective 
of the more general jurisprudential thinking about general principles and 
rules discussed above. Professor Duncan Kennedy in his landmark article 
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication posits two opposed 
methods in American Law for implementing substantive law: standards and 
rules-the familiar substance and form (and equity versus law) debate in yet 
another guise. 120 This was the path the debate took as to the partnership 
116. See John W. Lee, Critique of Current Congressional Capital Gains Contentions, 15 VA. TAX 
REv. I, 57 (1995) [hereinafter Lee, Capital Gains Contentions], for a discussion of''pay-as-you-go" or 
paygo procedures of OBRA 1993 which, ''require revenue decreases to be offset by (a) increases in 
revenues ... " or "(b) decreases in spending, so there is no net increase in the deficit") 
117. Many of the earliest ISP's involved leveraged buyout issues such as interest incurred as to 
financing of stock repurchases and amortization of purchased intangibles. IRS Publishes List of /SP 
Guidelines, (September 30, 1996), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, lNT File, 96 TAX NOTFS 
TODAY 209-11 (Oct. 25, 1996). 
118. Long after our Submission and after this article was substantially completed evidence was 
released which suggests that Chief Counsel Stuart Brown at least for now intends to keep muddling 
through."What became clear through the process, however, was that there was no ''magic formula" for 
resolving the conundrum; in other words, the IRS has not developed an approach to avoid a case-by-case 
analysis." TEl Releases Minutes of IRS, Treasury Liaison Meetings (Jan. 27, 1997) (hereinafter TEl 
Liaison Minutes], available in, LEXIS, Fedtax Library, lNT File, 97 Tax Notes Today 20-46 (Jan. 27, 
1997) 
119. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 103 (1969) 
[hereinafter DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE]. 
120. Kennedy, supra note I. Neither this article, nor our Submission, nor Professor Lee's earlier 
treatment of Professor Kennedy's thought in Structured Discretionary Justice, supra note I, attempt to 
either explore or describe Professor Kennedy's central inquiry into the relationship between the ''two 
opposed rhetorical modes for dealing with substantive issues, ... individualism and altruism," 89 HARv. 
L. REv. at 1685, and rules and standards: "altruist views ... lead to willingness to resort to standards ... , 
while individualism seems to harmonize with an insistence on rigid rules rigidly applied." /d. Also, this 
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anti-abuse standard. Yet the policy choice does not have to be between 
rules and standards; rules may be combined with standards, as where tax 
"safe harbors" are combined with a facts-and-circumstances test subject to 
the underlying standard. In fact, that is the path followed in the final 
partnership anti-abuse regulations. Some tax commentators long-ago 
advocated this format as providing certainty in the safe harbor for anyone 
who could read the Code and "an area for those who want to venture into 
it where, if you really understand the cases, you can advise your client 
intelligently."121 Parenthetically nowadays the preserve of large, 
sophisticated tax departments is more likely to be the labyrinth of detailed, 
mechanical rules spun out in endless regulations at times implementing 
exceeding complex statutory regimes, 122 such as the Section 469 passive 
loss rules and standards, and at times more simple statutory provisions, as 
in the Sections 704(b) and 752 regulations. 
In contrast, detailed regulations promulgated by an administrative 
agency, here Treasury and the Service, increase the principled discretion of 
the agency as a decision maker, according to Discretionary Justice and 
subsequent administrative law scholarship. 123 Administrative law scholars 
believe that agencies through structured discretion, e.g., issuing regulations 
(rule making) setting forth specific factors to be used in balancing tests 
implementing the desired standards and policies, can implement standards 
effectively while maintaining the bureaucrat's discretionary judgement in 
application. They believe that such detailed rules channeling agency 
exercise of discretion can develop from first considering one concrete 
problem at a time, announcing the hypothetical cases as rulings and 
refraining from generalizing; then fashioning generalized principles or 
standards from this experience; and finally formulating regulations to 
impl~ment the standard in the form of structured discretion. 124 The 
article does not explore Professor Kennedy's method of tracing the conflict between altruism and 
individualism, viz., a "dialectical or structuralist or historicist or the method of contradictions." /d. at 
1712. For interesting applications of rules/standard thought to the tax area see John A. Miller, 
Indeterminacy, Complexity, and Fairness: Justifying Rule Simplification in the Law of Taxation, 68 
WASH. L. REv. I (1993); Colliton, supra note I. · 
121. Panel Discussions on Income Tax Revisions before the House Ways & Means Comm., 86th 
Cong. 883 (1959) (colloquy between Chairman Wilbur Mills and Hugh Calkins, Esq.). 
122. Some call for a two track approach: complex regulatory provisions for the generalist and 
average taxpayer backed up with an anti-abuse standard for the specialist and the sophisticated taxpayer; 
for all an anti-abuse provision must clearly target the avoidance it seeks to prevent. Olson, supra note 
26, at 824. Cf Lee, Structured Discretionary Justice, supra note I; Use and Misuse, supra note 26, at 
829. 
123. DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 119, at 103; see also JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC 
JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL DISABIUTY CLAIMS 103-23 (1983). 
124. DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 119, at 60. 
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evolution of the Section 355 regulations, which are but the later chapters in 
the Gregory story, strikingly illustrates this progression. 125 Similarly the 
partnership anti-abuse regulations, also ultimately derived from this source 
provide an excellent illustration. The generalized statute cum-detailed 
regulations tax model closely parallels the thinking of Professor Davis as to 
"discretionary justice" in administrative law and in particular his concept of 
"structured discretion." 
A rule may provide that over here at the right end the answer is 
always yes, and that over here at the left end the answer is always no; 
when it does that it confmes discretion to the middle territory. But the rule 
may go on and structure the discretion in that middle territory. . . . For 
instance, it may provide that in exercising discretion the agency will 
consider three factors. That much is a partial structuring of discretion. 
Then the rule may state the result when the three factors pull together but 
provide that the result will be worked out from case to case when the three 
pull against each other. Such a rule structures discretion, leaving many 
questions open. A rule which does not generalize but which gives 
illustrations may help structure discretion. 126 
Observe the parallel as life mimics art. 
As the product of long administrative experience with section 355, the 
1989 fmal regulations are a paradigmatic fusion of rules and standards 
implemented through factors that closely relate to the underlying policy or 
standard. De-emphasis of the active business test and the predominant 
weight given to the functional device standard continues from 1977 the 
125. See Lee, Structured Discretionary Justice, supra note 1. Mark Yieces tells Professor Lee that 
he drafted the 1977 proposed revision with a copy of Lee's Rafferty piece in front of him. This is 
corroborated by Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,387 (August 25, 1975); Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,069 (Nov. 5, 
1974): 
What we do wish to clarify is the test that should be used in determining whether a particular 
transaction constitutes a device to distribute earnings and profits under Code 355(a)(l )(B). 
The current leading authority on this issue is Rafferty v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d 767 (1st Cir. 
1971), affg, 55 T.C. 491 (1970). In that case, the court found a device to distnbute earnings 
and profits even though the shareholders had not yet converted ordinary income to capital 
gains. The court took an expansive view of the device clause and changed by its 
interpretation the emphasis of the limitations on shareholder nonrecognition of gain or loss 
in Code § 355 and the Regulations thereunder. The First Circuit cited and adopted some of 
the suggestions in Whitman, Draining the Serbonian Bog: A New Approach to Corporate 
Separations Under the 1954 Code, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1194 (1968). The Sixth Circuit took 
a similar view of the device clause in King v. Commissioner, 458 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1972), 
rev'g, 55 T.C. 677 (1970). [sic] Both cases are discussed at length in Lee, Functional 
Divisions and Other Corporate Separations Under Section 355 After Rafferty, 27 TAX L. 
REv. 453 (1972). 
126. DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 119, at 103. 
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proposals. But this time, the regulation drafters implemented the device 
standard through a balancing of non-per se factors evidencing device with 
factors evidencing non-device, including business purpose, tested against 
the underlying standard of preventing bailouts. Additionally, a 
nondividend equivalency test or "escape hatch" ordinarily trumps any 
device factors. Moreover, the drafters provided instructions as the 
weighing process. The active business test has been clarified and 
simplified in spots. The 1989 regulations rely heavily on a clarified 
business purpose requirement to deny tax deferral to undeserving 
transactions that do not otherwise violate the device restriction. The 
continuity of business interest requirement also has been strengthened in 
an effort to get at these transactions. 
The 1989 fmal regulations increase the number and quality of 
examples for every aspect of the regulations and often explain in the 
"Preamble" the rationale of the further examples. Moreover, the text 
greatly expands the general principles, particularly as to the business 
purpose and device provisions, and the accompanying examples often refer 
to the applicable principle. All in all, this process constitutes a major step 
in the maturity of regulation drafting, through lessening the agency's 
unbridled discretion in favor of structured discretion. 127 
We think that the more recent Section 1.701-2 anti-abuse regulation is 
in the same structured discretionary justice school of provisions with (a) a 
standard expressed through rules describing the intent of Subchapter K 
coupled with substantial reducton of the present value of the partners' 
aggregate federal (income) tax liability inconsistent with such intent; (b) a 
list of non-exclusive factors evidencing that the partnership was formed or 
availed of to violate such standard; and (c) numerous examples illustrating 
the relevant factors and the weight to be given them in various transactions 
both consistent and inconsistent with the intent of Subchapter K. "[The] 
examples contain the rules."128 
G. Conclusion 
INDOPC0129 theoretically did not change the rules as to 
capitalization according to the conventional wisdom of the courts, 130 
Treasury/IRS 131 and commentators. 132 The catch is that few knew what 
127. Lee, Structured Discretionary Justice, supra note 1, at 1035 (footnotes omitted). 
128. Battle, supra note 18, at 806. 
129. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992) (Biackmun, J.) 
130. See Sun Microsysterns, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-467 (1993)(Tannenwald, 
J.) (declining to consider a "new look" for capitalization purportedly created by INDOPCO for items 
with incidental future benefits) (citing Lee, Capitalization Rules, supra note 2, at 670). 
131. See Rev. Rul. 94-12, 1994-1 C.B. 36 (noting that!NDOPCO did not"change the fundamental 
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those rules were133 beyond perhaps a few limited talismans, 134 e.g., less 
than one-year benefit rule; 135 general plan of rehabilitation; 136 and 
legal principles" of capitalization); Rev. Rul. 94-77, 1994-2 C.B. 19 (same); Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-02-004 
(Sept. 10, 1993) (same); Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-35-011 (May 15, 1995) (same); Controversies Over Cost 
Capitalization Seen Increasing Following 'INDOPCO', DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Feb. 9, 1993, at d22 
("It is somewhat surprising to see IRS pushing additional capitalization arguments on INDOPCO when 
all the decision did was confirm what IRS' view always has been.") (Statement of former IRS Acting 
Chief Counsel Peter Scott); id. ("If [IRS) truly believes that Indopco doesn't create a different result than 
would have happened before Indopco, I don't see why it's so hard to state that in a way that revenue 
agents will follow.") (Statement offonner IRS Acting Chief Counsel Peter Scott); Brown Lists Factors 
That Could Be Used To See If Cleanup Costs Must Be Capitalized, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), March 10, 
1993, at d 19 (Mar. 10, 1993). 
132. See Lee, Capitalization Rules, supra note 2, at 670; See Carrington, supra note 7, at p. 25-29 
§ 25.03[1). 
133. Brown Lists Factors That Could Be Used To See If Cleanup Costs Must Be Capitalized, 
DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), March 10, 1993, at dl9 ("Part of the problem, according to [IRS Associate 
Chief Counsel (Domestic) Stuart) Brown, is that when the Service is attempting to set standards in the 
aftermath of Indopco, 'we discover that we don't know what the pre-lndopco standard was.'" Lee 
surmised that this would be the case which is why Lee, Capitalization Rules, supra note 2, at 669, 
quoted from Ecclesiastes "There is nothing new Beneath the sun"; the earlier is not remembered (except 
in student pieces). But Professor Lee had the good fortune to meet Glenn Carrington at a Virginia Tax 
Study Group Seminar between his issuance of the asbestos and soil remediation TAMs. For the rest of 
this story see Lee, 1993 Hearings, supra note 2, at 1702. 
134. See NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 953 (finding some arguments ignore matching principles ''by 
reference to one or more claimed departures supposedly embodied in a series of verbalisms, talismans, 
and rules-of-thumb"); Lee, Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 2, at 25 (criticizing the frequent 
distortion of income caused by the separate, saleable asset test for expenditures that produce long term 
benefits). 
135. Exceptions to capitalization acknowledged where expenditures result in benefits extending 
beyond one year. See, e.g., United States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686,689 (lOth Cir. 1968) (recognizing 
the practice of capitalizing expenditures with useful lives in excesses of one year but refusing to 
arbitrarily apply the rule); Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,784 (March 29, 1968) (recommending that expenditures 
for advertising and salaries associated with securing new customers for utilities be deducted under § 162, 
despite the fact that resulting benefits may last beyond one year); Rev. Rul. 68-134, 1968-1 C.B. 63, and 
Rev. Rul. 59-249, 1959-2 C.B. 55 (overlap 2 tax years with 1-year truck tires purchased late in year does 
not prevent current deduction). Professor Cal Johnson disagrees with this analysis consistent with his 
insistence upon the ideal rule. Law Professor Offers Counter-Analysis to ABA INDOPCO Report, 
available in, LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 97 TAX NOTFS TODAY 30-27 (Feb. 13, 1997). 
136. Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-47-002 (July 18, 1995) (destroyed vineyard "is an 'incidental repair,' 
it is subject to being incurred in conjunction with a general plan of capital improvement"). For a 
creative attempt by a taxpayer to attach start-up employee training to tangible assets, see Tech. Adv. 
Mem. 94-30-003 (April 22, 1994); Juliann Avakian-Martin, INDOPCO Guidance Likely to Cover 
Advertising, Repairs, Training, 56 TAX NOTFS 545 (1992) (Carrington "let it slip that in that TAM, the 
cleanup costs were amortized to the piping system. That fact was blacked out when the TAM was 
released."); Carrington, supra note 7, at 25-29 (taxpayer in Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15-004 operated a 
natural gas pipeline). Moss v. Commissioner, 831 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1987), correctly limited the 
''rehabilitation doctrine" to substantial capital improvements and repairs to the same specific assets 
(usually a structure in a state of disrepair). The IRS sought to add the recurring cost of repainting and 
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restoration to pre-deterioration status. 137 Moreover, the majority of the 
cases, the Service at times and Congress actually followed the "separate 
asset" test overturned in INDOPC0. 138 More importantly INDOPCO 
acknowledged that future benefit, although indicating capitalization may be 
necessary to avoid a "timing" mismatch of income and expense, is not 
determinative. 139 For the most part the administrative development to the 
date of our Submission had been listing exceptions one-by-one to future 
benefitl40 with only hints as to the underlying rules or standards. 141 
repapering motel rooms (every three years or so) to the cost of the long-lived structure of the motel. 
(Contemporaneous costs of replacement of furniture and fixtures were depreciated under ACRS. The 
court allowed a current deduction for the repainting, etc. Probably these costs should have been treated 
as a freestanding amortizable deferred charge due to the substantiality and deferred maintenance aspects, 
except that repainting normally recurred every three years or so. In short overreaching by the Service 
resulted in distortion of income the other way much like the separate asset rule.). See Juliann 
Avakian-Martin, Does The IRS Need To Clean Up Its Ruling On Cleanup Costs?, 59 TAX NOTES 728 
(I 993) ("Lee was also impressed with the IRS's decision to permit the environmental cleanup costs to 
be added to the cost of facilities that have a useful life and thus recovered, rather than capitalized to the 
land. According to Lee, the Service uses the concept of "a general plan of rehabilitation" in an entirely 
new way to permit recovery of the cost. Lee said that if the government did not permit amortization 
of the cleanup costs, the taxpayer's income would be distorted. Lee added that the decision to permit 
this recovery appears to mark a new direction for the Service. Previously, the IRS would seek to 
maximize revenue - arguing when it could that the taxpayer could not amortize a capitalized cost. 
Citing Moss v. Commissioner, 831 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1987) as an example, Lee said that courts have 
been reluctant to rule against the taxpayer when the Service advances its ali-or-nothing argument. The 
decision to permit cost recovery is probably an attempt to respond to this reality, he said."). /d. Also 
the non-official rulings have begun to approach association of expenditures in a commendable new 
manner of creatively finding amortization periods. See infra note 140. 
13 7. See supra Part I. 
138. /d. 
139. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 87 ("[A] taxpayer's realization of benefits beyond the year in which 
the expenditure is incurred is undeniably important in determining whether the appropriate tax treatment 
is immediate deduction or capitalization."). Unfortunately, some courts interpreted similar language in 
Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass 'n, 403 U.S. 345, 354 (1971) ("the presence of an ensuing 
benefit that may have some future aspect is not controlling"), as permitting a deduction despite the 
presence of future benefits without regard to the potential for income distortion. The explanations for 
these exceptions generally involved administrative efficiency. See Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir. 1982) ("The administrative costs of conceptual rigor are too 
great."); NCNB Corp I, 651 F.2d at 942, 953 (discussing cases following the "more-trouble-than-its-
worth exceptions" that ignore future benefit). Instead of assessing the effect of these exceptions on 
income, such focus placed undue emphasis on the presence of future benefits. Lee, Capitalization Rules, 
supra note 2, at 671; accord, Jeffrey Gates Davis, Note, INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner: National 
Starch Isn't the Only One "Stiffed" by the Supreme Court's Decision, 20 PEPP. L. REv. 1455, 1466 
(1993). The exceptions, proving the rule, demonstrate that at the heart of capitalization considerations 
lies the desire to minimize income distortion. Cf Faber, supra note 7, at 625, 628-29, 633-35. 
140. See Rev. Rul. 94-77, 1994-2 C.B. 19 (severance pay triggered by downsizing, but pursuant 
to pre-existing contract deductible), accord, Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-40-003 (June 30, 1995) (payments to 
employees in cancellation of employee stock options that are in excess of the amounts that would have 
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been paid if Corp X's stock price had not been influenced by a pending takeover are deductible as 
arising out of pre-takeover contract); Rev. Rul. 94-12, 1994-1 C.B. 36 (repairs); Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 
C.B. 57 (advertising); Rev. Rul. 95-32, 1995-1 C.B. 8, Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-48-004 (August 9, 1995), 
and Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-13-002 (Nov. 28, 1994) (both permit a deduction for energy conservation 
program costs); Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35 (soil remediation); Priv. Ler. Rul. 96-07-016 
(November 20, 1995) (lease termination payments added to cost of new lease); Priv. Ler. Rul. 95-50-011 
(Sept. 13, 1995) (settlement agreement and legal fees as to class action securities fraud allegations of 
concealment of adverse material information about the taxpayer's business and financial condition 
artificially inflating stock price deductible because acts giving rise to the litigation were performed in 
the ordinary conduct of the taxpayer's business); Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-44-001 (July 21, 1995) 
(just-in-time manufacturing ["JITM"] process constitutes radical redesign of existing manufacturing 
processes resulting in a fundamental change in the business processes transforming work force adapted 
property to a new or different use); Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-41-004 (June 30, 1995) (commissions for 
soliciting pre-need funeral contracts because contracts provided future benefits at least as entree to need-
funerals, i.e., goodwill advertising); Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-35-011 (May 15, 1995) (prudency audit so 
regulating agency could determine whether the construction and completion of the facility was justified 
so that rates charged to consumers could be increased deductible because comparable to market studies 
and cost analyses used by unregulated industries to determine a competitive or fair price for the goods 
and services to be sold); Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-27-005 (March 15, 1995) (management paid bonuses to 
executives to pay for taxes on stock options exercised so they could invest in firm going private); Tech. 
Adv. Mem. 94-30-003 (April 22, 1994) (costs incurred by the taxpayer for obtaining an operating license 
from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (''NRC") capitalized over 40-year li.fe of license; employee 
training costs amortizable over same period); Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-27-002 (March 30, 1994) (payments 
made by railroad to settle civil antitrust litigation brought by coal slurry pipeline venture deductible 
because liability relates primarily to the daily conduct of rail road business; any long term benefit merely 
incidental); Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-24-002 (Feb. 9, 1994) (costs sea wall around storage tanks and of 
raising drilling platforms to offset temporarily subsidence of sea floor due to drilling capitalized); Tech. 
Adv. Mem. 94-11-002 (Nov. 19, 1993) (costs of asbestos removal had to be capitalized); Tech. Adv. 
Mem. 94-10-008 (Dec. 13, 1993) (favorable financing not an asset used in taxpayer's mortgage 
securitization business); Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-02-004 (Sept. I 0, 1993) (taxpayer payment of multi-year 
insurance policy as to directors paid in connection with merger but arising out of normal business 
operations- taxpayer historically purchased similar insurance on an annual "claims made" basis, multi-
year to handle potential of future year claim- capitalized as freestanding amortizable intangible and not 
added to corporate structure); Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-02-006 (Sept. 24, 1993); Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-48-003 
(Aug. 30, 1993), Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-33-005 (May 7, 1993) (entrance and exit fees as to acquisition 
of savings and loan or conversion to bank not deductible); accord Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-02-006 (Sept. 
24, 1993) (Treasury later reversed itself as memorialized in the Conference Committee Report, 142 
CONG. REC. Sll,909 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996)); Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-31-001 (April23, 1993)("1n light 
of!NDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039, 1044-45 (1192), even though the opening of the 
additional boutiques constituted business expansion, rather than a new trade or business, the expenditures 
paid or incurred by Taxpayer regarding the opening of the additional boutiques might not be currently 
deductible."); Priv. Ler. Rul. 93-30-034 (May 5, 1993) (payments to underwriter for marketing by 
investment fund deductible); Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-26-001 (March 18, 1993) ("payments made to the 
executives and the directors were coincidental to the reorganization (and] had their basis in the 
longstanding employment relationship with target not the reorganization itself'); Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-18-
003 (Jan. 21, 1993) and Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-53-002 (Sept. 22, 1992) (take-or-pay payments arising 
from cancellation of natural gas requirements contracts deductible); Priv. Ler. Rul. 92-40-010 (June 30, 
1992) (multi-year covenant not to compete must be amortized over the period of the covenant [prior to 
1520 OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23 
According to Professor Davis this is the proper first rule making step when 
the agency is not yet sure of the principles. 142 Subsequent capitalization/ 
expensing TAMs, however, more fully articulate principles. 143 
This article maintains that in some capitalization areas the doctrine and 
policy are more evolved than the simple case-by-case rules and any 
regulations should reflect that. Thus, as elaborated in Section ill below, 
proposed regulations should not only state the general principle of minimum 
distortion of income from timing but also should contain rules such as (1) 
a presumption of capitalization where an expenditure provides future 
benefits, with (2) exceptions for average lives of not more than 12 months, 
de minimis and regularly recurring expenditures and where depreciation is 
impractical,144 and (3) capitalization and amortization over uniform periods 
of substantial, irregularly recurring expenditures. The regulations should 
state in the context of timing distortions the clear reflection (minimum 
distortion) of income standard and these rules. Specific problem areas such 
as (1) business expansion costs, (2) advertising, (3) employee training costs 
(including just-in-time retraining), (4) repairs including cyclical overhauls, 
(5) pollution clean up expenses, and (6) writers prepublication costs should 
be addressed through examples based upon judicial precedents and the 
Service's ruling experience. 145 
Section 197]); Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992) (cost of removing and replacing asbestos 
insulation must be capitalized). 
141. The best reading of the recent tea leaves not surprisingly has been by Glenn Carrington, 
supra note 7. Glenn, as Assistant Chief Counsel, Income and Accounting, had a major hand in the 
brewing and steeping of the post-INDOPCO administrative rulings tea. Peter Faber also provides a sound 
policy based reading consistent with the minimum distortion of income analysis advocated in this article 
and ultimately based upon or at least influenced by Boris Bittker's work. Faber, supra note 7, at 635. 
142. This point is discussed extensively in Part 1. 
143. Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-45-002 and 96-38-002 (June 21, 1996 and June 3, 1996, respectively). 
144. More experience could lead to final structured discretionary justice regulations which would 
set forth the factors that afl: to be applied, for example, in determining (1) de minimis and (2) how 
infrequently recurring and how much variation from average annual costs is permitted under the recurring 
exception. 
145. At the time of Professor Lee's 1993 testimony recommending that Congress authorize 
legislative regulations as to capitalization with the Service first developing a body of ruling experience 
which it would then distill into legislative regulations, he had not yet investigated the body of Service 
non-published rulings which provide both the necessary factual experience and legal reasoning supporting 
many of the rules proposed in our Submission and this article. At the time of the Submission Professor 
Lee anticipated that the final version of this article would apply the model to the areas mentioned in text 
as well as other areas. That turned out to be too many stories for one article to carry. Now Professor 
Lee is scheduled to participate in a discussion on capitalization at the Virginia Tax Study Group Seminar 
in March, 1997, and to give a speech in June at the 49th Annual Virginia Federal Tax Conference at 
Charlottesville, Virginia in June, 1997, that will attempt that project That work is already beginning 
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Another fundamental capitalization principle mandates capitalization 
where necessary to avoid a character mismatch between a current ordinary 
deduction and related tax preferenced income. The precedents and rulings 
there are less developed than the timing authorities. 146 This article 
proposes that minimum 'distortion of income as to character at this time be 
addressed primarily through examples in the regulations applying the "origin 
of the claim" doctrine, particularly as to merger issues. The Solicitor 
General's Office attempted in argument and on Brief to make that argument 
to the Court in INDOPCO, 147 but the Court perhaps understandably148 
appears to have been fixated on the future benefit rationale. This article 
argues that this does not mean that INDOPCO precludes adoption of a 
character distortion rationale for denying a current deduction to a (hostile) 
takeover or any other merger. Rather, it means that the argument once 
received favorable policy review at a high level of tax administration and 
thus any future administrative development should very seriously consider 
it. 149 
This article proposes that the more mature administrative law model of 
(1) general principle, (2) regulation rules implementing the standard, and (3) 
numerous examples culled from the existing administrative and judicial 
ruling experience (especially judicial experience in the case of the 
contemplated interpretative regulations) should be applied to timing 
distortion issues, where after deduction or capitalization the basic question 
is often to what "asset" should capitalized costs be allocated. A more bold 
approach will be needed as to amortization of such assets if capitalized. 
This article proposes the perhaps bold, but not unprecedented, approach of 
standard class lives based upon minimum distortion of income (more 
broadly equity and the Cohan rule of approximation). 
to be in progress. In the meantime good discussions of the areas are presented by Canington, supra note 
7; Faber, supra note 7. 
146. See generally Lee & Murphy, Capital Expenditures, supra note 2, at 509-27. 
147. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at pp. 34-8. 
148. Kent Jones at times seemed to merge and thus obscure the doctrines. Additionally Justice 
Blackmun was the author of the leading cases adopting the future benefit rationale and capital transaction 
for capital expenditures, Idaho Plower and Lincoln Savings and Loan and United States v. General 
Bancshares Corp., 388 F.2d 184, 191 (8th Cir. 1968) (Blackmun, J.), respectively, which naturally Kent 
Jones played to. 
149. Professor Lee must once again acknowledge a "vested interest'' here. The Solicitor General's 
Brief and Assistant Jones' argument were solidly grounded on Professor Bittker & Lokken's income tax 
treatise as well as Professor Bittker & Eustice's corporate tax treatise. Professor Lee is most proud of 
his collaboration with Professor Bittker on the former and of some of his capitalization work having 
made Professor Jim Eustice's long and short lists. (Perusal of Lee's work here will show how much he 
followed in their footsteps). 
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A similar bold approach was considered in Government Counsel 
Memorandum 34,959150 and is buttressed by the tax policfes underlying 
the statutory rules of (a) 5 year amortization for start up costs under Section 
195 and (b) 15 years for purchased intangibles under Section 197. As to 
character distortion, the evolution of the cases and rulings as the "origin of 
the claim" suggests that the second stage of general principle (of minimum 
distortion of income from character mismatch) and examples and mere 
conclusions. 
ill. ROUGH JUSTICE EXCEPTIONS TO FUTURE BENEFIT CAPITALIZATION 
The rough justice exceptions to future benefit capitalization can be 
categorized as (a) de minimis (insubstantial) or short-lived, (b) recurring 
steady state, (c) no depreciation deduction available although benefit is 
temporally limited, and (d) where the burdens of capitalization and 
depreciation outweigh the revenue benefits of more clear reflection of 
income through such capitalization/depreciation. The starting point for 
minimum distortion of income as to timing of deductions is that 
business/investment expenses that typically don't provide on the average a 
benefit much beyond a year (say truck tires 151) should be currently 
deductible in the year of purchase. Other expenditures providing longer 
benefits should be capitalized unless (1) they are relatively small (say hand 
tools, and professional joumals152 and sometimes calculators) or (2) 
regularly recurring (say repainting every three years or so153 or steady 
/d. 
150. (July 25, 1972). 
We believe that the Service is not inalterably bound to abide by a strict capitalization rule 
when dealing with minor, recurring-type small items. It is clearly within the Commissioner's 
discretion under section 446(b) to allow expensing of such items [under $100] as long as 
income is clearly reflected under such method. We believe that the Court of Claims in 
Cincinnati was using this rationale in reaching its decision. And, although we do not purport 
to agree entirely with the Cincinnati decision, we believe it lends support to our view that the 
Commissioner need not regard section 263 as truly immutable. 
151. Rev. Rul. 68-134, 1968-1 C.B. 63; Rev. Rul. 59-249, 1959-2 C.B. 55;see Gen. Couns. Mem. 
38,618 (January 23. 1981); supra note 135. 
152. Treas. Reg.§ 1.162-12(a)(as amended in 1972); cf Rev. Proc. 95-33; 1995-281.RB. 7 (".05 
De minimis rule. If the § 48I(a) adjustment is less than $ 25,000, the taxpayer may elect to take the 
adjustment into account in the year of change instead of over the adjustment period otherwise prescribed 
by section 5.04 of this revenue procedure. A taxpayer that makes this election inust attach to its original 
Form 3115 a statement indicating that it is electing the de minimis rule pursuant to section 5.05 of this 
revenue procedure."). 
153. Official Gives Update on Series of Guidance on Tax Accounting Issues, DAILY TAX REP. 
(BNA), March 11, 1993, at d6 ("'As Wolfsen pointed out, if [the taxpayer] had cleaned the PCBs every 
year, it would have been deductible. But if you've waited four or five years, it's not. I gotta draw the 
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state institutional advertising154) in which case current deduction would 
also be in order. The test justifying the first three rules is a more-trouble-
than-it's-worth balancing ofburdens and benefits. The story of the taxation 
of writer's prepublication costs reveals that future benefit costs which cannot 
meet the first three tests may still qualify under this administrative 
convenience balancing test. 155 There income forecast depreciation can 
work such a hardship that capitalization/depreciation of writer's 
prepublication costs is more trouble than it's worth. 
A. De Minimis or Short Lived Benefit Expenditures 
1. De minimis 
Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway v. United States156 
was the first decision to allow the current deduction of an expenditure 
benefiting future years under a distortion of income analysis. There the 
government argued that: (1) since the expenditures at issue admittedly had 
a useful life in excess of one year, they had to be capitalized under the 
predecessor to Section 263 157 as a "betterment"; and, (2) the method of 
line. I've got to say, 'If you do it every second year, you're fine. If you wait six years, it's not.' That's 
a tough one. I haven't resolved in my mind," he said.") (Statement of Glenn Carrington, Ass't Chic;f 
Counsel, Individual and Tax Accounting); accord, Service Ponders Environmental Cleanup Costs; 
Carrington Uncertain of Outcome, 93 TAX NOTES TODAY 102-10 (May 12, 1993) ("The TAM found 
that the cleanup expense was not merely incidental because the costs had been accumulating over many 
years, and that allowing the deduction of the entire cleanup costs in a single year would excessively 
distort the income in that year. Carrington admitted that the bulk of the cleanup cost would have been 
deductible had it been incurred as part of a regular maintenance program."). See generally Lee, Clear 
Reflection of Income, supra note 2, at 18-20; Lee, Capitalization Rules, supra note 2, at 679-82; accord, 
Note, An Analysis ofiNDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 54 OHIO ST. L. J. 1505, 1516-18 (1993). Four 
years is probably the cutoff. Tech. Adv. M'em. 96-18-004 (May 3, 1996) (costs of "major engine 
inspection" performed about every four years must be capitalized; engines are removed from the aircraft 
and inspected, part by part. Components not meeting FAA standards are reconditioned or replaced. 
Typical costs range from $25,000 and $80,000; in comparison new engines cost from $350,000 to 
$800,000; and the cost of a new aircraft ranges from $1 to $7 million). 
154. See authorities cited in Lee, Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 2, at 15-20; Lee, 
Capitalization Rules, supra note 2, at 679-83. 
155. As discussed in Part 1 Professor Lee has a work in progress addressing this area. 
156. 424 F.2d 563 (Ct. Cl. 1970). See generally Gunn, supra note 2, at 454-57. Much of the 
following discussion is taken from Lee, Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 2, at 15-18. 
157. Section 263 generally denies a current deduction for expenditures for new buildings or 
permanent improvements or betterments. I.RC. § 263 (1997). Commentators believe that the 
capitalization requirement is broader than any particular section of the Code. See, e.g., Gunn, supra note 
2, at450; accord 1 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, EsTATES 
AND GIFTS ~ 20.4.1, at 20-67 (2d ed. 1989). 
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accounting provisions (the predecessor to Section 446)158 were subordinate 
to the capital expenditure and depreciation provisions. 159 The Court of 
Claims (now the Federal Circuit) disagreed, reasoning that capitalization, 
depreciation, and the requirement that the taxpayer's method of accounting 
clearly reflect income were all so "inextricably intertwined"160 that the 
ultimate question was whether the taxpayer's (tax) accounting method 
clearly reflected its income, and not whether the benefits generated by the 
expenditures extended beyond the tax year, although that was a relevant 
inquiry. 161 The Court of Claims relied most heavily on the insubstantiality 
of the expenditures in relation to both the taxable income and the balance 
sheet of the taxpayer, concluding that the taxpayer's method did clearly 
reflect its income. 162 Critical to the court's conclusion was a costs\benefits 
analysis under which the burden of capitalizing and depreciating each 
purchase with benefits extending beyond the tax year would be heavy; "at 
the same time, the clearer reflection of income would be exceedingly slight 
if there were any at all."163 Such cost/benefits analysis lies at the core of 
the notion of ''rough justice" over theoretical purity. 
The Tax Court similarly pointed in Sharon v. Commissioner to the 
regulation permitting a farmer to currently deduct the full cost of 
inexpensive or short-lived tools in the year of payment despite their capital 
nature, as supporting the current deduction of the minor costs of a license 
by an attorney admitted to one state bar to practice in another state 
notwithstanding its future benefits. 164 In short, determining net income 
158. Section 446(a) and (b) provides that the taxpayer's income is to be computed under his 
regular method of accounting unless he fails to employ a method or the method used does not clearly 
reflect income. I.R.C. § 446(a)-(b) (1997). In either case, income will be computed under such 
method as does clearly reflect income in the opinion of the Secretary of the Treasury. /d. 
159. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pac. R.R. v. United States, 424 F.2d at 567-68. The useful 
life was assumed to be ten years. /d. at 571; Gunn, supra note 2, at 456 n.55. 
160. Cincinnati, 424 F.2d at 569. 
161. /d. at 568. In this determination of clear reflection of income, "the one year rule will be given 
adequate, though not conclusive, weight." /d. The taxpayer's method of accounting for these items was 
required by the Interstate Commerce Commission. /d. at 565. Courts tend to give considerable weight 
to the requirements of applicable regulatory accounting in determining clear reflection of income. See 
id.; NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285, 292-93 (4th Cir. 1982) (en bane) ("NCNB If'), 
overruled INDOPCO, 503 U.S. 79 (1992); see also Harold Dubroff, M. Connie Cahill & Michael D. 
Norris, Tax Accounting: The Relationship of Clear Reflection of Income to Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles, 41 ALB. L. REv. 354, 396-97 (1983). 
162. See Cincinnati, 424 F.2d at 571-72; Gunn, supra note 2, at 456-57. 
163. Cincinnati, 424 F.2d at 572. 
164. 66 T.C. 515, 527 (1976), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 
(1979); accord Diffley v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 547, 549 (1984); Galazin v. Commissioner, 
38 T.C.M. (CCH) 851, 853 (1979); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-12(a) (as amended 1960). Similarly, the 
regulations provide that "[a]mounts currently paid or accrued for books, furniture, and professional 
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annually with minimum distortion of income entails a cost\benefits balancing 
analysis under which taxable income is not distorted by currently deducting 
a cost producing future benefit so long as such cost is insubstantial or the 
future benefit is short-lived, particularly if capitalizing and then amortizing 
such cost will be burdensome. As Commissioner Goldberg put it, "a 
modification that saves the government a dollar, but costs the taxpayer two 
dollars, is a 'bad deal' and ... 'we can't make those kinds of deals. "'165 
An exception is where revenue is not the goal of the provision as much as 
public perception of the tax system such as the substantiation and other anti-
abuse rules under Section 274, designed to end publicity about the "it's 
deductible" in the 1960's, two-martini lunches and foreign conventions in 
the 1970's, and country club dues and spousal travel in the 1990's. 
A pair of Tax Court memorandum decisions by Judge Leo Irwin, 
Galazin v. Commissioner166 and Klutz v. Commissioner, 167 involving 
deduction versus capitalization and amortization of the cost of a calculator, 
probably reflect more of a doctrinal turf battle between the Tax Court and 
the then Court of Claims and taxpayer intransigence than disagreement with 
Cincinnati itself. In Galazin Judge Irwin read Cincinnati as resting on two 
legs: ''the expenditure be relatively small in size and relatively large in 
number."168 Galazin nevertheless allowed a current deduction for the cost 
of a used calculator on the grounds it was relatively minor ($52.45) and the 
Commissioner conceded that the calculator was relatively short-lived (two 
years). In contrast, the calculator in Klutz cost $75 and with a useful life 
conceded to be five years. Judge Irwin required capitalization. The real 
problem in Klutz was that the taxpayer appears to have been a tax klutz 
exhausting the court's patience. 169 
instruments and equipment, the useful life of which is short, may be deducted." Treas. Reg. § 1.162-6 
(as amended 1960). Cincinnati, N.O. & Tex. Pac. RR, supra, noted the "insubstantiality" underlying the 
current deductibility by mine operators of the cost of items of plant and equipment necessary to maintain 
the mine's normal output 424 F.2d at 569; see also Treas. Reg.§ 1.612-2(a) (as amended 1960). 
165. Joe Spellman, On The Road Again: Goldberg Pushes His Simplification Plan, 48 TAX NOTES 
1214, 1215 (1990). 
166. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 851; T.C. Memo 1979-206. 
167. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 724; T.C. Memo 1979-169. 
168. /d. In the earlier Klutz, Judge Irwin merely noted that in Cincinnati, "the relative size of the 
expenditure is only one factor taken into account for purposes of determining whether the assets may be 
currently deducted." /d. In any event, reflection on Sharon leads to the conclusion that a lot of costs 
is not a prerequisite for deducting minor costs as not income distorting. /d. 
169. 
It is unclear whether this case is a result of confusion or stubbornness on the part of petitioner. 
He has been audited nearly every year since 1962. Also, he has apparently been apprised of 
the necessity of maintaining adequate records. However, in 1973, he failed to do so. This 
lack of substantiation is the crux of respondent's case. 
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Effectuation of ''rough justice" under a minimum distortion of income 
standard would dictate a carve-out from a strict minimum distortion rule for 
relatively small expense items. General Counsel Memorandum 34,959,170 
resulting from the study of the decision in Cincinnati, 171 expensing items 
other than railway ties costing less than $500 ($1,563 in 1990 dollars), 
examined the taxpayer's reliance upon the Interstate Commerce 
Commission's minimum capitalization rule172 to justify deducting the 
costs of small items. 173 This Gen. Couns. Mem. noted that the general 
capitalization rule of Section 263 was not "immutable," but that departures 
may be justified in "prescribed and limited circumstances."174 This 
principle led the Gen. Couns. Mem. to conclude that the Service should 
provide for all taxpayers a minimum capitalization rule as to purchases of 
tangible personal property (generally $100 per item in 1972 dollars175 or 
$313 in 1990 dollars) with safeguards to prevent distortion of taxpayers' 
income. 176 (This is largely covered now as to moderate purchases of 
depreciable tangible personal property generally by taxpayers with smaller 
income or at least smaller capital purchases which can be expensed under 
Section 179.) Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,959 reasoned that Section 461 's 
directive that a taxpayer take into account income and deductions in the 
proper tax year under her or his "method of accounting" was subject to the 
Section 446 proviso that such method clearly reflect income. 
Thus, while we believe those provisions provide authority for the 
Commissioner to prohibit deductions where such is necessary to prevent a 
Klutz, 38 T.C.M. 724. 
170. (July 25, 1972). 
171. 424F.2d 563. 
172. It allowed regulated taxpayers to currently deduct expenditures incurred in acquiring items 
with a cost of less than $500 under Section 162. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,959. 
173. /d. 
174. /d. (noting that Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-3 and 1.461-l(a)(3) "provide recognition that 
expenditures that are capital in nature may be deducted if this treatment does not materially distort 
income"). 
175. "In addition, if a taxpayer's accounting method allows expending of more costly items, even 
though they have a useful life in excess of one year, and such method is generally accepted by the 
accounting profession for that industry and produces no distortion of income, use of such method should 
be permitted." Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,959. "A taxpayer that elects to expense currently small 
items acquisitions should be deemed to have elected to treat such items as "current assets", and to the 
extent any amount realized on their disposition represents an amount deducted previously it should be 
treated as ordinary income under the tax benefit rule." /d. 
176. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,959. Note that the recommended minimum capitalization rule was 
for deduction of small items less than $100 rather than the Interstate Commerce Commission's $500 
rule. /d. Today that the lesser amount would not exempt capitalization of minor items such as office 
supplies/equipment with useful Jives of less than three years. /d. 
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distortion of taxable income, we also believe they provide authority for the 
Commissioner to permit certain deductions where a deduction is seemingly 
proscribed by a particular provision of the Code. 177 
The difficulty in the "insubstantiality" test lies not in its theory, which 
is recognized by certain statutory provisions, but rather in determining 
"insubstantiality" as to the particular taxpayer and the tax year. While the 
cases explicitly relying on the doctrine have involved a $20-$500 range, the 
Claims Court has viewed $15,000 as insubstantial (at least compared to 
$300,000). 178 Perhaps if the amount is large enough in the abstract it must 
be capitalized even if it is not so great compared to total revenues or 
expenses. Wolfsen Land and Cattle suggested that absolute amount of the 
expenditure militated towards capitalization. 179 
2. Short-lived Benefits 
In Southland Royalty Co. v. United States180 the taxpayer, an oil and 
gas company, currently deducted the cost of an oil and gas reserve survey 
used in current operations, with an uncertain and short useful life. 181 The 
177. !d. 
178. Compare Cincinnati, 424 F.2d 563, with Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 
7 Cl. Ct. 220 (1985). 
179. Wolfsen Land & Cattle Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1, 17 (1979) ("redredging every 10 
years cost as much as original construction-the magnitude of the expenditures themselves" is relevant 
to whether it produced independent value). The Service waffies. Compare Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15-004 
(Dec. 17, 1992) ("In determining whether a repair is incidental, courts look to the nature of the work in 
relation to the taxpayer's operations, and not solely to the cost of the work performed.") with Tech. Adv. 
Mem. 94,24,002 (Feb. 9, 1994) ("The taxpayer argues that the expenditures at issue are minor relative 
to the cost of its oil field, and thus, these expenditures are incidental. However, we believe that the 
scope of work performed was massive in view of the overall operations. For example, the elevation [of 
a seawall around an offshore oil facility] project involved 72 sub-contractors from 10 different countries, 
15,000 people, over 100 jacks and 200 hydraulic units, and took 16 months to complete. The barrier 
wall took 7 months to construct and 17 ships were required to tow these two-ten-story structures into 
place. (The required towing strength was record-breaking, 180,000 horsepower.] Further, the value of 
these expenditures relative to the cost to replace the facility is also not incidental. For these reasons, we 
do not consider these expenditures incidental. . . . The total elevation project cost approximately 
$471,000,000 and the barrier wall cost approximately $547,000,000. The taxpayer estimates that the 
current cost to replace the facility is $5,000,000,000."). Professor Lee is most pleased to have brought 
Wolfsen Land & Cattle into the National Office's repertoire. 
180. 582 F.2d 604, 616-18 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (Surveys of the kind at issue, while providing some 
future benefits (three to four years), were used in current operations to make income projections, develop 
short- and long-term budgets, arrange financing, and prepare reports to shareholders and regulatory 
authorities). Much of the following discussion in text is taken from Lee, Clear Reflection of Income, 
supra note 2, at 18-20. 
181. /d. at 616. Misidentification of cost with nonarnortizable assets has been a longstanding 
problem. Gunn, supra note 2, at 446. 
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government disallowed the current deduction for the survey, but disavowed 
prior survey decisions that capitalized such survey costs as part of some 
underlying property, 182 instead arguing that the cost must be capitalized 
because the survey itself had a useful life lasting beyond the taxable 
year. 183 The Court of Claims allowed the deductions because they were 
"functionally part of, and indistinguishable from, expenditures for ordinary 
management planning," noting that the reserve survey was not used to 
determine whether oil drilling was feasible, prior to acquiring the mineral 
interest. 184 If the company had obtained the mineral interest, the survey 
cost would have constituted part of the cost of such interest (under the 
acquisition cost doctrine). 185 The court looked to "matching expenditures 
to the income resulting from a capital transaction" as a function of 
capitalization, but found amortization inappropriate because the surveys were 
subject to change at any time and were updated every few years, and hence, 
capitalization without amortization would distort the taxpayer's income. 
Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-45-002 186 provides an excellent analysis of the 
short-term future benefit factor particularly as supported by Sun 
Microsystems. 
Further support for not requiring pre-opening costs to be capitalized 
under section 263 is found in the fact that the costs appear to generate 
predominantly short-term benefits. In general, expenditures to produce 
current income are deductible currently even though some incidental future 
benefit may result. See Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57 (advertising costs 
generally deductible); Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Commissioner, 
592 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1979), aff'g 68 T.C. 872 (1977); Three-in-One Oil 
Co. v. United States, 35 F.2d 987 (Ct. Cl. 1929) (advertising that increases 
sales is not a capital expenditure); A. Finkenberg's Sons, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 17 T.C. 973 (1951); Rev. Rul. 74-318, 1974-2 C.B. 14 
182. Southland, 582 F.2d at 616-17. 
183. !d. at 617, n.20. 
184. For discussion of the treatment of recurring expenditures incurred in the acquisition of capital 
assets, see Lee, Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 2, at 67-71. 
185. Southland noted that it was: 
The useful life of the [oil and gas reserves] survey is very uncertain; as the trial judge found, 
the estimates in a reserve study are subject to change at any time and have to be updated every 
few years to take account of subsequent developments [such as the effect of pumping out oil 
and gas]. In those circumstances, it is not compulsory to amortize such a recurring item over 
a fixed time-interval. Neither is it appropriate to require capitalization without amortization; 
such a requirement would clearly distort Southland's income. 
Southland, 582 F.2d at 618 (footnote omitted); see also Iowa-Des Moines Nat'! Bank v. Commissioner, 
592 F.2d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 1979) ("Where the prospective benefit is very slight, capitalization is not 
easily supported."). 
186. Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-43-002 (June 21, 1996). 
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(advertising to sell cars deductible); Rev. Rul. 69-510, 1969-2 C.B. 23 
(cost of cars given to customers as a prize deductible); Rev. Rul. 56-181, 
1956-1 C.B. 96 (advertising as part of opening new sales territories 
deductible). In A. Finkenberg's Sons, an installment dealer was required 
to currently deduct promotion and advertising costs to obtain new 
customers because there was a direct relationship between amounts 
expended and income. Current deduction was required as "[a] substantial 
part of the thrift club expenses produced immediate results which are 
impossible to segregate from prospective results." 17 T.C. at 982-983. 
Thus, expenditures that result in immediate sales generally are deductible 
currently even if some incidental future benefits also result. 
The importance of current sales is also demonstrated by two cases 
decided after INDOPCO. Fidelity Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. 
Memo. 94-142 (1994); Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. 
Memo. 93-467 (1993). Commissions paid to salespersons for obtaining 
sponsors were held to be currently deductible in Fidelity. The Tax Court 
reached this result even though the sponsorship agreements were for 
two-year periods and sponsors could elect to pay the taxpayer over two 
years. The court reasoned that the contractual right to receive payments 
over two years, standing alone is not a sufficient reason to classify the 
commissions as capital expenditures. In reaching this result, the court 
noted that dealers are specifically authorized to deduct commissions by 
section 1.263(a)-2{e). Similarly, in Sun Microsystems, the Tax Court 
allowed a current deduction for the cost of stock warrants issued to the 
buyer of computer workstations as an incentive to induce the purchase of 
the workstations. The court reasoned that the possible development of a 
long-term customer relationship was an "incidental future benefit" when 
compared with the immediate benefits of selling the workstations. Fidelity 
and Sun Microsystems show that whether immediate sales result from an 
expenditure remains an important factor after INDOPCO in determining 
whether the expenditure is deductible currently under section 162 or must 
be capitalized under section 263. 
B. Steady State Recurring Costs 
Several decisions analyzed the current deduction of recurring expenses 
benefiting several tax years as not distorting the taxpayer's income. In 
Davee v. United States, 187 the taxpayer conducted a market research 
service using continuous surveys compiled from nation-wide panels of 
representative physicians. This data was assembled in the form of periodic 
publications distributed to American pharmaceutical and ethical drug 
manufacturers. In 1962, taxpayer initiated essentially the same operation in 
187. 444 F.2d 557 (Ct. Cl. 1971). 
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France, paying a French management consulting firm over $12,250 in 1962 
and $2,350 in 1963 to obtain French sources of such data. The Court of 
Claims noting nearly $10,000 for the same services from 1962 to 1963, 
stated that "[i]t is reasonable to conclude in this case that the expenditures 
made by Davee [the taxpayer] in 1962 were largely nonrecurrent and, 
therefore, non-deductible, and those made in 1963 were recurrent and 
deductible. "188 
The Service has for far longer than Professor Lee knew back then 
favored a recurring expense safe harbor pointing to various judicial opinions. 
In a host of unpublished rulings189 and a few published rulings190 the 
188. !d. at 567. 
189. See reasoning in Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,116, pp. 18-20, 28-9 (Nov. 14, 1972) (costs of 
establishing a credit card system)( citing Davee, 444 F.2d at 557) (ijln examining Briarcliff in light of 
Davee, supra, we believe it worthy of note that the expenditures described as capital in Briarcliff would 
generally be incurred on a nonrecurring basis. It is therefore evident that although Briarcliff did not rely 
on Davee or employ its rationale in reaching its decision, the two cases are consistent and serve to 
supplement each other. Both are useful in arriving at the proper conclusions for treatment of expenses 
in marginal cases."), and Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,483 (March 5, 1986) (the "L'Eggo" or package design 
GCM) (citing Davee, 444 F.2d 551). More recently the outstanding analysis of capitalization and 
indication of approval of a balancing test in Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-38-002 (June 3, 1996), may reflect the 
impact of the submissions pursuant to Notice 96-7. That TAM also cited Encyclopaedia Britannica, 685 
F.2d at 217, for "[t]he distinction between recurring and nonrecurring business expenses [as providing] 
a very crude but perhaps serviceable demarcation between those capital expenditures that can feasibly 
be capitalized and those that cannot be." 
See also Mountain Pager Products Corp. v. Commissioner, 287 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 
1961 )(nonrecurring nature of expenditures a factor in determining that capitalization was 
appropriate); Rev. Rul. 89-23, 1989-1 C.B. 85 (recurring or nonrecurring nature of costs is an 
important factor in distinguishing capital expenditures from currently deductible costs); Rev. 
Rul. 73-463, 1973-2 C.B. 34, amplified by Rev. Rul. 94-70, 1994-2 C.B. 17 (distinguishing 
stock issuance expenses of an open-end investment company from other stock issuance expenses 
because the purpose of the open-end investment company is to raise capital on a continuing 
basis in its day to day operations). Thus, the recurring nature of costs is an important factor 
to be considered in determining whether an amount is to be capitalized or currently deductible. 
Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-38-002 (June 3, 1996); accord, Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-45-002; Tech. Adv. Memo. 
95-35-011 (May 15, 1995) (citing Encyclopaedia Britannica, 685 F.2d 212) (''we do not believe that the 
nonrecurring nature of the prudency audit justifies characterizing the p~dency audit costs as capital 
expenditures"); Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-37-006 (April24, 1992) (citing Encyclopaedia Britannica, 685 F.2d 
212, Davee 444 F.2d 551, and Central Texas Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181 (5th 
Cir. 1984)); Priv. Letr. Rul. 92-36-021 (June 8, 1992) (citing Encyclopaedia Britannica) (recurring short 
week benefits paid to laid off employees currently deductible). 
190. Rev. Rul. 89-23, 1989-1 C.B. 85, 87 (explaining current deductibility of advertising costs 
"either because they are of a recurring nature or because their benefit does not extend beyond the tax 
year,'' citing Davee, 444 F.2d 551); Rev. Rul. 73-463, 1973-2 C.B. 34, 35 (semble) ("the unique 
circumstances which permit shareholders of an open-end investment company to withdraw their capital 
from the company on demand leads to the conclusion that continuous capital raising efforts by the 
company after the initial stock offering period is an essential part of its day to day business operations."); 
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Service has stated that the recurring or nonrecurring nature of the costs with 
future benefits serves as a useful basis for distinguishing ordinary business 
expenses from expenses that are in the nature of capital expenditures, 
regardless of the type of expense at issue including institutional advertising. 
At the same time, a survey of older rulings reveals that the Service has gone 
back and forth on capitalization. For instance, in Gen. Couns. Mem. 
33,784,191 considering Rev. Rul. 68-561, the Service addressed bonus 
payments or cash allowances paid by utilities to contractors, builders, and 
home owners to encourage construction of, or conversion to, all electric (or 
all gas) homes, apartments, motels. etc., proposing a current deduction as 
advertising costs. The Chief Counsel disagreed, concluding that "where the 
acquisition of new customers can be attributed directly to particular 
expenditures, those expenditures must be capitalized since they have resulted 
in the acquisition of a benefit extending into subsequent years, i.e., the 
increased earning capacity to be generated from the new customers 
obtained."192 The Memorandum suggested amortization over the useful 
lives of the buildings benefitted by the incentives. 193 Significantly, Gen. 
Couns. Mem. 33,784 also addressed capitalization of other payments by the 
utilities to its staff in administering the bonus payment program and for an 
accompanying advertising promotion. 194 The Chief Counsel's office 
expressed, as it turned out justifiable, concern as to how capitalization of 
such advertising costs and a portion of the utilities' salaries to administrators 
would fare in the courts due to administrative difficulties with amortization 
of such capitalized costs. 195 Next, Tech. Adv. Mem. 69-05269-380A, in 
Rev. Rut. 96-62, 1996-53 I.R.B. 6, 7 (Dec. 30, 1996) (semble) ("training provided in the ordinary course 
of a taxpayer's trade or business"). 
191. Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,784 (March 29, 1968). 
192. Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,784 (March 29, 1968) (the primary question presented by the proposed 
ruling is whether or not the "incentive payments" (''bonus payments" or "cash allowances") made by the 
utility-taxpayers in the instant cases are advertising expenses deductible as ordinary and necessary 
business expenses or are capital in nature and have value extending substantially beyond the taxable years 
in which they were paid or incurred."), considering Rev. Rul. 68-561, 1968-2 C.B. 117; accord Gen. 
Couns. Mem. 34,558 (July 31, 1971), considering Rev. Rut. 71-469, 1971-1 C.B. 120. Increased earning 
capacity also finds some case-law support Mid-State Prod. Co. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 696, 714 
(1954). Professor Lee has always thought that tack proved too much. See John W. Lee, A Blend of Old 
Wines in a New Wineskin: Section 183 and Beyond, 29 TAX L. REv. 347,462 (1974) (Lee, "Section 
183"). In Part 1 we traced that thought through Bittker's Treatise to Judge Posner's Encyclopaedia 
Britannica. 
193. Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,784. 
194. /d. 
195. Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,784, at 20, 24. 
As to the remaining items referred to above we have some reservations as to 
whether we could support capitalization of such expenses in a court test, although we 
recognize that the Houston Natural Gas case appears to lend support to the position 
1532 OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23 
considering improvement and maintenance of a utility's transmission and 
distribution system limited the recurring exception to payments "realized and 
exhausted within the taxable year."196 This would in effect eliminate the 
steady-state recurring expenditure exception to future benefit capitalization. 
In 1972, in Gen. Coun. Mem. 35,116, the Chief Counsel's Office 
considered a taxpayer's establishment of its own credit card system followed 
by its subsequent unrelated conversion into a national credit card 
system. 197 Costs included a feasibility study, implementation costs 
incurred prior to the initial issuance of the credit cards, and conversion 
costs. 198 The Chief Counsel rejected the taxpayer's contention "that its 
taken in the proposed G.C.M. The items relating to salaries of representatives and to 
advertising costs do not appear to be as closely connected to the acquisition ofbenefits 
to be realized over a period lasting substantially beyond one year as do the bonus 
payments. In the case of salaries, the expenditures could be said to be in payment for 
the services currently being rendered by the utility's representatives. Certainly the 
connection with any further benefit to be realized in the form of increased 
consumption of electricity is somewhat tenuous. Moreover, it would be difficult to 
establish a direct connection between the advertising expenses and increases in the 
future consumption of electricity. Because of the difficulty inherent in establishing 
this connection, several cases have held that the expenditures should be charged off 
to expense in the year that they were paid rather than capitalized. E.g., Consolidated 
Apparel Co., 17 T.C. 1570 (1952), rev 'don another issue 207 F.2d 580, 53-2 USTC 
~9586 (1953); F.E. Booth Co., 21 B.T.A. 148 (1930); Richmond Hosiery Mills, 6 
B.T.A. 1247 (1927), affd 29 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1928), cert. denied 279 U.S. 844 
(1929). We are also somewhat concerned that the proposed position requiring 
capitalization of salary and advertising expenditures could logically be extended to 
other businesses and industries where traditionally an expense deduction has been 
allowed. 
Another objection to requiring that the salaries and advertising costs be capitalized 
is the difficult task of determining the useful life of the asset acquired. The proposed 
G.C.M. suggests that the maximum useful life in the case of incentive payments would 
be the useful life of the building involved. Since the salaries and advertising costs do 
not appear to be related to any particular building such a guideline could not be used 
in this area. 
In regard to the allowance or discounts that grants to its employees who convert 
their homes to electric heating, we believe that these items could just as easily be 
construed as designed to benefit the employees rather than to increase the future 
consumption of electricity. 
/d. at 17-19. 
196. Tech. Adv. Mem. 69-05269-380A (May 26, 1969). 
197. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,116 (Nov. 14, 1972). Professor Lee independently came to much the 
same conclusions or at least considered the same precedents in Lee, Section 183, supra note 193, at 461-
64. 
198. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,116. Implementation acts incurred prior to the initial issuance of 
credit cards included: 
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banking and credit card operations constitute one 'trade or business' for 
purposes of Code § 162(a)."199 The ruling under consideration proposed 
allowing a current deduction for (1) administrative costs and staff salaries 
for permanent employees assigned to the credit card operation; (2) the cost 
of the promotional materials for credit cards; (3) (television, radio, 
newspaper and other) advertising expenditures incurred in issuing both credit 
cards; and ( 4) a cardholder establishment fee (the first three of which would 
seem to follow from Gen. Coun. Mem. 33,784).200 The Chief Counsel 
disagreed with the proposed ruling, but concurred that expenses of 
establishing subsequent credit card accounts and of periodic renewal of 
established credit card accounts were deductible under Section 162(a) in the 
year incurred.201 Analyzing the classic start-up cost authorities, Gen. 
Coun. Mem. 35,116 concluded that the taxpayer "entered into a new and 
additional trade or business when it engaged in the activity of issuing credit 
cards and performing credit card services."202 It explained Briarcliff 
Candy on the basis of the recurring nature of the expenses (although it 
noted that the Second Circuit had that argument before it and failed to 
address it in the opinion).203 In 1975, the National Office rulings division 
addressed a Cleveland Electric llluminating fact pattern, concluding in Tech. 
Adv. Mem. 75-090-994-40A on the basis of same/new business precedents 
discussed in Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,116, that the training costs as to the 
taxpayer's first nuclear power plant were "start-up costs ... [:] those unusual 
one-time costs incurred in commencing a new venture. The costs are 
incurred with the expectation that any benefits will be derived in future 
periods, rather than during the period in which the costs are incurred. Such 
expenses must be capitalized under section 263."204 It held that the 
nuclear power electricity generating plant was a new business different from 
the taxpayer's existing fossil fuel generating plant.205 
!d. 
(1) payroll and related costs incurred to solicit and obtain participation by merchants 
in its program; (2) administrative costs and staff salaries for permanent employees 
assigned to the operation; (3) cost of printing credit cards, mailing costs and cost of 
promotional materials enclosed; ( 4) television, radio, newspaper, and other advertising; 
(5) initiation fee to join • • • association • • • and (6) costs of decals and other 
display items distributed to merchants. 
199. !d. 
200. Tech. Adv. Memo. 72-122-901-20. This cite is in the General Counsel Memorandum (GCM) 
but computer research only brings it up in the GCM itself. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,116. 
201. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,116. 
202. !d. at 11. See supra note 193. 
203. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,116, at 29, n.16. 
204. Tech. Adv. Mem. 750-90-994-40A (Sept. 9, 1975). 
205. !d. 
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At the approximately same time the Service was considering the start-
up costs/same business expansion fact patterns, it also examined tax shelter 
transactions where it similarly took a strict doctrinal approach, emphasizing 
even more the distortion of income principle underlying the 
capitalization/amortization concept. 206 The distortion of income analysis 
is particularly good and looks as our Submission did at the general principle 
at work across several doctrinal sets of rules.207 
The Service in its private rulings initially relied upon the start-up cost 
and related doctrines to deny current deduction of business expansion 
costs.208 Then explicitly in response to the 1970s failure in the courts of 
the Service's credit card establishment as start-up cost contentions, in 1980 
Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,410/09 implicitly but not explicitly reversing Gen. 
Couns. Mem. 35,116,210 adopted the separate asset doctrine as to 
establishment of bank credit card systems and with it the notion that a 
geographic expansion in the same field did not create a separate asset.211 
206. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,961 (Dec. 21, 1976). 
207. /d. (The Service takes the position that a distortion of income results if a taxpayer deducts 
expenditures in years other than the year in which income attributable to these expenditures is realized. 
"G.C.M. 36,824, ••• 1-312-76 (Aug. 27, 1976); see also Rev. Rul. 60-358, 1960-2 C.B. 68. Put another 
way, in order to assure clear reflection of income, expenditures cannot be cu"ently deducted if they are 
expected to contribute more than incidentally to the realization of income in subsequent taxable years. 
G.C.M. 36,824, supra, at 2; see also O.M. 18,282, ••• 1-341-75 (Sept. 30, 1975), at 7-8; O.M. 17,736, 
••• 1-4333 (July 26, 1972), at 10-11. [The Service has taken a similar position in requiring amortization 
of prepaid expenses in order to prevent a material distortion of income. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-643, 
1968-2 C.B. 76, considered in Prepaid interest, 1-3207 (Nov. 25, 1968); Rev. Rul. 75-152, 1975-1 C.B. 
144, considered in Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,458, ••• 1-408-73 (Aug. 30, 1973); see also Commissioner v. 
Boylston Mkt. Ass'n, 131 F.2d 966 (1st Cir. 1942).] In the present case has deducted currently 
expenditures (i.e., the costs incurred in producing the films) in years other than those in which income 
attributable to these expenditures (i.e., payments received under the Production Agreements) is realized. 
Consequently, the practice of currently deducting these payments does not clearly reflect income.") 
(footnote combined in bracketed language with text; emphasis added). This was a shelter; for the 
opening salvo against abusive tax shelters, especially the inflated purchase price variant. See Gen. 
Couns. Mem. 36,577 (Feb. 26, 1976) (a position paper on "abusive" tax shelters), with attached O.M. 
18426 (Feb. 2, 1976), where the Chief Counsel considered such a transaction then in litigation as part 
of its real estate tax shelter program. The O.M. repeatedly cited Lee, Section 183, supra note 192, and 
more significantly addressed many of the issues it raised. When Professor Lee discovered this in 1992 
he could not have been more pleased. 
208. Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-42-007 (July 6, 1978) (carrying on a trade or business and holding 
ones' self out doctrine); Tech. Adv. Mem. 77-031-402-80A (March 14, 1977) (real estate precedent and 
functioning as a going concern test); Tech. Adv. Mem. 770-32-808-50A (March 28, 1977) (same). 
209. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,410 (June 18, 1980). 
210. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,116 (Nov. 14, 1972). 
211. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,410 (June 18, 1980). 
The costs incurred by the taxpayer in securing governmental regulatory approval to 
operate the branch facilities created or enhanced for the taxpayer a separate and 
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A host of business expansion technical advice memoranda followed.212 
distinct asset, which constituted a capital expenditure. Such costs, including for 
example, the application filing fees, legal costs, market feasibility surveys, could not 
be deductible under section 162. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,116. The other costs in this 
case did not create or enhance this asset, or any other asset, and accordingly, 
constituted deductible expenses under section 162. 
/d. at 15-16. 
212. Tech. Adv. Memo. 81-35-031 (May 29, 1981): 
For a cost to be capitalized under section 263 of the Code, it must create, enhance, 
or be part of the cost of acquiring or defending a separate and distinct asset or 
property interest with a useful life that extends substantially beyond the year in which 
the cost is paid or incurred. Thus, more than a mere future benefit or advantage must 
be created. See Lincoln Savings and Loan, supra. 
In Briarcliff Candy, supra, this rule did not require capitalization of advertising and 
promotional expenses attributable to a program of developing new retail outlets for 
the taxpayer's products. Similarly, in Colorado Springs National Bank, supra, 
capitalization of these expenses was not required when incurred in connection with the 
taxpayer's participation in a bank credit card system. In both cases, the desired future 
benefit was not considered a separate and distinct asset or property interest. It follows 
therefore, that the advertising and preopening rental expenses in this case are not 
separate and distinct additional assets, and accordingly may be currently deducted by 
the taxpayer. 
Nor is there any basis on which capitalization may be required of the merchandise 
distributed to new depositors. The taxpayer is merely expanding its existing business. 
No separate or distinct asset is created thereby. Rather, the distribution of small 
appliances and similar merchandise ofsmall or nominal cost to the taxpayer is merely 
a promotional effort to attract new accounts and deposits. Thus, like the advertising 
expenses, the costs of the promotional items are expenses of continuing and 
developing the taxpayer's existing business. Accordingly, these expenses are currently 
deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses under section 162(a) of the 
Code. 
No opinion was expressed as to treabnent of application fees, professional fees, market surveys, and 
allocated internal costs incurred in connection with obtaining regulatory authorization for the new branch 
locations, citing North Carolina National Bank v. United States in the district court. Accord, Tech. Adv. 
Mem. 84-23-005 (Feb. 8, 1984) (expenditures for (a) salaries and travel expenses of managers and 
opening team and of newly-hired employees during their training, and (b) advertising, polygraph tests, 
and rental of a space for training and interviewing as to 26 restaurants operated in various cities 
throughout the United States under the corporate taxpayer's tradename operated within its corporate form 
are not as "start up" costs, which 
are not incurred in an established business operation when the new activities are 
similar to current business activities. 'Start up' costs, however, may be incurred by an 
existing business if the new activities are distinguishable from those currently 
conducted by the business . . . No separate asset is created when the Company merely 
expands the identical business to a new geographical location.). 
Tech. Adv. Mem. 83-03-012 (Oct. 7, 1982), modifying reasoning but not result of Tech. Adv. Mem. 
82-04-61 (Oct. 28, 1981) 
(expenses incurred in developing operating procedures, testing new equipment, and 
recruiting and training a work force in connection with the establishment of a new 
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Tech. Adv. Mem. 81-41-033 distinguished between permit and promotional 
costs of establishing new branch facilities by an existing savings and loan 
association, with the former being capitalized as part of the costs of a 
separate asset, the permit.213 The latter promotion costs were currently 
deductible on the theory that the branch did not constitute a separate, new 
business.214 
With Government victories in Central Texas S&L and particularly in 
Cleveland Electric flluminating, the Service reversed course yet again, 
rejecting once more the separate asset doctrine in 1986 in Gen. Couns. 
Mem. 39,483215 requiring capitalization of package design costs (the 
L 'Eggo TAM) and rationalizing Briarcliff Candy and its bank credit card 
progeny in terms of recurring expanses which the Service had long-followed 
as a rough demarcation between capital and ordinary.216 
manufacturing facility [are] deductible under section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code 
when the taxpayer has similar existing operational plants in other locations .... The 
training cost here involved did not create or enhance a separate and distinct asset 
requiring the taxpayer to capitalize such cost under section 263 of the Code.). 
213. Tech. Adv. Mem. 81-41-003 (Dec. 6, 1978). Tech. Adv. Mem. 81-35-031 (May 29, 1981), 
served as the model for the analysis as to the promotional expenses as to the branches, while reserving 
opinion as to permit costs. 
214. 
The business activity of the taxpayer remained the same after the branch facilities 
were opened. It involved extending credit to customers and receiving deposits. That 
activity was conducted in the same manner at the main office and at the branch 
facilities. The taxpayer only geographically added to the locations at which it 
operated its pre-existing business. 
As a result, the costs in this case were not "start-up" costs requiring capitalization. 
Furthermore, some of the costs were incurred during the 30 day promotional 
campaigns, after the branch facilities were opened. Such costs are indistinguishable 
from other costs resulting from the current operation of a business. In the Richmond 
Television Corporation case, there was no dispute that costs incurred after the license 
was obtained were ordinary and necessary in nature, and thus deductible. 
Tech. Adv. Mem. 81-41-033. Similarly, Tech. Adv. Mem. 83-03-012 (Oct 7, 1982), modifying Tech. 
Adv. Mem. 82-04-061 (Oct. 28, 1981) (which reached the same result), held that geographic expansion 
to a new plant did not result in costs of developing operating procedures, testing new equipment, and 
recruiting and training a work force creating or enhancing a separate asset so that they were currently 
deductible); accord Tech. Adv. Mem. 84-23-005 (Feb. 8, 1984) (same as to 28 branch restaurants so long 
as operated by same entity) (''No separate asset is created when the Company merely expands the 
identical business to a new geographical location."). /d. 
215. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,483 (March 5, 1986), considering Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-11-005 (Nov. 
26, 1985) (capitalization of package design costs). 
216. The blackhole here of capitalization without amortization was covered over at least partially 
by Rev. Proc. 90-63, 1990-2 C.B. 664, which provides three alternative "exclusive" methods of 
accounting for package design costs: (I) capitalization without amortization, (2) design-by-design 
capitalization and sixty-month amortization, and (3) pool-of-cost capitalization and forty-eight-month 
amortization. See generally ISP Package Design Cost Settlement Guidelines, available in LEXIS, Fedtax 
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Important in distinguishing capital expenditures from ordinary 
expenses is the recurring or nonrecurring nature of the costs. Davee v 
United States, 444 F.2d 551 (Ct. Cl. 1971). Some advertising expenses can 
be currently deductible either because they are of a recurring nature or 
their benefit does not clearly and identifiably extend substantially beyond 
a year. However, nonrecurring promotional or advertising expenses 
resulting in benefits to the taxpayer extending beyond the year the expenses 
are incurred are properly regarded as a capital investment. Liberty 
Insurance Bank v Comm 'r, 14 BTA 1428 (1929); Northwestern Yeast Co., 
5 BTA 232 (1926); Alabama Coca-Cola Bottling Company v. Comm 'r, 
TCM 1969-123; ••• GCM 35116, 1-4895 (Nov. 14, 1972), modified on 
another issue by • • • GCM 38400, 1-4178 and 1-4895 (June 18, 1980). 
See Cleveland Electric llluminating Co. v. US, 7 Cl. Ct. 220 (1985), which 
held that advertising to lessen public's fear of nuclear plants had to be 
capitalized. 
Package design development costs are not akin to deductible 
advertising expenditures because they are not a recurring expense and they 
result in an asset that has a useful life of many years. A package design 
is developed when a product is first introduced and, although it may be 
modified occasionally, it is not usually changed on a regularly recurring 
basis. Further, the package design remains valuable for many years as the 
producer tries to establish both an enticing and uniquely recognizable 
package. 217 
Ironically, the ultimate resolution of the package design controversy 
was a compromise, suggested by the Assistant Chief Counsel Glenn 
Carrington as a model for resolving the general capitalization contro-
versy.218 This Article agrees. Revenue Procedure 90-63 provides three 
Library, TNT File, 93 TAX NOTES TODAY 179-33 (August 27, 1993). Then Assistant Chief Counsel 
Glenn Carrington once suggested as an alternative to facts and circumstances case-by-case ruling, "[a] 
second option ... to publish an analysis similar to that for package design, under which taxpayers would 
capitalize the costs and write them off over a period of five years or 10 years, Carrington said. However, 
IRS is concerned that many taxpayers would not buy into that system, he said. 'It may help people in 
the very gray area and other people would continue to do what they're doing and it won't be useful,' 
he said. "IRS Environmental Cleanup Guidance May be Out by July, Official Says, 1993 DAILY TAX 
REP. 89 diS (May 11, 1993). 
217. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,483, at 7-8. 
218. IRS Environmental Cleanup Guidance may be out by July, Official Says, 1993 DAILY TAX 
REP. 89 diS (May 11, 1993): 
First, IRS is considering whether to tailor revenue rulings to particular taxpayer fact 
patterns, according to Carrington. 
"Some would argue that maybe we should take the typical examples and publish revenue 
rulings addressing them, saying, 'If you fall within the four comers of these particular facts, 
the answer is x, y, z or whatever,"' he said. 
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exclusive alternative methods of tax accounting for taxpayers changing such 
method as to package design costs: (1) capitalization without amortization, 
(2) design-by-design capitalization and sixty-month amortization, and (3) 
pool-of-cost capitalization and forty-eight-month amortization.219 In a 
1993 Industry Specialization Paper on Package Design Costs the Service 
adopted this approach for settlement of cases in which audits raised this 
issue.220 
Following the fall of the separate asset test in the Service's rulings 
approach seven years before INDOPCO's final rejection, the National Office 
began to take strict approaches on the same business/new business issue 
which tended to push the issues more to Section 195 where the Service also 
flip-flopped on when a business begins for purposes of Section 195. In 
Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-31-001 the National Office suggested that in light of 
INDOPCO business expansion costs might not be currently deductible. 221 
Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-45-002 subsequently provided extensive analysis of the 
deductibility of start-up costs of new stores opened in the same business 
across the United States. Geographic separation of the stores was not 
discussed.222 Rather the Tech. Adv. Mem. properly focused on the 
recurring nature of the store opening costs and short-term future benefits. 
The published ruling, Revenue Ruling 96-62, in digest fashion considered 
only the employee training costs emphasizing the ordinary course of the 
/d. 
A second option would be to publish an analysis similar to that for package design, 
under which taxpayers would capitalize the costs and write them off over a period of five 
years or 10 years, Carrington said. However, IRS is concerned that many taxpayers would 
not buy into that system, he said. "It may help people in the very gray area and other people 
would continue to do what they're doing and it won't be useful," he said. 
Asked whether IRS believes it has regulatory authority to "arbitrarily" require 
capitalization over a fixed period, such as five years or I 0 years, Carrington responded, "It 
would be arbitrary, but we've done arbitrary - reasonably arbitrary - things in the past." 
Third, IRS is exploring the adoption of the presumption that taxpayers would capitalize 
the expenditures if they already would capitalize them under the rules under generally 
accepted accounting principles, according to Carrington. 
219. Rev. Proc. 90-63, 1990-.2 C.B. 664 (Dec. 18, 1990). 
220. IRS Approves Settlement Guidelines in Food ISP, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, lNT 
File, 93 TAX NOTES TODAY 179-33 (Aug. 27, 1993). 
221. Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-31-0001 (April 23, 1993). 
222. Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-45-002 (June 21, 1996). 
1997] RESTATING CAPITALIZATION STANDARDS 1539 
taxpayer's business.223 This connotes recurring, but not near so clearly as 
Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-45-002. More's the pity. 
Professor Lee has argued for the past decade that current deduction of 
steady-state regularly recurring costs does meet the clear reflection of 
income standard under a balancing of (a) simplicity and avoidance of 
administrative costs of such deduction with (b) the more clear reflection of 
income from instead capitalizing and depreciating such costs.224 A recent 
excellent analysis of the doctrine so holding is contained in Tech. Adv. 
Mem. 96-38-002225 which extensively quotes Judge Richard Posner's 
famous steady-state rationale in Encyclopaedia Britannica.226 
We can think of a practical reason for allowing authors to deduct their 
expenses immediately, one applicable as well to publishers though not in 
the circumstances of the present case. If you are in the business of 
producing a series of assets that will yield income over a period of years--
which is the situation of most authors and all publishers--identifying 
particular expenditures with particular books, a necessary step for proper 
capitalization because the useful lives of the books will not be the same, 
may be very difficult, since the expenditures of an author or publisher 
(more clearly the latter) tend to be joint among several books. Moreover, 
allocating these expenditures among the different books is not always 
necessary to produce the temporal matching of income and expenditures 
that the Code desiderates, because the taxable income of the author or 
publisher who is in a steady state (that is, whose output is neither 
increasing nor decreasing) will be at least approximately the same whether 
his costs are expensed or capitalized. Not the same on any given book--on 
each book expenses and receipts will be systematicallymismatched--but the 
same on average. Under these conditions· the benefits of capitalization are 
unlikely to exceed the accounting and other administrative costs entailed 
in capitalization.227 
Recurring payments alone may not justify an immediate deduction 
when the benefits obtained from the expenditures lack a similar recurring 
pattern. If a substantial useful life remains when the taxpayer next incurs 
223. Rev. Rut. 96-92, 1996-53 I.RB. 6. The implications of the hints in this ruling are discussed 
in Part I. TEl appreciates that the ruling can be used by a knowledgeable advocate to retain a current 
deduction for a number of [recuning] expenses. Timothy J. McCormally, Rev. Rul. 96-62: A Lump of 
Coal or a Nicely Wrapped Present?, 74 TAX NOTES 797 (Feb. I 0, 1997). Mr. McCormally is General 
Counsel and Director of Tax Affairs for Tax Executives Institute. 
224. Lee, Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 2, at 18-20; Lee, 1993 Hearings, supra note 2, 
at 1699 (Prepared Statement of Professor John Lee). 
225. (June 3, 1996); accord, Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-45-002. 
226. Encyclopaedia Britannica v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212,217 (7th Cir. 1982). 
227. !d. at 215 (dictum). Implicitly Judge Posner was hypothesizing an aggregate approach to 
recuning future benefit costs. 
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the recurring expense, the recurring expense is not incidental. The objective 
of minimizing income distortion seeks to match expenses with the income 
they produce. 228 Mismatching occurs when expenditures of a fairly 
constant amount produce benefits that are disproportionally realized in future 
years: immediate deductions understate income in early years when the 
benefits occur in later years. In these situations, the duration of the future 
benefits properly requires taxpayers to consider capitalizing the costs as 
directed by INDOPC0.229 
The Eighth Circuit encountered this mismatching problem of recurring 
expenditures with substantial benefits bunched in later years in Black Hills 
Corp. v. Commissioner.230 In Black Hills, several coal mining companies 
formed · an entity designed to indemnify any of its members for their 
employees' black lung disease claims. 231 Each member paid this separate 
entity a relatively constant annual premium, based on that mining company's 
individual exposure, calculated as the present value of projected liabilities 
throughout the anticipated life of the mine.232 In the event that a company 
closed a mine before its anticipated closing date, that mining company faced 
an "early termination charge" equal to the difference between the total 
projected annual premiums due and the premiums actually paid. 233 
Despite the relatively constant payment schedule, the mining companies 
expected claims primarily during the last year of a mine's operation.234 
This delay occurred because miners often continue to work after contracting 
the disease. 235 The discrepancy in timing between the premium payments 
and actual claims produced a reserve intended to satisfy the resulting claims 
in the mine-closing year.236 
228. See Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 16 (1974). 
229. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 87 (1992) ("[A] taxpayer's realization of 
benefits beyond the year in which the expenditure is incurred is undeniably important in determining 
whether the appropriate tax treatment is [an] immediate deduction or capitalization."). 
230. 73 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 1996). 
231. /d. at 800-01. The mining companies formed this entity to comply with the Federal Coal 
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 that required mines to carry commercial insurance or qualify to self-
insure against compensation, medical, and other beneficial payments to employees that contract black 
lung disease. /d. 
232. /d. at 801-02. The initial premiums included components for anticipated future liability and 
for claims expected to arise from past operations. /d. at 802. Both of these components were adjusted 
annually to account for fund income, expenses, claims, and balances on nonrefundable terminated 
accounts. /d. 
233. /d. at 801. 
234. /d. 
235. /d. at 800-01. 
236. Black Hills, 73 F.3d at 801. 
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Contrary to the taxpayer's insurance premium characterization, the 
Eighth Circuit determined that the taxpayer failed to shift the risk of loss 
produced by an early mine closing to the separate entity.237 Upon the 
early closing of a mine, the mining company needed to make an additional 
payment-the early termination charge-to cover any liabilities not funded 
by the prior premium payments. 238 This payment structure left the risk of 
loss on the individual mining companies.239 The excess of the annual 
premiums over the year's actual losses, therefore, represented a prepayment 
for the mine closing year.240 By failing to diminish its risk exposure, each 
mining company could expect future benefits in future periods as these 
prepayments satisfied its ultimate liability for claims from its mines.241 
Thus, the recurring nature of the premium payments alone could not justify 
an immediate deduction when the benefits were not expected until future 
periods. 242 
I. Recurring How Often? 
Professor Lee has long surmised that a four year cycle goes beyond 
pushing the envelope on currently deducting steady-state recurring costs to 
tearing it open. His students can recite that substantial case law and 
administrative authority supports expensing costs recurring every three 
years243 (in a non-tax shelter context~ the classic illustration is repainting 
every three years.244 Similarly Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,102 reasoned that 
237. /d. at 807. 
238. /d. 
239. True insurance premiums would account for the risk of an early closure and would place the 
risk of this closure on the insurer; by requiring an additional payment upon an early closure, the risk 
remained with the individual mining companies. /d. 
240. /d. 
241. /d. The court also accepted the Tax Court's determination of significant future benefits 
obtained from a refund provision and a guaranteed option to renew the contract /d. 
242. This simultaneous existence of recurring expenditures and benefits does not imply that 
"income" must be produced in the traditional sense of the word. Recurring expenses may be incurred 
despite the lack of any actual income. For example, a company can incur routine selling expenses 
without actually making a sale to generate any income. See Cabintaxi Corp. v. Commissioner, 63 F.3d 
614, 619 (7th Cir. 1995). The typically continuous nature of these sales expenses justify an immediate 
deduction because they are intended to generate income in the current year. See id. 
243. Professor Lee must admit that Darryl like his other co-submitters is an exceptional tax student 
with the added insight from studying most of the substantive documents cited in our Submission and 
drafting many of the footnotes. But Lee has more objective proof in old exam answers tackling Moss 
and Cleveland Electric-based hypotheticals raising similar borderline issues of cyclical and regularly 
recurring costs. Then to Professor Lee's delight, he found a GCM discussing capitalizing and amortizing 
as a deferred charge or expensing of redredging costs repeated every 3 years. See note 245 infra. 
244. Cf. Wilbur's Estate v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 322, 327 n.6 (1964), acq. 1965-2 C.B. 7. 
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[a]fter further consideration of the problem we fully realize that 
characterization of expenditures incurred in a silting removal operation as 
either "expense" or a "capital improvement" is not free from doubt. Of 
course we still feel that an expense characterization is the only proper 
classification where complete redredging is accomplished on an annual 
basis. However, classification becomes suspect where silt is removed every 
three years as in *** or one-third of the operation is accomplished every 
year as in Commodore's Point. In either case, whether the removal of silt 
accumulated during the prior three years benefits the current year or 
benefits the succeeding three years conjures visions in legalistic semantics 
and often as not the barnyard may wear an entirely different hue when 
interpretative chickens come home to roost. In either event both sides of 
the coin have merit. Moreover, leaving Rev. Rul 68-483 unchanged 
removes the necessity for withdrawing our longstanding acquiescence in 
Commodore's Point. 
In view of the foregoing we offer no objection to publication of Rev. 
Rul. 68-483 without the clarification suggested in G.C.M. 33994. G.C.M. 
33994 is accordingly modified.245 
Furt4er, after Wolfsen Land and Cattle recurring every ten years 
indisputably requires capitalization; and some reasoning in Service 
unpublished rulings, and the five year depreciation of the costs of repairing 
irrigation gates in Wolfsen Land and Cattle as well as a lot of statutory 
guideposts such as Sections 195, 248, etc., support capitalization and 
depreciation where a five year cycle is present.246 Four years, which is 
245. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,102 (Apri117, 1969)(emphasis added). See Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,006 
(Jan. 2, 1969), considering Rev. Rut. 71-121, 1971-1 C.B. 80. 
246. Wolfsen Land & Cattle, 72 T.C. at 13 n.4 (depreciating as intangible over 5 years cyclical 
costs of repairing irrigation ditch gates every five years). Congress beginning with Section 248 of the 
1954 Code (60-month amortization of formation costs of corporation) followed by Section 709 (same 
for partnership) and Section 195 (60-month amortization of start-up costs) show a Congressional pattern 
of providing 60-month amortization for self-created intangibles where case law did not readily provide 
deduction or depreciation. Purchased intangibles under Section 197 have a much longer amortization 
period of 15 years due to pay-go revenue neutrality constraints. There case law was an ali-or-nothing 
crap shoot, nothing or pretty short depreciation if customer-list, etc., treatment could be achieved. 
Government Accounting Office, Tax Policy, Issues and Policy Proposals Regarding Tax Treatment of 
Intangible Assets (Aug. 9, 1991), available in LEXIS, Fed tax Library, TNT File, 91 TAX NOTES TODAY 
169-1 (Aug. 31, 1991) 
([T]he current tax treatment of intangible assets is based on the original income tax 
law and decades of conflicting court decisions .... The vague definition of goodwill, 
as well as taxpayers' latitude in determining useful life, has led to frequent disputes 
between taxpayers and IRS. Some of these disagreements have been resolved in the 
courts, where the decisions have been influenced by the most convincing evidence. 
This situation has resulted in inconsistent treatment of similarly situated taxpayers.). 
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the cycle for FAA required reconditioning of aircraft engines involved in 
Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-18-004, thus constitutes the hard question. Glenn 
Carrington, then Assistant Chief Counsel (Income Tax & Accounting) and 
known as an expert on capitalization, is quoted by the BNA Daily Tax 
Report as providing "[i]n his personal opinion" a similar framework for 
analyzing deductibility of recurring expenses: 
As Wolfsen pointed out, if [the taxpayer] had cleaned the PCBs every 
year, it would have been deductible. But if you've waited four or five 
years, it's not. I gotta draw the line. I've got to say, 'If you do it every 
second year, you're fme. If you wait six years, it's not .... 247 
2. Recurring Less Frequently and Freestanding Depreciable 
Intangible 
What if the cycle is longer than four years or whatever is the ceiling 
on recurring? The distortion of income which results from adding a 
recurring cost to a longer-lived or nonamortizable asset, under the rationale 
that it constitutes an acquisition cost of the business as a whole, can be 
avoided by relying on the basic fmancial accounting concept of treating the 
expense itself as an amortizable asset or deferred charge.248 Assets, for 
financial accounting or balance sheet purposes, include both the economic 
resources of the enterprise and certain deferred charges that are not 
resources. If an expenditure may not be expensed in its entirety in the year 
paid, the cash assets of the enterprise are reduced and the portion of the 
expenditure that cannot be currently expensed is treated as a separate, 
noncash asset on the balance sheet. 249 Thus, the NCNB I court noted that: 
In order more accurately to reflect income, both in the present period 
and in future accounting periods, the carried-forward "assets" of an 
enterprise include, without regard to whether they are tangible or 
How much better it would have been had the Commissioner followed the Chief Counsel's rough justice 
solution of Cohan approximations. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,262 (Jan. 30, 1970), considering Rev. Rul. 74-
456, 1974-2 C.B. 65. Professor Lee too has long favored Cohan approximations as an answer to 
recurring and other temporally limited expenditures without a definite life as an alternative to the income 
distorting horns of the capitalization (without depreciation) versus expensing dilemma. Lee, Clear 
Reflection of Income, supra note 2, at 38-41. 
247. Official Gives Update on Series of Guidance on Tax Accounting Issues, 1993 DAILY TAX 
REP. 46 d6 (March II, 1993). 
248. See Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Cl 220, 229 (I 985); cf Madison 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 521, 566 (1979), affd, 633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980). The 
following discussion is taken in large part from Lee, Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 2, at 32-36. 
249. NCNB Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 942,949 (4th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter NCNB 1], rev'd, 
NCNB II, overruled, INDOPCO. 
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intangible, certain expenditures for benefits whose cost has already been 
incurred but the outlay for which is nevertheless most properly matched 
against some future period's revenues which the benefits will help 
produce. 250 
In short, in financial accounting the expenditure itself may be treated 
as a separate asset or deferred charge to be expensed, or in tax terms 
"depreciated" or "amortized," in future tax periods.251 In the start-up and 
business expansion areas, such amortization of recurring costs as a 
free-standing asset, without regard to whether incurred in starting up a new 
business or expanding an existing business, provides a "golden mean" 
avoiding the ali-or-nothing extremes of the talismanic separate, saleable asset 
(current deduction) or preparatory (capitalization without amortization) 
approaches. 252 
The Tax Court in Wolfsen Land & Cattle53 treated a recurring 
expenditure with a limited life as such a separate, amortizable, intangible 
asset to avoid the distortion of income that would have followed from 
associating the expenditure with the nonamortizable asset it enhanced. 
Wolfsen Land & Cattle considered the deductibility of substantial 
expenditures, which the taxpayer incurred every ten years, for draglining an 
earthen work irrigation system with an indefinite life. 254 These substantial 
expenses resulted from the taxpayer's allowing the system to deteriorate 
until it became almost dysfunctional, rather than annually repairing and 
maintaining it. 255 The court noted: 
Thus, we are faced with something of a conundrum, how do we treat 
a maintenance-type expense substantial in amount, which only restores its 
subject to its original operating condition, yet need be repeated only on the 
average of every 10 years and is performed on a subject of indefmite life. 
To permit a current deduction of such a large expenditure with a 
beneficial effect lasting on the average of 10 years would surely distort that 
years's [sic] income. Yet to deny even an amortization deduction for an 
expenditure with a specific demonstrable beneficial life on the ground that 
its deductibility is contaminated by its relationship to an asset of indefmite 
life, i.e., the land, would similarly require an uneven reporting of income. 
250. /d. 
251. Gunn, supra note 2, at 445 (citing Miguel A. De Capriles, Modern Financial Accounting, pt. 
I, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1001, 1020-21 (1962)). 
252. See NCNB II, 684 F.2d at 294-95 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (Judge Murnaghan was author 
of the reversed panel opinion). 
253. 72 T.C. I (1979). 
254. /d. at 8. 
255. /d. 
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Since a basic premise of the income tax laws is to relate expenses to 
the income which they helped earn, a reasonable solution to our 
conundrum is to hold that the expenses in issue should be written off over 
their useful life. In short we would subscribe independent status to those 
expenditures on the basis that they create a free-standing intangible asset 
with an amortizable 1 0-year life. 2s6 
The treatment of certain recurring expenses as a separate asset, even 
though such expenses are incurred in the acquisition of a nonarnortizable 
asset, is not inconsistent with Idaho Power.251 The Supreme Court in 
Idaho Power required (1) capitalization of the "depreciation" allocable to 
equip-ment the taxpayer used to construct capital improvements and (2) 
addition of the capitalized amounts to the basis of such improvements.258 
The Court sought to prevent the distortion of income that would result from 
cur-rently deducting "depreciation" costs properly allocable to assets that in 
the future would produce income themselves.259 The Court also sought 
to maintain tax parity between a taxpayer that did its own construction work 
and a taxpayer that purchased the work from an independent contractor, 
which in turn charged its construction equipment depreciation to the tax-
payer as an element of the total cost of the services.260 However, alloca-
tion of a temporally limited expenditure to the basis of a substantially 
longer-lived asset, or an asset with no determinable life, produces distortion 
of income. If a recurring expenditure-such as employee training in a 
workforce with high turnover-is added to the nonarnortizable basis of a 
new or expanded business, a distortion of income is produced;261 this is 
not the situation in Idaho Power. Distortion will also exist when an 
expenditure with a shorter-term benefit is incurred in connection with the 
acquisition of an asset with a longer term. In Idaho Power the expenditures 
in question benefited the depreciable assets, created with the machinery, 
256. /d. at 13 (foolnote omitted). Gunn, supra note 2, at 446, perspicaciously suggested just this 
approach. The NCNB I panel came close to this approach. NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 942. 
257. The Seventh Circuit intimated a conflict between distortion of income analysis and Idaho 
Power. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212,215,217 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, 
J.) (discussing Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. I (1974) (Blackmun, J.)). Lee, Clear 
Reflection of Income, supra note 2, at 34-36, argues that the resolution is to treat the costs as the 
acquisition costs of an amortizable deferred charge rather than as the acquisition cost of the business or 
some other long lived asset.. Thus employee training costs at a new plant should have been treated as the 
cost of the work force itself rather than of the plant or an operating license associated with il !d. 
258. 418 u.s. I. 
259. /d. at 14. 
260. /d. 
261. See Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 633 F.2d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 1980). 
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over their entire useful life, in effect creating a construction cost of the 
assets. 
The deferred charge or separate asset approach is consistent with 
basic tax concepts such as the "separate basket" approach to transfers of a 
going business and to "component" depreciation. Under the firmly 
established "separate basket" rule, 262 the sale or acquisition of a business 
is not treated as the transfer of a single asset; rather, the business is 
fragmented into its components, with each asset given separate treatment on 
both the sale and purchase side.263 Accordingly, even under an acquisition 
cost approach, start-up as well as internal and external business expansion 
costs should be separated into their components for "tax parity" purposes, 
with those items providing benefits for a shorter period than the useful life 
of the business (which usually is indefinite) being treated as separate assets 
to be expensed or amortized according to clear reflection of income 
principles. For instance, if a taxpayer purchases an ongoing business that 
possesses short-lived recurring assets (usually already expensed by the 
seller)/64 e.g., tools, supplies, or recurring marketing surveys, then the 
purchaser-under the ''basket of assets" fragmentation approach, involving 
transfers of a going business-will be allowed to deduct currently the 
external cost of such items in the year of purchase. Technically, perhaps,· 
the deduction may be considered depreciation or amortization of the cost in 
its entirety in the acquisition year because its determinable life is one year 
and as such can be amortized fully within one year under section 167.265 
Accordingly, treatment of internal costs for short-lived recurring expansion 
or start-up expenditures as a separate asset, to be expensed or amortized 
under clear reflection of income principles, does not conflict with Idaho 
Power. 
262. Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1945). Judge Learned Hand concluded 
that "upon the sale of a going business it is to be comminuted into its fragments, and these are to be 
separately matched against the definition [of 'capital assets' in the predecessor to § 1221 (I)]." /d. This 
principle is now codified in Section 1060. See I.R.C. § 1060. 
263. See Peter Faber, Allocation of Purchase Price on Acquisitions; Recapture; Going Concern 
Value, 39 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 6-1 (1981); Patricia Ganier, Treatment ofGoodwill: Allocating a Lump 
Sum Purchase Price Among Mixed Assets of a Going Business, 7 J. CORP. T AX'N Ill (1980); Richard 
Leighton, Tax and Accounting Problems on the Purchase of a Basket of Assets, 28 INST. ON FED. T AX'N 
75 (1970). 
264. Under the "tax benefit'' doctrine, the seller would recognize income (probably) equal to the 
prior deduction. See Hillsboro Nat'! Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983). 
265. See Lee, Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 2, at 50 n.219. 
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3. Recurring How Often? Aggregate Basis 
Courts and the Service have ruled that some variation in annual 
amounts with annually recurring costs can occur without precluding a 
current deduction.266 The Court of Claims in Cincinnati, in approving a 
de minimus exception to the future benefit/capitalization presumption 
explicitly applied an aggregate approach. 267 The critical question is 
whether current deduction of an expenditure will result in more than 
minimal distortion of income.268 If not, and the burden of capitalization 
266. Moss v. Commissioner, 831 F.2d 833, 842 (9th Cir. 1987Xtax consequences should not be 
drastically altered minor variations in the hotel taxpayer's pattern of annual capital replacements and 
repairs. "Given that the Hotel must completely remodel its interior every three to five years in order to 
remain competitive, there may be sound business reasons why the taxpayers or management may wish 
to accomplish the bulk of capital replacement in a particular year rather than spreading it out evenly over 
each year in the cycle."); see Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-37-006 (Apri124, 1992) (recurring costs for prudency 
audit varied year to year); Tech. Adv. Mem. 81-36-001 (Feb. 27, 1980) (recurring without 
"disproportionate changes"); Tech. Adv. Mem. 74-013-1140A (Jan. 31, 1974) (sharp decrease in annual 
expenditure indicates that under Davee non-recurrent). 
267. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. v. United States, 424 F.2d 563, 572 (Ct Ct. 1970): 
Where the burden on both taxpayers and Service to account for each item of property 
separately is great, and the likelihood of distortion of income is nil or minimal, the 
Code is not so rigid and so impracticable that it demands that nevertheless all items 
be accounted for individually, no matter what the trouble or the onus. 
/d. (emphasis supplied). 
268. The seminal commentary in the area of capital expenditures developed the thesis that "a 
determination of whether capitalization of an expenditure is necessary to clearly reflect income . . . 
[should be] substituted for the usual proc6ss of determining whether the expenditure produces an asset," 
and that expensing small items does not distort the taxpayer's income, Gunn, supra note 2, at 452; 
accord Lee & Murphy, supra note 2. Gunn bottomed his analysis here on Judge Tannenwald's opinion 
in Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 275, 283-84 (1967) ("sections 263 and 446 are 
inextricably intertwined. A contrary view would encase the general provisions of section 263 with an 
inflexibility and sterility neither mandated to carry out the intent of Congress nor required for the 
effective discharge of respondent's revenue-collecting responsibilities"); accord, Cincinnati, 424 F.2d 
563, and Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604 (Ct Ct. 1978); Gen. Couns. Mem. 
34,959 (July 25, 1972) (recommended minimum expensing rule as not distorting income). Professors 
Bittker and Lokken suggest in their treatise on federal income taxation that, in the final analysis, the way 
to decide whether costs should be expensed or capitalized is to focus on which approach more clearly 
reflects income. "[T]he best remedy ... is to focus on whether income will be better reflected by 
deducting or by capitalizing the amount in question. This ... has the virtue of emphasizing the basic 
objective of the relevant statutory provisions rather than secondary guideposts." See Bittker, supra note 
157, at 20-67. 
Gunn also raised the possibility that capitalization is not appropriate in this context when 
amortization is not available. Gunn, supra note 2, at 492-95; cf. Note, Deductibility of Start-Up 
Expenditures Under Section 162-Ihe "Clear-Reflection-of-Income" Test, CORNELL L. REv. 618, 621 
n.21, 625 n.42 (1976) (proposing as an alternative factor to future benefit the question whether the 
expense is recurring, in the context of distortion of income; but principally arguing that reliance upon 
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and amortization will be heavy, the expenditure should be currently 
deducted in its entirety in the year made.269 Such minimal distortion is 
produced by the current deduction of an expenditure with future benefits 
where (1) the expenditure produces future benefits that are (a) short-lived, 
(b) de minimis, or (c) recurring steady state costs (with a useful life 
corresponding with the replacement cycle) or (2) capitalization-cum-
depreciation is not administrable by taxpayers or the Service. 
The timing standard and implementing rules advocated below are 
supported, with one exception, by case law and various National Office 
documents as well as the Solicitor General Office's Brief and argument in 
INDOPCO (as to the current deduction legs of the model). That exception 
arises as to the amortization leg-uniform amortization periods for classes of 
self-created intangibles. This article argues that such a uniform amortization 
period is within the Commissioner's authority to require that the taxpayer's 
method of tax accounting (which includes expensing and capitalization 
practices) "clearly reflect income". The guiding standard should be 
minimum distortion of income, effecting ''rough justice" rather than more 
exact matching of income and expense which would entail more 
administrative difficulty. 
The small taxpayer's burden of establishing that an item is currently 
deductible would also be lessened by a small item exception to 
capitalization. This notion is especially true since most smaller businesses 
with limited resources rely upon the relatively expensive judgment of 
outside professionals, the scope of whose services are limited by concepts 
of materiality, concerning the classification of expenditures for tax 
accounting purposes. 270 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) for determining current deduction versus 
capitalization would avoid distortion of income). Essentially, this was the approach taken in NCNB I, 
651 F.2d at 961. One thesis of Lee, Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 2, at 21-24, is that 
accounting concepts, e.g., treating a cost as an amortizable deferred charge, are useful in clearly 
reflecting income, but "currency" or even "capitalization" does not incorporate GAAP per se. Lee, Clear 
Reflection of Income, supra note 2, at 21-24. 
269. See Cincinnati, 424 F.2d 563; see also Iowa-Des Moines Nat') Bank v. Commissioner, 592 
F.2d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 1979); Southland Royalty v. United States, 582 F.2d at 618. Some tribunals 
stress heavily the ''burden" of capitalization/amortization in attempting to distinguish between current and 
future use. E.g., Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Ct. Ct. 220, 234-35 (1985); cf 
NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 961 (vacated panel opinion). These courts focus on the "burden" rather than 
determining the total period benefitted (useful life). 
270. The economic burden placed on the small taxpayer to have every expenditure analyzed as 
to whether it provided benefits beyond one year would certainly warrant at least some exception for 
minor expenditures for such taxpayers. 
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C. Cu"ent Deduction if Amortization Unavailable 
The Court of Claims (now the Federal Circuit) correctly believes that 
capitalization, depreciation, and clear reflection of income are "inextricably 
intertwined," with the ultimate question being the success of the taxpayer's 
method of tax accounting in clearly reflecting income.271 Not surprisingly, 
therefore, the Court of Claims held in Southland that capitalization without 
amortization was inappropriate where the recurring expenditures produced 
highly variable and relatively short-lived benefits,272 because such 
capitalization would distort the taxpayer's income. The distortion of income 
arising from capitalizing an investigatory or start-up expenditure - with 
future, but temporally limited, benefits - incurred while expanding an 
existing business and then adding such cost to the basis of a nonamortizable 
asset also clearly motivated the courts considering the bank credit card and 
branch progeny of Briarcliff to adopt the "separate, saleable asset" rule.273 
This definitional rule overruled by INDOPCO called for current deduction 
of expansion costs, notwithstanding future benefits, if no separate, 
transferable asset is created or enhanced by the expenditure. 274 An 
unarticulated premise was that a saleable or transferable asset usually will 
have a determinable life and, hence, be amortizable. 275 "Current deduction 
under the separate, saleable asset test of recurring expenditures producing 
short- or variable-term benefits does not distort the taxpayer's income. 
Hence, the test often results in 'rough justice. "'276 
Nevertheless, a current deduction of temporally limited expenditures 
does produce less distortion of income than capitalization without 
amortization.277 However, under the model, the answer is to supply 
amortization through liberal approximation of useful life, rather than a 
current deduction that is more income distorting than amortization over the 
approximate period benefited. Often the lack of amortization arises from a 
failure to allocate properly the capitalized cost. The early start-up cases 
271. Cincinnati, 424 F.2d at 569 (relying on the decision in Fort Howard Paper Co. v. 
Commissioner, 49 T.C. 275, 283-84 (1967)). See generally Gunn, supra note 2, at 453-54. 
272. Southland, 582 F.2d at 618. 
273. Lee, Qear Reflection of Income, supra note 2, at 51-57. 
274. Lee, Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 2, at 51-57. 
275. See John P. Warner, Deductibility of Business Expansion Costs- NCNB Corp. v. U.S., Tax 
Mgmt Mem. No. 81-22 (BNA) 2, 8 (Nov. 22, 1981 ); Lee, Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 2, at 
25. 
276. Lee, Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 2, at 25. 
277. A commentator has suggested that a current deduction should be allowed "whenever 
capitalization would distort income more than current expensing." Note, Commissioner v. Lincoln 
Savings & Loan Association: "Separate and Distinct Asset" As a Condition Sufficient for Capitalization, 
2 VA. TAX REV. 315, 333 (1983). If this is the only choice, we agree. 
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allocated the capitalized expenditure to non-amortizable assets, 278 
triggering some distorted, antithetical doctrine279 and much critical 
commentary.280 Only recently have the courts properly suggested that 
such expenditures should be examined category by category under traditional 
capitalization factors. 281 The Service initially permitted in Tech. Adv. 
Mem. 75-909-9440A282 amortization of capitalized new plant employee 
training costs over the life of the building in which the workforce was 
employed.283 Contemporaneously Tech. Adv. Mem. 75-042-81070A284 
also capitalized "start-up costs" of a new plant in an existing business of 
manufacturing and selling lumber, plywood, particleboard, hardboard, shakes 
and shingles and other basic building materials creating an intangible asset-
"an operational fiberboard plant." The Memorandum classified employee 
training costs for the new plant as not currently deductible "since they are 
essentially non-recurring expenditures necessary to commence initial 
operations.285 These costs similarly must be capitalized as part of the cost 
of establishing the operational fiberboard plant. "286 Subsequently during 
the period the Service followed the separate asset doctrine, a Tech. Adv. 
Mem. allowed a current deduction for the costs of developing operating 
procedures, testing new equipment, and recruiting and training a work force 
in connection with the establishment of a new manufacturing facility by a 
taxpayer with similar existing operational plants in other locations.287 The 
Tech. Adv. Mem. did not consider either the employee training costs or the 
operation at a new location as creating a separate asset. 288 
278. Lee, Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 2, at 45. 
279. Lee, Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 2, at 45-46, 51-57. 
280. Lee, Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 2, at 3-4 n.2 (authorities cited therein). 
281. Sealy Power, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 46 F.3d 382,400 (5th Cir. 1995); Lee, Clear Reflection 
of Income, supra note 2, at27-8 n.ll2. Cf. Cabintaxi Corp. v. Commissioner, 63 F.3d 614,619 (7th Cir. 
199 5) (Posner, J. ). 
282. Tech. Adv. Mem. 75-909-9440A (Sept 9, 1975). 
283. Chief Counsel was inclined to follow a proposed ruling by Technical that the costs of a joint 
venture to operate a first nuclear power energy generating plant were pre-operating costs and should be 
capitalized and amortized over the life of the facility, but declined to rule due to a pending GCM as to 
credit cards Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,116 (Nov. 14, 1972). Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,500 (April 5, 1978) 
(training cost not deductible, it must be capitalized and depreciated on a straight-line basis). 
284. (April 28, 1975). 
285. Tech. Adv. Mem. 75-042-81070A (April 28, 1975). 
286. I d. at 6-7 (emphasis supplied). 
287. Tech. Adv. Memo. 83-03-012 (Oct. 7, 1982), modifying Tech. Adv. Mem. 82-04-061 (Oct. 
28, 1981). 
288. 
The expenditures in the present situation can not be characterized as "start up" 
costs. "Start up" costs are not incurred in an established business operation when the 
new activities are similar to current business activities. "Start up" costs, however, may 
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With the Service's abandonment of the separate asset test, the issue of 
allocation arose again. Technical Advice Memorandum 94-30-003 took a 
much more sophisticated approach, properly treating permit costs and 
employee training costs incurred by a public utility as to a new and first 
nuclear power electricity generating facility as separate intangibles apart 
from the plant itself.289 Technical Advice Memorandum 94-30-003 
inadequately distinguished judicial precedents (and failed to consider earlier 
contrary Service rulings) capitalizing the costs of permits and licenses to 
specific related tangible assets on the grounds that they related "to 
construction and not to the right to operate a business. "290 (The earlier 
decisions were wrong.291) It properly concluded that both the direct 
permit costs and the costs of training the new workforce were separate 
amortizable assets, but incorrectly ruled that the proper period for 
amortization for both intangible assets was 40 years "because the NRC 
license [to operate a nuclear powered electricity generating plant] is limited 
to 40 years, the Taxpayer's business will terminate in 40 years."292 
Conventional wisdom holds that if an intangible such as a permit or license 
is renewable with reasonable certainty or as a matter of course, such 
intangible does not have a definitely determinable useful life and thus can 
not be amortized.293 On the other hand, the Service294 and courts295 
be incurred by an existing business if the new activities are distinguishable from those 
currently conducted by the business. This request does not concern an existing 
business that began a new activity unrelated to its prior business. Rather Company 
in its new facility is manufacturing the same basic products produced in all its other 
plants. 
Based on the facts in this case it is our opinion that the training cost here involved 
did not create or enhance a separate and distinct asset requiring the taxpayer to 
capitalize such cost under section 263 of the Code. 
Tech. Adv. Memo. 83-03-012 (Oct. 7, 1992). 
289. Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-30-003 (April 22, 1994). 
290. /d. 
291. Lee, Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 2, at 4 n.3; 31-8. 
292. Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-30-003. 
293. KWTX BroadcaSting Co., 31 T.C. 952 (1959), aff'd per curiam, KWTX Broadcasting Co. 
v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 406 (Sth Cir. 1959)(FCC license); Toledo TV Cable Co., 55 T.C. 1107 
(1971); Westinghouse Broadcast Co. v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 
U.S. 935 (1963); Pasadena City Lines, Inc. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 34 (1954), acq., 1955-1 C.B. 6. 
Cf Nachman v. Commissioner, 191 F.2d 934 (Sth Cir. 1951)(1iquor licenses); V. P. Shuffiebarger, 24 
T.C. 980 (19SS)(grazing rights); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1333 (1927); Dab 
v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 933 (1957), aff'd, 255 F. 2d 788 (C.A. 2, 1958); Tube Bar, Inc., v. 
Commissioner, IS T.C. 922, 930 (1950); Lassen Lumber & Box Co., v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 241, 
248 (1927); Letter dated October 14. 1994 to Glen A. Kohl from C. Ellen MacNeil, Arthur Anderson, 
on behalf of the Cellular Telephone Industry Association, available in LID{IS, Fed tax Library, TNT File, 
94 TAX NOTES TODAY 211-31 (Oct. 27, 1994) (renewal feature is taken into account for purposes of 
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often stretched to find that renewal was not likely, probably reflecting the 
unarticulated notion that a current deduction produces less distortion than 
capitalization without amortization. The TAM did not address whether the 
NRC permit was renewable, but experience in other regulated areas suggests 
that the NRC permits usually will be renewed. In short, in capitalizing 
recurring costs such as employee training, the Service seeks to find some 
asset with a more determinable life to serve as a surrogate for the life of the 
business. The above nuclear plant operating permit and the new plant itself 
are examples. Another illustration is the mysterious piping in the soil 
remediation TAM.296 So much better is the analysis in Tech. Adv. Mem. 
96-45-002: "These costs include the cost of stocking the stores with 
inventory and supplies, staff training, store promotional costs, utilities, rent 
. . . [T]he recurring nature of the these costs suggests that they should not 
be capitalized under section 263."297 The TAM further pointed to the 
predominantly short-term benefits produced as supporting a current 
deduction. 298 It also noted "that the cost of training employees generally 
is deductible under section 162."299 Therefore it allowed expensing of 
classic business expansion/start up in the same business costs. The 
determining a contract's term only where (1) the contract economically compels a contracting party to 
renew under lease-option authorities, see, e.g., M & W Gear Co. v. Commissioner, 446 F.2d 841 (7th 
Cir. 1971) (economic obligation to exercise purchase option where lessee risked losing investments); Rev. 
Rul. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 39 (economic obligation to exercise where purchase option price is nominal); 
or (2) such contract are extremely rarely not renewed.) Cf Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,607 (Aug. 28, 1984), 
considering Rev. Rul. 86-99, 1986-2 C.B. 159 (federal grazing privilege where readily renewable 
qualifies as an interest in real property for purposes of special use valuation under section 2032A). For 
probability of exercise in lease option arena see Gen. Couns. Mem. 36162 (Feb. 19, 1975). The Tax 
Court specifically stated in Cleveland Railway Co., v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 208, 211 (1937), that 
the same rationale governs leases, franchises, and contracts and affirmed that view in Harris-Emery Co., 
v. Commissioner 37 B.T.A. 958, 964-965 (1938). 
294. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,459 (Aug. 30, 1973) (permit was not renewable as a matter of course; 
one-third of renewal applications were denied), A contract is an intangible that may be depreciated under 
Section 167. Rev. Rul. 71-120, 1971-1 C. B. 79 (pipeline easement); Rev. Rul. 71-121, 1971-1 C.B. 
8 (reservoir and transmission line easement); Rev. Rul. 68-636, 1968-2 C.B. 92 (covenant not to 
compete); Rev. Rul. 67-379, 1967-2 C.B. 127 (baseball player contracts); Rev. Rul. 67-136, 1967-1 C.B. 
58 (patents and patent applications); Rev. Rul. 62-132, 1962-2 C.B. 73 (purchased life estate). 
295. Hoffman v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 176 (1967) (vending machine contracts amortizable over 
three years where the probability of renewal was uncertain and that possession of the contract itself did 
not carry with it any advantage in negotiating such renewal.); RichardS. Miller & Sons, Inc., v. United 
States, 537 F.2d 446 (Ct. Cl. 1976). 
296. See note 136 supra. Cf Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,247 (Jan 8. 1970), considering Rev. Rul. 70-
171, 1970-1 C.B. 55 (lifetime privilege to use hospital). 
297. Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-45-002 (Nov. 8, 1996). 
298. /d. 
299. /d. 
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published digest ruling, Revenue Ruling 96-62, narrows the discussion down 
to just that point of employee training costs.300 
D. Other Administrative Difficulties 
While Professor Lee was preparing this an earlier draft of article, a 
colleague brought to his attention an IRS audit of another colleague's 
prepublication costs as to non-academic books. Researching that area 
disclosed that application of the balancing test of burdens and benefits of 
capitalization can support a current deduction of costs with long-term future 
benefits even where the expenses are neither small nor recurring and 
depreciation is in theory available, e.g., costs of researching and writing by 
a one-shot author. Where the depreciation rules are unduly burdensome, as 
in the case of income forecast depreciation for an individual writer, the 
current deduction or some sort of safe harbor is in order, as discussed in a 
work in progress but not in our submission pursuant to Notice 96-7. 
V. SAFE HARBOR AMORTIZATION 
If a taxpayer can show that the benefits produced by the expenditure 
are temporally limited, although she may not be able to estimate that life 
with reasonable accuracy, logically she proves entitlement to a deduction 
equal to some percentage of the cost of the expenditure creating the 
intangible. 301 Often useful life of a self-created intangible cannot be 
estimated with reasonable accuracy;302 therefore, the taxpayer cannot prove 
300. Rev. Rul. 96-62, 1996-53 I.RB. 6. 
30 I. More recently the Tax Court requires a ''reasonable basis" for approximation. See Norgaard 
v. Commissioner, 939 F.2d 874, 879-80 (9th Cir. 1991) (Tax Court correctly refused to permit deduction 
of estimated gambling losses from reported and unreported gambling income. ''Neither winnings nor 
losses can reasonably be estimated in the absence of a credible basis for doing so."). As the Ninth 
Circuit stated in a case where proof was similarly lacking, "to allow the Cohan doctrine to be invoked 
by the taxpayers would be in essence to condone the use of that doctrine as a substitute for the burden 
of proof. See also Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930). This the court will not do." 
Coloman v. Commissioner, 540 F.2d 427, 431-32 (9th Cir. 1976). Cf Norgaard v. Commissioner, 939 
F.2d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (''the rule of Cohan cannot be applied in the presence of unquantified, 
unreported winnings unless both winnings and losses are estimated."); Lerch v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 
624, 627-29 (7th Cir. 1989) (refusing to apply Cohan rule where taxpayer could have but failed to 
present evidence to support the claimed deductions); Epp v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 801, 807 (1982)). 
Tax shelter cases probably helped cause this "shift''. See infra note 311. Sounds like what got the Board 
of Tall Appeals reversed in Cohan in the first place. Hagen Investments, Inc. v. Commissioner, 92-1 U.S. 
Tax Cas. ~50,030 (lOth Cir. 1991) (mem.). See John Lee, Section 482 and the Integrated Business 
Enterprise, 57 VA. L. REv. 1376, 1390, 1397-99, 1407 (1971). 
302. 
Further, the ''not insignificant burden" of proving that the taxpayer's work-force-in-place 
intangible asset has an ascertainable useful life, and is a separate and distinct asset from other 
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exactly what percentage of the cost should be ratably deducted (e.g., ten 
percent if the useful life were in fact ten years or three percent if the useful 
life were in fact thirty-three years). This situation calls for approximation 
of the useful life of the deferred charge under the doctrine of Cohan v. 
Commissioner.303 Under Cohan, if the taxpayer proves to the fact finder 
that deductible expenditures are incurred in some amount, it must "make as 
close an approximation as it can, bearing heavily if it chooses upon the 
taxpayer whose inexactitude is of his own making."304 Thus, where the 
taxpayer proved that an intangible asset (an easement) was indeed a wasting 
asset, the Eighth Circuit in Northern Natural Gas Co. v. O'Malley held that 
some amortization deduction is mandated under Cohan.305 The court read 
a similar, but harsher, requirement as to the limited life of an amortizable 
intangible, imposed by a prior regulation, 306 as not requiring proof of the 
exact number of years the easements would continue. "We believe that all 
that is required is definite proof that the asset is one definitely undergoing 
exhaustion. The evidence clearly establishes that the rights-of-way will be 
usefui for taxpayer's purposes for only a limited period ... [T]he 
tangible and intangible assets as set out in Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, U.S. 
113 S. Ct. 1670, 1681 (1993), is met. 
Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-30-003 (April22, 1994)(permitting amortization of employee training costs at new 
nuclear power plant over 40-year NRC license; "Taxpayer's 'work force in place' will be obsolete and 
will have no value when the Plant's license terminates because the business of the Plant will end.") 
303. 39 F.2d 540. Cohan involved the deductibility of business expenses incurred by the famous 
theatrical manager and producer George M. Cohan. He claimed over $55,000 in entertainment and travel 
expenses in 1921-1922. 
304. /d. at 544. Some courts imply that once the Service has allowed a Cohan approximation, 
it can not be seconded guessed. Rodman v. Commissioner, 542 F.2d 845, 854 (2d Cir. 1976). 
305. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. O'Malley, 277 F.2d 128, 135, 138 (8th Cir. 1960). In Gen. 
Couns. Mem. 33,994 (Dec. II, 1968), considering Rev. Rul. 69-78, 1969-1 C.B. 61, Chief Counsel 
similarly followed a ''rough approximation" approach to depreciation of an intangible so long as there 
was some factual basis, if only a scintilla, upon which depreciation could be taken. Accord, Gen. Couns. 
Mem. 34,006 (Jan. 2, 1969), considering Rev. Rul. 71-121, 1971-1 C.B. 80; Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,015 
(April 22, 1969). 
that: 
306. The regulations promulgated under § 23(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 provided 
Intangibles, the use of which in the trade or business or in the production of income 
is indefinitely limited in duration, may be the subject of a depreciation allowance. 
Examples are patents and copyrights, licenses, and franchises. Intangibles, the use of 
which in the business or trade or in the production of income is not so limited, will 
not usually be a proper subject of such an allowance. If, however an intangible asset 
acquired through capital outlay is known from experience to be of value in the 
business or in the production of income for only a limited period, the length of which 
can be estimated from experience with reasonable certainty, such intangible asset may 
be the subject of a depreciation allowance. 
Treas. Reg. Ill, § 29.23(1)-3 (predecessor of Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3). 
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uncertainty relates to the length of the period. "307 Several decisions to the 
contrary have required the taxpayer to prove a reasonable basis for a Cohan 
approximation, particularly where the taxpayer's sole evidence as to amount 
was his testimony.308 Moreover, depreciation has been denied due to a 
failure in establishing an asset's useful life even though the asset would 
physically deteriorate or someday be retired from service. 309 
Although only rarely so acknowledged, the Cohan rule is an equitable 
one310 under which a court, unable to be precise in its findings, dispenses 
"practical justice," i.e., "rough justice," as best it can.311 The trier of fact 
is convinced that the taxpayer incurred some part of the claimed 
expenditure. Therefore, she allows a rough estimate of the allowable 
deduction. Similarly, useful life for depreciation under one view need not 
be established with certainty. Only a "reasonable approximation" or even a 
"rough estimate" is required.312 Application of distortion of income 
307. O'Malley, 277 F.2d at 135. 
308. See, e.g., Plisco v. United States, 306 F.2d 784, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1962); A. Fink! & Sons v. 
Commissioner, 38 T.C. 886, 904 n.l5 (1962); Masters v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1093, 1099-1100 
(1956). 
309. See, e.g., Burlington Northern, Inc. v. United States, 676 F.2d 566, 582 (Ct. Cl. 1982) 
(Kashiwa, J., dissenting) (describing the majority's finding that the assets involved were durable but 
would nonetheless become obsolescent); cf Coleman v. Commissioner, 540 F.2d at 431-32. 
310. Gen. Couns. Mern. 37,153 (June 7, 1977) (Cohan approximation by IRS) (Nov. 19, 1969, 
Memo attached thereto, p.l4) would encourage litigation. This is probably not the case with regulatory 
uniform amortization period once the regulations are sustained); Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,884 (July 22, 
1968). 
311. See Dowell v. United States, 522 F.2d 708,711 (5th Cir. 1975) (dictum); John L. Ashe, Inc. 
v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 13, 16 (5th Cir. 1954); Robinson v. Commissioner, 10 T.C.M. (CCH) 571 
(1951 ). Several courts have required a reasonable basis for judicial estimation under Cohan. See supra 
note 301. Generally courts have not permitted an "equitable" allocation not based on credible evidence. 
E.g., Union Stock Farms v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 712, 723-24 (9th Cir. 1959); Professional Servs. 
v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 888, 919 (1982); Honigman v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 1067, 1081 (1971). 
See also Groff v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 77 (1984). A major difficulty in determining the 
approach followed by a particular opinion - equity or reasonable basis - is that judges are unlikely 
to admit that they are making Cohan approximations without any ascertainable basis. For instance, one 
dissenting opinion charged the majority with making a Cohan approximation without any ascertainable 
basis, or even a citation to Cohan, and hence clothing the court with the ''power of an equity court'' that 
it did not possess. Ward v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 332, 345-46 (1953) (Withey, J., dissenting). 
312. Burnet v. Niagara Falls Brewing Co., 282 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1931); cf. United States v. 
Ludey, 274 U.S. 295, 302 (1927) (considering depletion). Useful life has been determined by Cohan 
approximations implicitly or explicitly. See, e.g., Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 
481 F.2d 1240, 1253-54 (5th Cir. 1973) (approximation of useful life without citing Cohan); Richard 
S. Miller & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 537 F.2d 446, 455-56 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (same); Wisconsin 
Psychiatric Serv., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 839, 852-53 (1981) (Cohan approximation of useful 
life); Joyce v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 13, 15-16 (1955) (Cohan approximation of reasonable allowance 
for depreciation). 
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analysis to the issue of current deduction versus capitalization and 
amortization supports the liberal use of Cohan to effect uniform 
amortization periods. 
Commentators readily suggested prior to Section 197 that the courts 
could approximate under Cohan the amount of the purchase premium which 
is amortizable and the appropriate amortization period.313 In reality, 
however, the Tax Court has found it relatively easy to make Cohan 
approximations only where the question was an allocation between a 
covenant not to compete and non-amortizable goodwill.314 Where, 
however, the question was allocation to non-amortizable going concern 
value review courts have on occasion required some rational basis for the 
Cohan approximation. 315 Moreover, the Tax Court has come to recognize 
the administrative as well as equitable problems with approximation.316 
Chief Counsel's Office once considered, prior to enactment of Section 
197, the advisability of establishing safe harbors for depreciation of 
purchased intangibles on the grounds that judicial use of Cohan 
approximations encouraged excessive litigation.317 Moreover, in Notice 
88-62 the Service provided elective 3-year safe harbor (50%/25%/25%) 
amortization of writer's prepublication costs.318 The tax treatment of 
package design costs is similar. Technical Advice Memorandum 86-11-005 
determined that package design costs of a unique container for women's 
hosiery products (the "L'Eggo" package319) had to be capitalized but did 
not qualify for the since repealed Section 177 elective 60-month 
amortization of trademark and trade name costs. 320 The taxpayer admitted 
that the costs created an asset with a life longer than 1 year, but argued that 
313. Lee, Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 2, at 38-40. 
314. See, e.g., Peterson Machine Tool, Inc. v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 72, 86 (1982); accord 
Levine v. Commissioner, 324 F.2d 298, 302 (3d Cir. 1963). 
315. See Concord Control, Inc. v. Commissioner, 615 F.2d 1153 (6th Cir. 1980), rev'g and 
remanding in part, T.C. Memo. 1976-301, 35 CCH T.C.M. 1345 (1976). 
316. See Messing v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 502, 512 (1967). 
317. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,262 (Jan. 30, 1970), considering Rev. Rul. 74-456, 1974-2 C.B. 65. 
318. Notice 88-62, 1988-1 C.B. 548 (May 13, 1988). 
319. George Mundstock, Taxation of Business Intangible Capital, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1179, 1198 
(1987). 
320. Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-11-005 (Nov. 26, 1985), considered Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,483 (March 
5, 1986) ("Package design development costs are not akin to deductible advertising expenditures because 
they are not a recu"ing expense and they result in an asset that has a useful life of many years. A 
package design is developed when a product is first introduced and, although it may be modified 
occasionaiJy, it is not usuaiJy changed on a regularly recurring basis. Further, the package design remains 
valuable for many years as the producer tries to establish both an enticing and uniquely recognizable 
package.") (Emphasis supplied). 
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the costs were currently deductible as "akin to advertising expenses."321 
The taxpayer also conceded that the package designs did not qualify as 
amortizable "trademarks" under then Section 177. Then Revenue Procedure 
90-63322 offered taxpayers three alternative methods of accounting for 
package design costs; (1) capitalization, (2) design-by-design capitalization 
and 60-month amortization, and (3) pool-of-cost capitalization and 48-month 
amortization. 
General Counsel Memorandum 34,959323 in recommending a "rough 
justice" expensing of all [tangible] items under a set ceiling relied upon the 
notion that Section 461 's directive that a taxpayer take into account income 
and deductions in the proper tax year under its "method of [tax] accounting" 
(which includes expensing and capitalizing practices324) was subject to the 
321. "Only when a particular package design is abandoned may the accumulated costs be written 
off." See I.RC. § 165 of the Code and Treas. Reg.§ 1.165-2(a)." Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-11-005. 
322. Rev. Pro. 90-63, 1990-2 C.B. 664. 
323. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,959 (July 25, 1972) ("In addition, if a taxpayer's accounting method 
allows expensing of more costly items, even though they have a useful life in excess of one year, and 
such method is generally accepted by the accounting profession for that industry and produces no 
distortion of income, use of such method should be permitted. . . . A taxpayer that elects to expense 
currently small item acquisitions should be deemed to have elected to treat such items as "current assets", 
and to the extent any amount realized on their disposition represents an amount deducted previously it 
should be treated as ordinary income under the tax benefit rule."). Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,162 (March 2, 
1984) took just such an approach as to Section 174 deductions for costs that created an intangible (a 
patent). The taxpayer sold patents and confidential technical information in discontinuing a product line. 
"[T]he tax benefit rule requires the taxpayer to characterize as ordinary income the amount of deductions, 
taken under section 174(aXl) of the Code, for R & D expenditures attributable to the property sold .... 
We believe that the taxpayer's sales of the patents and Confidential Technical Information are 
fundamentally inconsistent with the current deductions under section 174(a)(l )." Rev. Rul. 85-186, 
1985-2 C.B. 84, reached the opposite conclusion based upon Justice O'Conner's testing for fUndamental 
inconsistency by examination of Congress' purpose in providing the particular year 1 deduction when 
year 2 events are inconsistent with such deduction. 
/d. 
[B]oth purposes underlying section 174(a) were accomplished by allowing the 
taxpayer a current deduction for the research or experimental expenditures paid or 
incurred. The legislative purpose of encouraging research or experimental activity was 
accomplished in the year of the deduction because that is the year the research or 
experimental expenditures were paid or incurred. The legislative purpose of relieving 
the taxpayer of the obligation to allocate costs between amounts currently deductible 
and amounts required to be capitalized was accomplished in the year of the deduction 
because the taxpayer was allowed a deduction in that year for all research or 
experimental expenditures paid or incurred. It would be inconsistent with this 
legislative purpose to relieve the taxpayer of the obligation to allocate costs in the year 
of the deduction only to impose the obligation in the year of disposition of the 
resulting technology. 
324. Generally any consistent and predictable treatment of a material item of income or expense 
constitutes an accounting method, i.e., those procedures, processes, or practices regularly followed in 
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Section 446 proviso that such method clearly reflect income: Chief Counsel 
concluded that such a clear reflection of income standard authorized the 
Commissioner ·~to prohibit deductions where such is necessary to prevent a 
distortion of taxable income . . . [and] to permit certain deductions where 
a deduction is seemingly proscribed by a particular provision of the 
Code. "325 We believe that this reasoning supports the proposed de 
minimis and regularly recurring exceptions and this article argues the 
proposed capitalization with standard amortization periods for larger non-
regularly recurring costs. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Notice 96-7 the Internal Revenue Service requested written 
comments concerning 
(1) whether general guidance clarifying the fundamental principles of 
capitalization would aid in resolving capitalization issues; (2) what specific 
approaches, principles, or issues guidance should address; and (3) whether 
safe harbor amortization periods should be provided for certain 
capitalization expenditures and what data supports any suggested periods. 
Having thought about these very issues for years and testified on these 
very points Professor Lee thought that this Notice looked like it was written 
just for him. It was not. It more likely was written for TEL Professor Lee 
vehemently disagrees with Chief Counsel Stuart Brown that there is no 
"magic formula" for a global approach. There is strong evidence that Chief 
Counsel never intended to issue a global response, but only a narrow ruling 
or so and a broader Tech. Adv. Mem. or two. No regulation project was 
opened as to this area in 1996. On the other hand, the business expansion 
TAM was excellent and it and the training costs ruling permit TEl members 
determining taxable income, and the rules governing the timing of items of income, deduction, or credit 
which depend upon the taxpayer's method of accounting. Treas. Regs.§ 1.446-I(e)(2)(ii)(a) provides that 
a material item is any item which concerns the "timing" of income or deductions. Correspondingly, 
changes which do not affect timing are not changes in method. !d. § 1.446-l(e)(2)(ii)(b). Treas Reg. § 
1.446-1 (a) states that "the term 'method of accounting' includes not only the overall method of 
accounting of the taxpayer but also the accounting treatment of any item." A taxpayer's practice of 
capitalizing or expensing certain items constitutes a method of accounting. E.g., Rev. Rul. 95-74, 1995-2 
C.B. 36 (Nov. 13, 1995); Rev. Rul. 95-32, 1995-1 C.B. 8; Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,328 (Jan. 23, 1985) 
("A material item is [defined as) any item which involves the proper time for the inclusion of the item 
in income or the taking of a deduction. /d. Clearly, the taxes, interest and loan fees at issue constitute 
material items since the decision whether to capitalize or expense such items involves the appropriate 
time for taking a deduction."). 
325. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,959 (July 25, 1972). Similar administrative developments and 
reasoning occurred as to writers prepublication costs. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,968 (Nov. 18, 1968) 
and Notice 88-62, 1988-1 C.B. 548. 
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and other sophisticated large taxpayers to resolve favorably most questioned 
partial future benefit costs where current deduction would not distort their 
income. The 1997 Business Plan calls for guidance as to start-up costs, 
although again no regulation project has been opened. Conversion of the 
business expansion TAM into a broad ruling setting forth the standard of 
minimum distortion of income and the factors of small, recurring and near-
term future benefits might be a sufficient incremental step. But if Professor 
Lee hears that the Service is applying a broad future benefits capitalization 
to small taxpayers, represented by generalists at best, before at least 
published rulings setting forth such factors and preferably regulations along 
the lines advocated in this article are issued; he will reluctantly join those 
calling for a broad limitation rider applying to all future benefit costs 
traditionally deducted by small taxpayers prior to INDOPCO, until 
regulations are promulgated. It is very unfair to expect Main Street, much 
less rural route taxpayers to find answers in TAMs. This is what Professor 
Lee believes former Commissioner Mortimer Caplin meant in the Virginia 
Tax Conference Planning Session in November 1996 when he exclaimed 
"no TAMs," when we were describing the scope of a tax conference topic 
entitled "INDOPCO Comes to Main Street." As far as the split between 
National Appeals and Associate Chief Counsel, the Service should bear in 
mind former Chief Judge Lapsley W. Hamblen, Jr's admonition at the' same 
meeting-"Audit doesn't have to try them." 
